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Thesis Abstract 
 
We can distinguish different forms of attention, for example paying attention 
to what we are thinking about, paying attention to what we hear, and paying 
attention to what we see or otherwise visually experience. This thesis is 
concerned with the form of attention paid to what we visually experience – 
visual attention. A natural way to think of visual attention is as sufficient for 
visual awareness: visually attending to an object is sufficient for being 
visually aware of it. (Plausibly, the relationship is closer. Visual attention is a 
way of being visually aware.) But we shouldn’t think of visual attention as 
necessary for visual awareness: we can be visually aware of objects that we 
are not visually attending to. In this thesis I provide a novel defence of the 
pre-theoretical conception of visual attention as sufficient, but not necessary, 
for visual awareness. 
 
Some psychologists have interpreted evidence, in particular from 
experiments involving subjects with blindsight, as proof that visual attention 
to an object is possible in the absence of any visual awareness of it. I argue 
we should not think of these results as proving that attention is not sufficient 
for awareness, but instead see them as motivation for a distinctively 
philosophical inquiry into the role of visual attention. I examine different 
explanations of the significance of visual attention for thought and action, 
ending with my own. 
 
Other psychologists have claimed, on the basis of experimental data, that 
visual attention is necessary for visual awareness. I argue this is inconsistent 
with the phenomenology of visual experience, and with other experimental 
data. 
 
I conclude that visual attention is sufficient but not necessary for visual 
awareness. 
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Chapter 1: Setting the Scene 
 
In this chapter I begin by setting out what I take to be a 
recognisable pre-theoretical way in which we think 
about attention and awareness in visual experience. We 
can distinguish different forms of attention, for example 
paying attention to what we are thinking about, paying 
attention to what we hear, and paying attention to what 
we see or otherwise visually experience. This thesis is 
concerned with the form of attention paid to what we 
visually experience – visual attention. It is natural to 
think of visual attention as sufficient for visual 
awareness: visually attending to an object is sufficient 
for being visually aware of it. (Plausibly, the relationship 
is closer. Visual attention is a way of being visually 
aware.) But we shouldn’t think of visual attention as 
necessary for visual awareness: we can be visually 
aware of objects that we are not visually attending to. 
Some psychologists have interpreted experimental data 
as showing that visual attention is necessary but not 
sufficient for visual awareness. This thesis aims to 
defend the pre-theoretical conception described. 
 
1. Initial Motivations 
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Those of us with normally functioning vision are able to think about and act 
with respect to our immediate physical environment on the basis of seeing it. 
We are able to think about and act with respect to particular objects in our 
immediate environment on the basis of visually picking them out: someone 
may draw my attention to the book I am looking for, allowing me to visually 
pick it out from the pile of books surrounding it. Conversely, our visually 
picking out or attending to a particular object becomes intelligible when it is 
for the purpose of thought or action.1 However, visually attending to one 
object needn’t mean losing sight of surrounding objects. I can attend to a 
particular book among a pile of books for the purpose of thinking about it, or 
acting with respect to it, while remaining aware of the other books 
surrounding it. This way of thinking about the relationship between attention 
and awareness in conscious visual perception has implications for the 
philosophical understanding of conscious visual perception, as well as for 
understanding the explanandum of psychological research on attention. I’ll 
return to philosophical and psychological considerations shortly. Before that, 
I want to give a brief initial indication of what I mean by ‘visual awareness’ 
and ‘visual attention’. 
 
When I look around, I see a variety of objects of different shapes and 
colours, at varying distances and directions from me. This is true whether it is 
the clutter of books and papers on my desk, a scene of fields stretching 
                                            
1
 By ‘thoughts’ I mean the propositional content of a propositional attitude, such as believing 
or judging that something is the case, but I mean to restrict ‘thoughts’ to conscious thoughts, 
for example the propositional content of an occurrent belief or conscious desire. 
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down to a stream, or an unexpected face at the window. I am visually aware2 
of the books, the dog-walkers in the fields, and the face at the window – they 
figure in my visual experience. 
 
If you realise I am looking for a particular book on my desk, and you know 
where it is (no doubt buried under several others), you might draw my 
attention to it. If my attention is caught by an unexpected face at the window, 
I might be sufficiently startled to altogether cease paying attention to what is 
on the television, even if just briefly. Not only am I aware of what my 
attention is drawn to, caught by, or paid to, but I know that I am attending to 
it. Visual attention to our environment is part of our everyday experience, and 
part of our everyday use of language. It is this very pervasiveness that 
makes sense of the much quoted sentence from William James’ Principles of 
Psychology, “Everyone knows what attention is.”3 
 
James goes on to describe attention as 
 
“… the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, 
of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to 
deal effectively with others…”4 
 
                                            
2
 As I will use the term ‘visual awareness’, if I am visually aware of something I am 
conscious of it (though I can also be conscious of things that are not visual, but auditory, for 
example). My visual experience includes what I am (consciously) visually attending to – 
what I have visually picked out – and what I am visually aware of but not attending to. 
3
 James (1983) p. 381. 
4
 James (1983) p. 381-382. 
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In addition to perceptual (e.g. visual or auditory) attention, James also means 
to include the paying of attention to what we are thinking about, an example 
of which might be completing a mental calculation. Focussing attention on a 
mental activity or task need not require any perceptual input at all – 
calculating the product of two numbers could quite conceivably be 
accomplished without relying on perceptual awareness. Indeed, if the mental 
arithmetic is difficult, ignoring perceptual input while executing the calculation 
would be an instance of ‘withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others’. So visual attention is a type or form of attention, 
along with auditory attention (another form of perceptual attention), and the 
paying of attention to what we are thinking about (a non-perceptual form of 
attention). 
 
While we are familiar with non-perceptual attention, the relation between 
visual attention and intentional behaviour may not be as obvious. When we 
pay attention to something we see – visually attend to it, as I shall say – that 
object becomes the focus for one sort of intentional behaviour. The object 
becomes the focus for intentional behaviour for which vision is necessary – 
visually based intentional behaviour. If I am visually attending to an object, I 
am in a position to respond to it intentionally, and my response to it will take 
precedence over my response to anything else I might also be seeing. So, 
for example, if I am looking for a particular book among a pile of books, I will 
be in a position to intentionally act with respect to the book I am currently 
attending to, not the book I am about to attend to, or the book I was 
attending to. This is true both when our attention is voluntarily exercised, as it 
10 
 
is in the case of looking for the book, and when our attention is involuntarily 
caught, as it might be by a sudden flash of light. Our visual attention to 
objects also explains our visually based intentional behaviour, and our 
visually based thoughts5 about them. My reaching towards the book is 
explained by my visually attending to it – I can see where it is. My visual 
attention to the book also explains my thinking ‘That’s the book I want’. 
Moreover, my visual attention to the book explains the relation between that 
thought and action: my thought and action are about the book. 
 
Philosophical interest in aspects of attention can be traced back to Aristotle 
(Hatfield (1998)), but more recent philosophical work on attention has tended 
to follow in the wake of several decades of empirical psychological research, 
beginning with auditory attention. Early work in the 1950s investigated the 
‘cocktail party phenomenon’, the ability of listeners to select one out of 
several different simultaneously presented sounds (e.g. voices at a cocktail 
party). The circumstances under which this was possible as well as the 
extent to which listeners were aware of the other (ignored) sounds were 
investigated. Experiments made use of the dichotic listening task, which 
involved presenting different sounds or speech simultaneously to both ears 
via speakers or headphones. The experimental subjects had to complete 
some task, such as recalling the words played to one ear, or repeating 
(‘shadowing’) the words played to one ear (Styles (2006), Driver (2001)). 
 
                                            
5
 That is, thoughts for which vision is necessary. 
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An influential early theory of attention that made use of this research is 
Donald Broadbent’s filter theory. In Perception and Communication 
(Broadbent (1958)), Broadbent examines experimental results in the light of 
communication theory and proposes a capacity limit on processing 
simultaneously presented stimuli, analogous to the capacity limit on 
communication channels such as telephone lines. Early in the book, 
Broadbent argues for the use of experimental methods that ‘set the subject 
some objectively scorable task’ rather than relying on subjects’ descriptions 
of their experiences. 6 As we will see shortly, this has become the norm. In 
the 1958 work, Broadbent does at least mention the importance of 
congruence between the results of psychological research and common 
sense.7 
 
More recently, Harold Pashler has described the approach of psychologists 
researching attention as follows: 
 
“Most present-day attention researchers work in the tradition sometimes called 
information-processing psychology. Their avowed goal is not to characterize conscious 
experience per se, but rather to trace the flow of information among different 
representational systems in the mind/brain. For the most part, they place little stock in 
introspection as a means of achieving this goal, relying instead on recording observations 
of human behaviour in laboratory settings.”8 
                                            
6
 Broadbent (1958) p. 8. 
7
 Broadbent (1958) p. 35. On p. 300 he states that ‘it would be a poor set of scientific 
principles’ that were ‘contrary to everyday observation’, though in other places he is 
ambivalent (e.g. pp. 58-59). 
8
 Pashler (1995) p. 73. 
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The limitations of this ambition are rather disappointing. If the aim of attention 
research in psychology is not to characterize conscious experience, surely 
the research excludes a vital part of what attention is. Pashler is careful to 
preface the quoted section by urging caution about the ‘confusion’ that can 
be caused by ‘smuggling terms like attention into scientific discourse from 
ordinary language’.9 I think if psychologists use the word ‘attention’ to identify 
the subject matter of their research, they ought to be understood as making 
claims about that aspect of our everyday experience which James was 
happy to declare we all know. 
 
Instead, psychologists tend to treat the characteristics of attention in its 
everyday sense, such as its selectivity and limited capacity, as phenomena 
to be individually investigated.10 Of course, one way of conducting such an 
investigation has a long history in both philosophy (Hatfield (1998)) and 
psychology; James addresses the question of how many things we can 
attend to at once.11 But the danger with this approach is that conclusions 
about attention could be drawn on the basis of the empirical study of just 
some of its characteristics, ignoring essential aspects of what attention is. A 
prime example of such a conclusion is the claim that visual attention to an 
object is possible in the absence of any visual awareness of it. Robert 
Kentridge and colleagues have interpreted data from spatial cuing 
                                            
9
 Pashler (1995) p. 71. 
10
 Pashler (1998) pp. 2-3. In particular, “… our commonsense metaphysics of mental life 
points out, and in a very loose way might be said to try to explain, a number of phenomena: 
selectivity of perception, voluntary control over this selectivity, and capacity limits in mental 
functioning that cannot be attributed to mere limitations in our sensory or motor systems. 
These are the core phenomena addressed by attention research…” (p. 3). 
11
 James (1983) p. 383. 
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experiments with a neurologically impaired subject to show that this is 
possible.12 Yet in our everyday use of ‘attention’, we would be hard-pressed 
to think of a situation where visual attention was focussed upon an object in 
the absence of any visual awareness of it. I can’t voluntarily attend to one 
among the pile of books on my desk without being aware of the book, and if 
my attention is caught by a face at the window, I become aware of the face. 
 
Another aspect of our everyday understanding of visual attention has come 
into question on the basis of a different experimental paradigm. Arien Mack 
and Irvin Rock’s experiments required subjects to focus their attention on a 
rapid visual discrimination task. An unexpected stimulus was briefly 
presented to the subjects while their attention was focussed on the 
discrimination task. A large number of subjects failed to notice the 
unexpected stimulus, and this result was taken to show that “… there seems to 
be no conscious perception without attention.”13 Now, there may be occasions on 
which we concentrate on something, and as a result we ignore or fail to 
become aware of something else, but this surely does not prove that we are 
only ever aware of what we attend to. If visual attention is understood in the 
pre-theoretical sense outlined earlier, Mack and Rock’s claim means that 
visual attention to an object, such as one among a pile of books, precludes 
visual awareness of the other books in the pile. This seems straightforwardly 
wrong, suggesting that what is meant by visual attention in the claim is not 
the same as what is meant in the pre-theoretical sense outlined. 
 
                                            
12
 Kentridge et al. (1999). 
13
 Mack and Rock (1998) p. ix. 
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It may seem at this point that too much weight is being put on what I have 
been calling variously a ‘natural’, ‘everyday’, and ‘pre-theoretical’ sense of 
visual attention as sufficient but not necessary for visual awareness. Felipe 
de Brigard14 argues 'against the claim that, according to our commonsense 
psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention' on the basis that 'there 
isn't such a thing as the view of commonsense psychology about the relation 
between attention and consciousness'.15 Can the issue be decided by 
surveying public opinion? I agree with de Brigard that it cannot, though my 
motivation for saying so differs from his. According to de Brigard,  
 
“... there is little agreement, in so far as our commonsense psychology is concerned, 
about the relation between attention and consciousness. Although there may be some 
consistency to the way in which most people use these terms in common parlance, there 
are definitively certain situations in which our preference for one or another is context-
dependent, i.e. dependent on the category against which each term is contrasted.”16 
 
I agree with de Brigard that it is a mistake to assume that the way we use the 
words 'attention' and 'consciousness' in our day-to-day speech is either 
entirely precise, or always consistent. However, my motivation in writing this 
thesis depends on my belief that philosophical research has a contribution to 
make to our understanding of visual attention and visual awareness. Pace de 
Brigard, I think philosophical investigation can reveal how we should 
understand visual attention and visual awareness. This is a claim about the 
                                            
14
 de Brigard (2010). 
15
 de Brigard (2010) p. 190. 
16
 de Brigard (2010) p. 200. 
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meaning of ‘visual attention’ and ‘visual awareness’: regardless of variations 
in current usage, we should understand visual attention to be sufficient, but 
not necessary, for visual awareness. To embark on this task, it will suffice if I 
begin with a conception of the relation between attention and awareness that 
the reader will recognise, whether or not this conception is acknowledged by 
everyone, in every situation. 
 
I reject de Brigard's proposal, that we should 'further define' our pre-
theoretical conceptions 'in cognitive and/or behavioural terms in conformity to 
verifiable evidence'.17 Instead, we ought to conduct a philosophical 
investigation of the role that visual attention plays when it is understood as 
sufficient but not necessary for visual awareness. If I am right, visual 
attention conceived like this plays a role in our visual experience that so-
called attention without awareness cannot play. In turn, what legitimises this 
conception of visual attention is that it plays this role. 
 
I have said that according to a recognisable way of thinking about visual 
attention, if someone is visually attending to an object, they are also visually 
aware of it. I am not suggesting, though, that we should simply assume this 
pre-theoretical conception is correct. I think that this conception can be 
sustained by identifying why visual attention must be conscious to explain 
our visually based thoughts and actions in the way it does. That is, I think we 
can vindicate this conception of visual attention by determining what it is 
                                            
17
 de Brigard (2010) p. 200. 
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about the role visual attention plays in relation to our visually based thoughts 
and actions that requires it to be conscious. 
 
I have also said if someone is visually attending to an object, such as one 
book in a pile of books, they may at the same time be visually aware of the 
other, unattended, books in the pile. When I reflect on my visual experiences, 
it seems quite clear to me that I am visually aware of objects that I am not 
visually attending to, but I will corroborate this evidence from introspection 
with experimental results. 
 
In this thesis I will defend the conception of visual attention and its 
relationship with visual awareness that I have described against the 
revisionary conceptions proposed by some psychologists. The alternative 
conceptions some psychologists have interpreted their data to support, it will 
be argued, do not allow us to understand our visual experiences, and visually 
based thoughts and actions in the way we do. The thesis is structured 
around two questions: 
 
(i) Is a subject’s visual attention to an object (or property) sufficient for the 
subject to be visually aware of it? 
(ii) Is a subject’s visual attention to an object (or property) necessary for the 
subject to be visually aware of it? 
 
While philosophical interest in attention has been growing in the last few 
years, there has been less interest in defending the pre-theoretical 
17 
 
conception of visual attention and visual awareness outlined here. In some 
cases, the treatment of attention has not properly distinguished perceptual 
attention from the paying of attention to what we are thinking about.18 If, as I 
claim, visual attention to an object is sufficient but not necessary for visual 
awareness of the object, there is a significant difference between attention in 
thought and visual attention. When we pay attention to what we are thinking 
about, we are conscious of the thoughts that occupy our attention. When we 
visually attend to an object, we are conscious – visually aware – of the 
object, but we are often also visually aware of other adjacent objects. 
Consider again visually attending to a book on a shelf of books. In visually 
attending to one book, I visually pick it out, but I remain aware of other 
adjacent books. But I am not, in a corresponding way, conscious of thoughts 
I am not attending to. I am just conscious of the thoughts I am attending to. 
The relationship between visual attention and awareness is quite different 
from the relationship between attention in thought and awareness of those 
thoughts, and this difference is matched by a difference in the distinct 
contribution visual attention makes. 
 
Another kind of philosophical treatment of attention approaches it from the 
perspective of empirical psychology.19 This, in my view, gets things exactly 
the wrong way around. As the ubiquitous quote from William James reminds 
us, everyone knows what attention is. There may be variations in usage, but 
there is a clearly recognisable conception of paying attention to what we see, 
                                            
18
 E.g. Watzl (2011). 
19
 E.g. Prinz (2005), (2011). This is also de Brigard’s concluding proposal in de Brigard 
(2010). 
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according to which we are aware of what we are attending to. Equally clear is 
our ability to visually attend to one object while remaining visually aware of 
surrounding objects. Attention is part of our everyday lives. Our starting point 
should be what we know and experience: the pre-theoretical conception of 
visual attention and awareness I have outlined here. 
 
2. Chapter Overview 
 
In Chapter Two I set out the evidence in Kentridge et al. (1999) and critically 
examine their interpretation of it as showing that blindseers are able to 
visually attend to objects they lack any visual awareness of. I begin by 
describing the experimental evidence (§2). I consider a challenge to 
Kentridge’s interpretation from Christopher Mole (§3-§4), highlight a problem 
with the challenge (§5), and raise a question of my own: does the 
experimental task described in §2 measure the effects of attention in 
blindsight? I end by examining Kentridge et al.’s response to Mole (§6), and 
offering a tentative explanation of the mystifying description by the blindseer 
that he was ‘trying to attend’ (§7). 
 
In Chapter Three I identify how visual attention, conceived as sufficient for 
awareness, explains our visually based object-directed thoughts and actions 
in a way that the selective enhancement the blindseer is capable of does not. 
I consider four candidates for this explanatory role. In §2 I consider whether 
visual attention enables us to have spontaneous (i.e. unprompted) visually 
based object-directed thoughts and actions; in §3 I look at Declan Smithies’ 
19 
 
Rational Access account of the explanatory role of attention; in §4 I look at 
John Campbell’s Relational View account of the explanatory role of attention, 
and in §5 I propose my own reasons-based account. 
 
In Chapter Four I critically examine the claim that visual attention is 
necessary for visual awareness. The claim is based on the results of 
experiments in which subjects had to concentrate on a task, and while doing 
so failed to notice a task-irrelevant stimulus in full view, a stimulus which 
when they were not engaged in the task, they invariably did notice. I describe 
some of the experiments in §2. The common-sense explanation of why 
subjects in these experiments fail to notice the task-irrelevant stimulus is that 
they were concentrating on the task. When we are concentrating on a task, 
and this includes visual tasks, we tend to ignore distractions. In §3 I outline 
experimental evidence that supports the common-sense explanation. 
 
In the concluding chapter, Chapter Five, I return to the key points of previous 
chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Blindsight and Common Sense 
 
In this chapter I set out the evidence in Kentridge et al. 
(1999) and critically examine their interpretation of it as 
showing that blindseers are able to visually attend to 
objects they lack any visual awareness of. I begin by 
describing the experimental evidence (§2). I consider a 
challenge to Kentridge’s interpretation from Christopher 
Mole (§3-§4), highlight a problem with the challenge 
(§5), and raise a question of my own: does the 
experimental task described in §2 measure the effects 
of attention in blindsight? I end by examining Kentridge 
et al.’s responses to Mole (§6), and offering a tentative 
explanation of the mystifying description by the 
blindseer that he was ‘trying to attend’ (§7). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Seeing objects and people can prompt us to think about them, and perhaps 
act with respect to them. When on the basis of seeing something we have a 
thought about it, or act with respect to it, the sort of seeing we are normally 
talking about is conscious visual perception, that is, visual experience. 
Correspondingly when we talk of an object ‘grabbing our attention’, or 
‘drawing someone’s attention’ to an object in their immediate environment, 
we are talking about getting them to perceptually (e.g. visually or aurally) 
21 
 
experience it. The same is true of talk of someone ‘paying attention’ to an 
object in their environment. 
 
Visually based thoughts and actions need not, of course, be directed at a 
single object. I can think about the beautiful view from my window, and I can 
run away from multiple pursuers. When we do think about or act with respect 
to a single object on the basis of vision, the object is visually ‘picked out’ from 
its surroundings. Not all object-involving actions are, in this way, visually 
based and object-directed. If I close my eyes and spin around on the spot till 
I become disorientated and then reach out and grab the first object that 
comes to hand, my action of grabbing that object is neither visually based, 
nor is it directed towards that particular object: which object I end up 
grabbing is a matter of chance. We can contrast that case with another, 
where I see a particular object, such as a coin, and as a result of seeing it I 
reach out and grab it. In this instance, my action is visually based and object-
directed. Similarly, if by chance the word ‘racoon’ enters my thoughts, the 
presence of a racoon in my vicinity does not make my thoughts either 
visually based, or about that racoon. If, instead, on the basis of seeing the 
racoon, I think ‘Racoon!’ then my thought is both visually based and object-
directed. When an object-directed thought or action is visually based, the 
relevant visual information must be selected: visual information pertaining to 
the coin provides the basis for my grabbing of it; visual information pertaining 
to the racoon provides the basis for my thinking about it.20 In some cases I 
                                            
20
 At this point I am leaving open how we think about what I have termed ‘visual information’ 
– that is, I am leaving it open whether, for example, we think of what is visually selected as 
physical objects and spatial locations, or some form of mental representation. 
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might express a visually based object-directed thought of mine using a 
perceptual demonstrative (e.g. ‘That car is red’ said of a car I see). 
 
These preliminary considerations, brought together, extend our 
understanding of visual attention. What we normally mean when we talk 
about visual perception, including the visual perception involved in visually 
based thoughts and actions, is conscious visual perception, or, as I shall 
usually say, visual experience. Typically, when we talk of attention, the object 
being attended to is something that the person who is attending is aware (i.e. 
conscious) of. And what I have called visually based object-directed thoughts 
and actions require the selection of visual information pertaining to the 
relevant object. Now, attention in the case of perceptual phenomena is itself 
thought of as consisting, at least in part, of a kind of selection.21 When 
someone’s attention is drawn to an object, the relevant object is singled out – 
selected – from its surroundings. These considerations together suggest that 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions require the thinker or 
agent to be visually aware of the relevant object because they require visual 
attention, and visual attention to an object is sufficient for awareness of it. 
(Actually, I think the way we usually think of visual attention goes further – I 
think we conceive of visual attention as a way of being visually aware, rather 
than simply as something ‘constantly conjoined’ with visual awareness.) 
When I think ‘Racoon!’ as one stares back at me, it seems that thought 
depends on me visually attending to the racoon, and when racoon and I 
                                            
21
 E.g. the ‘selectivity of perception’ is among the ‘core phenomena addressed by attention 
research’ Pashler (1998), p. 3. 
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hurriedly part company, it seems my moving away from the racoon depends 
on me having visually attended to the racoon. 
 
Despite its natural appeal, this view faces a serious challenge. Individuals 
with the condition known as blindsight can have thoughts about objects, and 
carry out actions with respect to them, and though those thoughts and 
actions are based on visual information from the objects, the blindseer lacks 
any visual awareness of them.22 A blindsighted subject can reliably detect 
whether, and in some cases what sort of object is presented to his blind field 
when he is prompted to respond. This is not merely object-involving in the 
sense outlined earlier, where the object might be involved purely by chance 
(e.g. the coin grabbed by chance, or the thought ‘Racoon’ that by chance is 
coincident with the presence of a racoon). The blindsighted subject’s ability 
to detect objects can be spatially directed to a particular object, and result in 
intentional action (reporting the presence of the object). This suggests that 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions are possible in the 
absence of visual attention to the relevant objects. 
 
We are in a quandary. On the one hand, when we think or act on the basis of 
seeing an object, those thoughts or actions seem dependent on our visually 
attending to the object. On the other hand, in the blindsight cases there is 
evidently visually based behaviour directed towards objects without 
awareness of them. Given that blindseers are capable of visually based 
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object-directed thoughts and actions without any visual awareness of the 
relevant objects, this immediately prompts a question. Is visual attention to 
an object also possible in the absence of any awareness of it? 
 
While we don’t normally think it is possible to attend to something while 
remaining unaware of it, it might be countered that our normal way of 
thinking of attention does not take into account recent discoveries about the 
nature of vision. In particular, our normal way of thinking of attention does not 
take into account the performance of blindsighted subjects (or the 
performance of subjects with unimpaired vision under certain conditions). 
Evidence from experiments with subjects with blindsight has been interpreted 
by some psychologists, among them Robert Kentridge, to demonstrate that 
visual attention is possible in the absence of visual awareness. The kind of 
pre-theoretical understanding of visual attention I outlined in the previous 
chapter has been the inspiration for some philosophers, among them 
Christopher Mole, to remain committed to the sufficiency of attention for 
awareness. Looking in some detail at the evidence and argument against 
sufficiency presented by Kentridge and his co-authors makes clear exactly 
what is being claimed. Careful examination of the defence of sufficiency 
made in response by Mole and the counter-response by Kentridge and 
colleagues also underlines the importance of ensuring that cross-disciplinary 
talk of attention does not end up being talk at cross purposes. 
 
The exchange takes place primarily in two articles, one authored by Mole 
(Mole 2008), and the other jointly by Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and 
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Charles Heywood (Kentridge et al. 2008). Those papers were themselves 
prompted by an earlier article co-authored by Robert Kentridge (Kentridge et 
al. 1999), contending that visual attention is possible in the absence of 
awareness; the latter article is outlined in the next section. In the section after 
that (§ 3), I set out Mole’s commonsense view of attention. In Section 4, I 
examine a challenge to Mole’s view from the case of a vigilant observer. In 
Section 5 I look at whether, through this exchange, Mole and Kentridge et al. 
have ended up talking at cross purposes. Section 6 looks at further evidence 
in favour of their view Kentridge and his co-authors put forward, and the final 
section considers how to understand a blindseer’s description of himself as 
‘trying to attend’ in the absence of visual awareness. 
 
2. Attention in Blindsight 
 
‘Blindsight’ is 
 
“… a condition caused by brain damage in which a person is able to respond to visual 
stimuli without consciously perceiving them. It is associated with damage to human 
primary visual cortex (otherwise known as striate cortex or area V1) which causes 
blindness in parts of the affected visual fields, with a size and shape to be expected from 
the classical retino-cortical maps. If, however, subjects are required to guess about stimuli 
presented to their blind fields, they may be able to locate them in space or to discriminate 
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them from each other, despite saying that they do not see them and have no awareness 
of them.”23 
 
Within an experimental paradigm designed by Michael Posner and others,24 
an increase in the speed or accuracy of response to the presentation of a 
visual target preceded by a cue, when the cue correctly predicts the target’s 
location compared to when it incorrectly predicts the target’s location, is 
understood to be due to the effects of spatial attention.25 The subject 
maintains fixation (that is, keeps looking directly at) the centre of the display, 
and shifts attention covertly (without movement of the eyes) to the cued 
location before making a report (typically a button press) to indicate whether 
or not a target is presented. Eye movement is usually monitored, so 
responses following overt orienting eye movements can be discarded. 
 
Robert Kentridge, Charles Heywood and Lawrence Weiskrantz were inspired 
to use the Posner paradigm with a blindsighted subject, GY, by a 
spontaneous remark made by him during a set of experiments in 1997: 
 
“GY is a very experienced subject, but in the vast majority of experiments he had 
participated in previously, stimuli were presented in locations on the horizontal midline. 
Quite by chance, during one of the breaks in testing, GY remarked that he had just 
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realized that the stimuli were sometimes being presented well above the horizontal and so 
now he was trying to pay attention higher up in his blind visual field.”26 
 
In their (1999) paper, Robert Kentridge, Charles Heywood and Lawrence 
Weiskrantz describe using the Posner paradigm to test whether GY could 
exercise attention in this way. 
 
Items were presented to GY on a monitor screen, which was positioned in 
such a way that part of it was in GY’s blind field. GY’s task was to use a 
button press to report, as quickly as he could, whether or not a target was 
presented to his blind field when he heard an auditory signal. Just prior to the 
auditory signal, a visual cue signalled the probable location of the target, if 
one was presented. After each response, GY had to confirm whether or not 
he had been visually aware of the target. In half the trials, no target was 
presented, and in the trials in which a target was presented, the cue was 
valid (i.e. correctly predicted the location of the target) just over two-thirds of 
the time. 
 
Two different sorts of cue were used, an arrow in the middle of the display 
which GY was visually aware of (‘central cue’), and a pair of bars one each 
above and below the target’s possible location in GY’s blind field (‘direct 
peripheral cue’). In the central cuing condition, GY was faster at detecting the 
target when the cue was valid than when it was misleading (i.e. indicated the 
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wrong location for the target), and more accurate in his reporting of whether 
or not a target was presented when the cue was valid than when it was 
misleading. This indicates that the difference in the speed of his responses 
could not be explained simply as a trade-off between speed and accuracy. 
 
If the central cue was misleading, the accuracy of GY’s responses was 
around chance (53%).27 When the central cue was misleading, and despite 
this GY’s response was correct, his reaction time was ‘significantly slower’ 
than for his incorrect responses, or his responses when no target was 
presented.28 That is, something appeared to be making his reaction times 
slower when his responses were correct despite the cue being misleading, in 
comparison to the speed of his reaction times when his responses were 
incorrect, or no target was presented. 
 
In the direct peripheral cuing condition, GY was faster at detecting the target 
when the cue was valid, but no more accurate when the cue was valid than 
when it was misleading, though in both cases he was significantly better than 
chance.29 
 
Perhaps most surprisingly, GY’s responses were also faster and more 
accurate when the peripheral cue contingency was reversed – instead of 
directly signalling the possible location of the target, the peripheral cue – of 
which GY was unaware – most often (just over two-thirds of the time) 
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signalled the opposite location (e.g. the upper quadrant if the cue appeared 
in the lower one). As the experimenters point out, “successful use of [the 
reversed peripheral cue] requires interpretation of the cue in light of the rule relating 
cue and target locations”.30 
 
The results of the reversed peripheral cue condition (‘indirect peripheral 
cue’), however, need to be seen in light of the fact that, despite GY being a 
very experienced test subject, it took over 400 trials before his responses 
adjusted to the reverse contingency.31 For the first 384 trials, his responses 
were faster to targets in the wrong condition, which in the case of the indirect 
peripheral cue condition were targets that appeared in the same location as 
the peripheral cue.32 GY was not immediately able to adjust to the reversal of 
the cue contingency, rather his responses became faster and more accurate 
over the course of multiple trials. As Kentridge and colleagues also make 
clear, “there was a great deal of variability in the effect of cue validity which was often 
small and sometimes even negative…”.33 
 
Though these results are surprising, you might feel that their importance is 
easily exaggerated. Strictly speaking, you might think, all they show is that in 
certain very rare circumstances, visual attention and visual awareness can 
dissociate. To concede even this, however, is to concede that attention is not 
sufficient for awareness. Making this concession, I believe, would be a 
mistake. Visual attention as we usually conceive of it is sufficient for visual 
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awareness: it is hard to make sense of how you might pay attention to the 
colour of the vase in front of you if you are not visually aware of it. What is 
needed is a way of showing that this conception of visual attention is not 
simply based on a prejudice of habit. In Sections 5 and 6 I set out some 
considerations against interpreting the results of the experiments with GY as 
proof of attention without awareness (a full defence of sufficiency will have to 
wait until the next chapter). 
 
The disagreement between the two views (i.e. sufficiency and its denial) can 
be seen as a disagreement about the extent to which reflection on perceptual 
experience can inform us about its nature. There is agreement that a 
subject’s verbal reports are a valid way of determining whether and what she 
is aware of when a stimulus is presented to her, but beyond that there is little 
agreement. In the next section, I set out Christopher Mole’s defence of our 
everyday grasp of attention as sufficient for awareness, which forms part of 
what he calls ‘commonsense psychology’. 
 
3. Mole’s Commonsense Psychology 
 
Commonsense psychology is motivated by the sort of considerations in 
favour of the sufficiency of attention for awareness outlined earlier; a view on 
the relation between attention and awareness based on common usage of 
those terms, usage which in turn is informed by reflection on the nature of 
experience. 
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"We catch someone's attention as a way to influence what he is conscious of, and it is by 
introducing something into his field of consciousness that we catch his attention... we 
expect the facts about what a person is attending to to make an immediate difference to 
what it’s like to be that person and we expect a person to be able to know what she is 
attending to in the immediate first-person, privileged-access, non-inferential way that 
characterizes knowledge of facts about consciousness. 
 
The fact that we expect attention and consciousness to behave in these ways is made 
intelligible if we understand commonsense psychology to treat paying attention to 
something as a way of being conscious of that thing... According to commonsense 
psychology, then, attention requires consciousness."34  
 
(In his description of catching someone’s attention, it is noteworthy that Mole 
talks of introducing something into their ‘field of consciousness’, rather than 
drawing their attention to something in their visual field.) 
 
The view from commonsense psychology, that attention is sufficient for 
awareness, comes with some qualifications. The first is that we don’t, 
according to Mole, need to be aware of something before attending to it; we 
can become aware of something by attending to it.35 The kind of examples 
Mole gives of things that we might become aware of by attending to them – 
the dust on a bookshelf, the background noise of electric lights – seem to be 
things we could easily ignore. Another, perhaps more obvious sort of choice, 
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might be stimuli such as an unexpected bright flashing light (whether in the 
centre or periphery of the visual field), or a peripheral moving object: stimuli 
that are not so easily ignored. This sort of involuntary capture of attention36 
can be distinguished from deliberately directed attention by its being 
unplanned and unintentional.37 
 
The second qualification Mole makes is to draw a distinction between, on the 
one hand, being aware of an object as a result of attending to it, and on the 
other hand being aware of the property of the object in virtue of which we 
come to attend to it.38 Drawing the distinction allows him to concede that we 
can become aware of an object by attending to it even when we are unaware 
of the property of the object in virtue of which it captured our attention. The 
concession is made in the light of experimental findings by Steven Yantis 
(Yantis 1993) that detection of a target is faster when the target appears in a 
previously unoccupied space in an array (‘sudden onset’) compared to when 
it appears at a previously occupied location (‘no-onset’), despite most 
subjects being unaware of the target as having a sudden onset.39 In this 
particular case, there seems to be room to draw a distinction between 
intrinsic properties of the target (e.g. its shape, size and colour), and the 
properties it has in virtue of its relation to other objects in the array (e.g. its 
onset). It is not in virtue of one of the target’s intrinsic properties that we 
come to attend to it. In any case, the possibility of an involuntary shift in our 
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visual attention due to an object exhibiting a visual change seems to be 
consistent with our common sense way of thinking of visual attention. We 
can distinguish between our attention being caused to shift involuntarily, and 
attending to the thing that caused that shift of attention. Accepting that our 
attention may be caused to shift without our becoming aware of why does 
not require accepting that we are attending to something while remaining 
unaware of it. If we reversed the condition in the Yantis experiment to the 
sudden disappearance of an object within an array, it seems possible that 
our attention might shift involuntarily to the location the object had occupied, 
without our being aware that an object had just disappeared from there. 
What would then have caused the shift in attention is the sudden 
disappearance of the object, but what we would come to attend to is the 
location the object had previously occupied. (The extent to which this is 
actually possible can, of course, only be determined by empirical 
investigation.) 
 
Mole’s appeal to common sense would be presented with a challenge if it 
turned out that there are quite familiar cases of attention without awareness. 
If these were more of a common occurrence, there would be grounds to 
challenge his view as not representing the common sense view after all. 
 
4. The Vigilant Observer 
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In their 1998 book, Inattentional Blindness, Arien Mack and Irvin Rock 
describe what they consider quite common instances of perceptual attention 
in the absence of awareness: 
 
“It is not an uncommon experience to be looking for something or keenly awaiting its 
appearance in the absence of perceiving it, for example, waiting in silence in the dark for 
the phone to ring. Both the looking for and the awaiting are part of what we mean by 
attention in our ordinary language, but in cases such as these the looking for is not 
associated with any perception.”40 
 
Mack and Rock use a cross-modal example of anticipatory attention (waiting 
in the dark for the phone to ring), but we can concentrate on the visual case. 
The sort of thing that Mack and Rock have in mind is presumably something 
like straining to see through a doorway into the pitch black room beyond. It 
certainly seems right to describe this as an instance of attention in the 
ordinary sense of the word. The question is what they mean when they say 
‘the looking for is not associated with any perception’. A little later they refer 
to laboratory studies of vigilance, which  
 
“… demonstrate an observer’s ability to monitor one particular region of blank space, 
which results in the more rapid or more sensitive detection of a stimulus in that location. 
Although the consequence of the vigilance may be a lower detection threshold and a more 
rapid perception of the target, if no event occurs, there will be no perception. In other 
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words, one can be vigilant without actually perceiving, implying that perception and 
attention are distinct processes.”41 
 
Evidently, awareness (‘perception’) is understood purely in terms of 
awareness of an object (stimulus). Mole’s response to this kind of case is to 
diagnose Mack and Rock’s mistake as ‘a kind of quantifier-shift fallacy’, 
which ‘confuses the perception of absence with the absence of perception’. 42 
This needs some explanation. Mole’s gloss is that ‘the subject is perceiving 
that nothing has yet occurred’ (ibid.). This suggests a commitment to the 
vigilant observer having an accompanying belief, the belief that nothing has 
yet occurred.43 This raises a further question: is it possible to visually 
experience an absence, or can we only perceive that there is an absence? 
 
Roy Sorensen considers this question in his (2008). According to Sorensen, 
“In pitch darkness, we at least see the darkness.”44 Sorensen, then, would agree 
that in my example of straining to look through the doorway into a pitch black 
room, we see something. He also thinks that the sort of seeing in question 
here is non-epistemic seeing45 – visual experience of the darkness beyond 
the doorway, not the seeing that there is darkness beyond the doorway that 
requires the formation of a belief: 
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“When a bear follows you into a cave, he sees the same darkness as you. This darkness 
existed long before anyone saw it and would have existed even if no creature ever beheld 
it.”46 
 
The implication here is presumably that the bear does not possess concepts, 
or form beliefs, and therefore that what both bear and we see is the darkness 
itself. We don’t infer that it is dark (or that there is nothing to see), we directly 
experience the darkness.47 So Sorensen and Mole both think that Mack and 
Rock are wrong to claim that conscious perception – visual awareness – 
must be awareness of the presence of physical objects, but for different 
reasons. It seems Mole thinks our awareness of the darkness beyond the 
doorway is accompanied by a belief to that effect, while Sorensen thinks we 
are aware of the darkness itself. 
 
We might, instead, argue that the vigilant observer, like the person straining 
to look through a doorway into a pitch black room, is able to attend to a 
particular region of ‘blank space’ because that region of space is framed by 
things she can see. Someone who is straining to look through a lightless 
doorway can direct her gaze (and with it her attention) by using the doorway 
as a guide. We can fill this out by giving an account of what it is to see 
regions of space currently unoccupied by objects. Just such an account is 
suggested in papers by Mike Martin, Louise Richardson and Matt Soteriou. 
On this account, a visual field is a perspectivally presented volume of space, 
including the objects, properties and relations contained within it, that is 
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bounded by our sensory limitations.48 The sensory limits in question are 
limits imposed by what our eyes are capable of taking in (i.e. from a fixed 
position, excluding, for example, the region behind our heads). Key to this 
notion of a visual field is that it includes the spaces between objects, some of 
which, from a given position, we will be visually aware of. We are visually 
aware of the space between our bodies and the nearest object in front of us, 
for example, and we are aware of the space framed by an open door. Both 
these spaces could be occupied by objects, and we are aware of them as 
such, as spaces that could be occupied by objects. 
 
Using the notion of a visual field just outlined, we can ask what it is, in our 
example of straining to see through the doorway, that is being attended to. 
The answer seems to be that it is parts of the space framed by the doorway 
that are being attended to. If we then ask what it is we are aware of, here 
again the obvious answer seems to be parts of the space framed by the 
doorway. Given these answers, our attention and awareness seem to be in 
step, though what it is we are attending to and aware of is not a physical 
object, but a spatial area. 
 
There are, then, a few different ways in which we can account for the kind of 
exercise of vigilance that Mack and Rock put forward as an instance of 
attention without awareness. Let’s focus on my example of straining to see 
through a pitch-dark doorway. Taking our lead from Sorensen, we can 
account for the exercise of vigilance in terms of seeing the darkness beyond 
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the doorway; we don’t see any objects, but we are attending to and aware of 
the darkness. On the space-based account inspired by Martin, Richardson 
and Soteriou, we are visually attending to and aware of the space framed by 
the doorway. Mole’s description of ‘perceiving that nothing has occurred’ 
emphasises our belief that there is no object we can see through the 
doorway, but this is quite consistent with us attending to and being aware of 
the darkness, and it is also consistent with us attending to and being aware 
of the space framed by the doorway. On any of these accounts, our attention 
and awareness are in step, and Mole’s commonsense psychology emerges 
unscathed. 
 
5. Cross Purposes 
 
Mole wants to use a ‘somewhat similar distinction’ to the one he uses against 
Mack and Rock, between a perception of absence and an absence of 
perception, against Kentridge et al.’s blindsight case. He grants that GY is 
indeed employing his attention in the experiments, which is in line with GY’s 
own descriptions of what he is doing. He also concedes that “the facilitative 
effect shown by [GY] is attention involving”.49 What Kentridge and colleagues 
need to show, according to Mole, is that GY’s abilities constitute a 
counterexample to his formulation of sufficiency: 
 
                                            
49
 Mole 2008 p. 100. 
39 
 
α: For all persons and all things, if the person is attending to the thing then 
the person is conscious of that thing.50 
 
For there to be a counterexample to α, a subject would need to attend to 
something (and it seems we should read ‘thing’ to mean object) without 
being aware of it.51 This is not, according to Mole, what is happening in the 
case of GY: “the facilitative effect of the cue can be understood as a consequence of 
[GY] attending to the location in which the [target] appears”,52 the evidence does 
not require us to say that GY is attending to the target itself. 
 
As Mole is well aware, this just pushes the threat back one step. It is an 
obvious move for someone who thinks that GY’s case does constitute a 
counterexample to α to reformulate the challenge with respect to space: GY 
is attending to a space (which happens to be the location of the target) which 
he is unaware of. Mole thinks he has an answer to the challenge, whereby 
he can show that GY is aware of the space to which he is attending, and his 
response is most interesting. 
 
"In normal situations, as when sitting at one's desk, one experiences oneself as being 
oriented in a space, even when there are parts of that space to which one is not currently 
perceptually receptive. Regions of the space in which one is oriented are potential loci for 
attention. One can, even with one's eyes closed, direct one's attention to different parts of 
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the space around one's head... If all is silent then it may be that nothing in particular is 
experienced as being in these locations, but this does not prevent them from being parts 
of the space in which one experiences oneself as oriented, and it does not prevent them 
being loci of attention. The attention to locations in the scotoma demonstrated by the 
blindsighter can be thought of similarly... the part of space that falls within GY's scotoma 
does figure in his conscious experience as a part of the spatial field in which his 
experiences are oriented... It is possible, then, to claim that the blindsighter is paying 
attention to a part of space, and that that part of space does figure in his consciousness 
(as part of the space in which he is oriented), while still holding on to the fact that it is a 
part of space from which nothing is visually experienced."53 
 
Clearly, ‘experience’ as it is being used here does not mean visual 
experience, or even perceptual experience, since we can experience 
ourselves as oriented in a space parts of which we might not be ‘currently 
perceptually receptive’ to. ‘Attention’, as it is being used here, also does not 
mean, or does not exclusively mean visual attention, since it is possible, 
according to Mole, to direct our attention to a space with our eyes shut. This 
suggests that the sufficiency claim that Mole is interested in defending is not 
a claim about the sufficiency of visual attention for visual awareness. In his 
book-length treatment of the subject (Mole (2011)), Mole makes this clear 
from the outset.54 We might well think, however, that there are some 
important differences between non-perceptual and perceptual forms of 
attention: paying attention to what we are thinking about, and paying 
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attention to what we see. The phenomenological difference is nicely brought 
out by Mike Martin. 
 
“Arguably, it is part of the manifest image of the mind that we are aware of objects of 
sense experience in a different way from being aware of the objects of thought, and that 
this is reflected in the ways attention can relate one to an object of sense as opposed to 
thought… it is tempting to think of experience in terms of a whole array of items stretching 
beyond what I have focused my attention on at a time—an array over which I could move 
my attention, as a beam or spotlight. It is as if I am aware of the whole array at a time, 
albeit more or less determinately, whether I now focus my attention on one part of it or 
not; and my awareness of some element of it can explain why I shift my attention from one 
part of the scene to another. There seems to be no corresponding array of items to shift 
one’s attention over in thought: if we think of thoughts as determinations of attention, then 
there can be no way of thinking of something without thereby to some extent to be 
attending to it.”55 
 
Besides the phenomenological difference, there is the fact that we cannot 
acquire information about our environment purely through the exercise of 
attending to our thoughts. And in any case, it is quite clear that Kentridge et 
al. are making a claim about the relationship between visual attention and 
visual awareness. If this is right, then it seems the two parties to this 
exchange are talking at cross purposes. The upshot for our investigation is 
that we cannot use Mole’s argument as it stands to defend the sufficiency of 
visual attention for visual awareness against the challenge from blindsight. 
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To make matters worse, neither Sorensen’s take on seeing darkness, nor the 
space-based view of Martin, Richardson and Soteriou can be adopted as an 
alternative. Sorensen is explicit in denying that his analysis of seeing 
darkness applies to people who lack the capacity for visual awareness: 
 
“Blindness is an absence of experience rather than an experience of absence… A man 
with blind-sight may be able to visually sense an absence of light stimulation in a room. 
However, the blind-sighted man does not have a black visual experience.”56 
 
The space-based view is also quite explicitly concerned with normal visual 
experience. It is difficult to see how any alternative might go, because it is 
difficult to construct an alternative that can make sense of how GY can 
visually attend to a location despite having no visual awareness of that 
location. It is worth remembering at this point that the initial motivation to 
consider that GY was attending came from taking at face value his own 
description of what he was doing: 
 
“…GY remarked that he had just realized that the stimuli were sometimes being 
presented well above the horizontal and so now he was trying to pay attention higher up in 
his blind visual field.”57 
 
Now, one possible response to this is to flatly deny that GY was visually 
attending to anything. Whatever it is he was trying to do, the response would 
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go, he was not trying to visually attend to anything, since what he took 
himself to be attending to – part of his blind field – he was not aware of, and 
visually attending to something is sufficient for being visually aware of it. But 
not only do we have the results of the Posner spatial cuing experiments to 
take into consideration, we also lack any explanation of why visual attention 
is sufficient for visual awareness. Without an explanation of what it is about 
visual attention to an object that makes it sufficient for visual awareness of 
the object, this response simply sounds prejudiced. (Accounts of visual 
attention that aim to do just this will be presented in the next chapter.) 
 
So, for the moment, we ought to take GY’s description of what he was trying 
to do at face value, despite its apparent departure from our usual use and 
understanding of attention to what we see. Taking his description of what he 
was trying to do at face value, what he was trying to attend to was a part of 
his blind field. There is no mention of the target stimulus (he was unaware of 
it). On the evidence presented so far, Kentridge and his colleagues have yet 
to show that the differences in the speed and accuracy of response GY 
showed in the spatial cuing experiments were due to his attention to the 
target stimulus, rather than, for example, his attending to a location that fell 
within his blind field. In addition, the introspective evidence from GY that he 
was attending is not the kind of evidence that constitutes proof in 
information-processing psychology. Some prospects for marshalling a 
response to Kentridge and colleagues’ interpretation of the experimental 
evidence seem to be emerging. 
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With normally sighted subjects, the Posner spatial cuing paradigm is 
supposed to provide evidence for the effects of visual attention. Responses 
are faster and more accurate when visual attention is cued to the target, in 
comparison to when it is not. As Kentridge et al. put it, 
 
“Any difference in the speed or accuracy of response to the target between trials where 
the cue correctly predicted its location (i.e. it is a valid cue) and trials where the cue was 
misleading (an invalid cue) is evidence of spatially selective attention.”58 
 
But why should we accept that ‘any difference in the speed or accuracy of 
response to the target… is evidence of attention’, rather than evidence of 
some form of attentional process that is necessary, but not sufficient – in the 
absence of visual awareness – for attention? The best reason for thinking 
that the Posner spatial cueing paradigm provides evidence of the effects of 
visual attention is because it conforms to the recognisable pre-theoretical 
conception of attention described in the previous chapter. The use of a cue 
to direct attention is strongly reminiscent of drawing someone's attention to 
something in their environment by pointing. According to Posner, “orienting to 
stimuli in visual space is a restricted sense of attention”, where orienting is “the 
aligning of attention with a source of sensory input”59 that may be voluntary or 
involuntary (‘externally’ or ‘centrally controlled’), and overt or covert (i.e. with 
or without accompanying head and eye movements, respectively).60 The 
Posner spatial cuing task relies on visual attention being shifted covertly in 
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response to a cue of some sort (e.g. an arrow). In the preamble to the 
description of the task’s design, Posner observes that “Natural language refers 
to the ability to look out of the corner of our eyes…”.61 This suggests that the task is 
designed to mimic one of the ways visual attention is used in everyday life 
(when it is covertly oriented, without eye or head movements), albeit not the 
way it is most often used (when it is overtly oriented). Given the way the cue 
is used, however, it makes perfect sense to think that what is cued is a 
spatial location. On some occasions, after all, the cue is misleading, and no 
target is present at the cued location, so on those occasions at least what is 
cued is just a spatial location. And of course this is exactly what the task is 
understood to be – a spatial cueing task. But in that case, why not think what 
is being attended to is always just a spatial location? The obvious reason for 
not thinking this is that with a normal subject, when the cue is not misleading, 
the subject attends in the usual sense – consciously attends – to the target 
stimulus. The task usually requires subjects to indicate as soon as they can 
the presence (and sometimes location) of the target, so with normal subjects 
when the cue correctly indicates the location of the target, it is the target to 
which subjects’ (conscious) attention is drawn. Using the Posner task with a 
blindseer, however, takes us into unfamiliar territory, since it is no longer 
obvious that the blindseer is attending to the target (or, indeed, attending at 
all). 
 
Our typical use of ‘attention’ in relation to things we see implies awareness of 
the thing attended to. If I say my attention is drawn to a face at the window, 
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you would expect me to be aware of the face. The reason it is plausible that 
the Posner task is a measure of the effects of visual attention, I have just 
suggested, is that the spatial cuing it utilises mimics the drawing of attention 
that pointing achieves. Using the Posner task with a blindseer, however, 
raises the question of whether, in this novel situation, we can still consider it 
a measure of the effects of attention. A little earlier I conceded that the way 
we normally use ‘attention’ can only be an indication, and not a proof, of the 
sufficiency of attention for awareness. Without an explanation of why 
attention to something entails awareness of it, it remains an open question 
whether the results of testing GY measure the effects of his attention, or 
merely the effects of some attentional process that is necessary but not 
sufficient for attention. There is another important question. We have also to 
consider GY’s own description of what he is trying to do, according to which 
he is ‘trying to pay attention higher up in his blind field’. 
 
We have seen that Mole’s defence of the sufficiency of attention for 
awareness did not succeed. Mole attempted to defend the sufficiency claim 
by trying to show that GY was aware of what he was attending to. As we 
have also seen, Mole’s argument relied on a non-visual construal of 
attention, while Kentridge et al.’s claim that GY was attending without 
awareness was a claim about visual attention. Roy Sorensen’s analysis of 
seeing darkness, and the space-based view of Martin, Richardson and 
Soteriou are both exclusively concerned with normal visual experience and 
are not applicable to blindsight. Before I turn, in the next chapter, to the 
question of why attention is sufficient for awareness, there remain the two 
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questions outlined above regarding Kentridge’s interpretation of the results of 
testing GY. One question asks of the Posner cueing task whether, when 
what is cued is within a blindseer’s blind field, it still makes sense to think 
that the task is measuring the effects of attention. The other question asks 
how we should understand GY’s description of himself as ‘attending’. Should 
we be thinking in terms of GY selecting a part of his blind field? I consider 
this second question, which asks how we should understand GY’s claim that 
he is ‘trying to attend’ to a part of his blind field, in the last section of this 
chapter (§ 7). 
 
In the next section, I set out the evidence that Kentridge and his co-authors 
appeal to in support of their claim that GY is attending to the target stimulus. 
They begin by characterising attention as consisting of selection and 
enhancement of processing, and then show that whether the processing of 
an object occupying a location is enhanced can be sensitive to the properties 
of the object at that location. The connection between GY’s performance in 
the spatial cuing experiments and the use of attention in everyday life is 
made a little circuitously. As Kentridge et al. read William James’ 
characterisation of attention, it is comprised of ‘two key components’, 
selection (e.g. of an object, property or spatial location) and enhanced 
processing (e.g. of the object with that property or at that spatial location).62 
Ordinarily, when I draw your attention to something by pointing to it, you are 
able to select that particular object and process it in a way that is facilitated 
by my drawing your attention to it. The evidence of enhanced processing 
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elicited by the Posner task is similarly understood to be evidence of visual 
attention to the particular object that has been spatially cued. The spatial 
cuing experiments with GY demonstrate that his responses were faster and 
more accurate when the target was validly cued despite the fact that he was 
not aware of it. As I have emphasised, they don’t prove that GY was 
attending to the target. I have suggested that the best reason – in fact, the 
only good reason – for thinking the Posner spatial cueing task is a measure 
of the effects of visual attention is its resemblance to the everyday use of 
pointing to direct someone’s attention. The use of pointing to direct attention 
is premised on a tacit assumption that the viewer is visually aware of the 
pointing and what is pointed at. (Pointing to direct someone who is blind 
would be, quite literally, pointless.) Given that, the validity of the Posner task 
as a measure of the effects of attention in blindsight is questionable. But 
there is another closely connected issue. Part of what makes the Kentridge 
et al. (1999) paper so provocative is its mention of GY describing himself as 
‘trying to attend’ to a part of his blind field. I will look at ways of trying to 
understand this in §7, but suppose, for the moment, we take this literally. We 
could salvage part of Mole’s defence of sufficiency. We suppose GY was 
attending to a portion of his blind field. However, his performance in the 
Posner task showed the effects of selection and enhanced processing of the 
target. There is the potential for a gap opening up here, between what GY 
claimed to be attending to (a portion of his blind field) and what the Posner 
task provides evidence of enhanced processing of (the target). So GY’s 
performance on the Posner task might not be evidence of the effects of 
attention. 
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It is this argument, or something very similar, that Kentridge and his co-
authors take themselves to need to rebut. In the next section, I describe the 
evidence they marshal to show that changes in the speed of a response 
following the presentation of a cued target can depend on the properties of 
the object at that location. Since changes in the speed of response can 
depend on which object occupies the cued location, they argue that it is the 
object, and not merely the location, that is being visually attended to. 
 
6. Attention to Space and Attention to Objects 
 
In their (2008), Kentridge et al. take themselves to be responding to an 
argument of Mole’s that is pertinent to their denial that visual attention is 
sufficient for visual awareness. So what is the argument they take 
themselves to be responding to? In the abstract to their paper, they say Mole 
assumes that ‘all that is attended in spatial attention is space’, and in 
response object that ‘spatial attention can be deployed with the specific goal 
of determining the properties of objects occupying the attended region of 
space.’ It is a reasonable guess that they take Mole to be agreeing that GY is 
exercising his attention, and that they take Mole to be claiming that it is 
possible to visually attend to a spatial location without thereby attending to 
objects occupying that location. As we have seen, Mole’s argument does not 
concern visual attention, so we should not understand Mole as making the 
claim that it is possible to visually attend to a location without thereby 
attending to objects occupying that location. But as I suggested at the end of 
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the last section, this seems to offer a way of salvaging pat of Mole’s defence 
of sufficiency. 
 
Kentridge et al. want the spatial cuing experiments with GY to be accepted 
by supporters of sufficiency as a demonstration of the exercise of visual 
attention, and specifically a demonstration of GY’s visual attention to the 
target stimulus. Perhaps mindful of the strangeness of the claim that GY is 
visually attending to something that he is visually unaware of, they start with 
a characterisation of attention derived from William James. According to 
James, attention is 
 
“… the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, 
of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to 
deal effectively with others…”63 
 
According to Kentridge and colleagues, 
 
“Attention… involves a process of selection (withdrawal of processing from parts of the 
world in favour of other parts) and enhancement (the selective concentration of resources 
results in enhanced processing of the object of attention). In visual attention selection 
might be based on all sorts of properties, for example colour (‘look out for red things’), 
shape (‘look out for triangles’) or spatial location (‘look out for things on your left’).”64 
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Now, on James’ description of attention, it is a ‘concentration of 
consciousness’, so selection (‘withdrawal from some things’) and 
enhancement (‘dealing effectively with other things’) constitute only part of 
what James thinks attention is. I have conceded that without an explanation 
of why attention is essentially conscious, our typical use of the word can only 
be an indication, and not a proof of attention’s sufficiency for awareness. 
Providing that explanation is the subject of the next chapter, but even without 
an explanation we are not obliged to just accept Kentridge and colleagues’ 
characterisation of attention as selective enhancement. 
 
Kentridge, de-Wit and Heywood go on to say that selecting a location for 
attention ‘only seems sensible’ in order to ‘facilitate processing of objects 
which might be presented at that location’.65 Clearly, there are different ways 
in which we can understand this claim. Someone concerned to argue in 
favour of the sufficiency of attention for awareness might agree with regard 
to the normal case, but would certainly disagree in cases where there was no 
awareness of the putative object of attention. If, for example, while driving I 
look to my left to see if the way is clear, this would be an example of my 
selecting a location in order to acquire more information about objects which 
might be occupying it. If, on the other hand, I am in a pitch black 
environment, it would be highly questionable whether it makes sense to say 
that I was selecting an object that happens to lurk in my line of sight, even if I 
am somehow able to utilise visual information pertaining to it. (How we 
                                            
65
 Ibid. 
52 
 
understand the activity of making a selection, I will argue in the next section, 
ought to affect what we think of GY’s claim to be ‘trying to attend’ to part of 
his blind field.) 
 
This is the point at which Kentridge and colleagues move to persuade 
doubters that there is ‘good evidence that selection and enhancement 
processes are independent’ (p. 107). What they mean by this is that the 
selection of a location does not preclude the possibility of the visual 
processing of an object at that location being enhanced, even if the perceiver 
is unaware of the object. Why, they ask, should we assume that “attending to a 
location is not part of the same process as attending to the properties of objects at that 
location”?66 That is, as long as there is evidence of enhanced processing in 
the form of speeded responses in the Posner paradigm, why shouldn’t that 
be sufficient to conclude that it is the object, and not just the location, that is 
being attended to? They offer empirical evidence they believe weighs in 
favour of this view, evidence concerning the enhancement of processing of 
properties of objects at attended locations. If what is attended to is an area of 
space and not any particular object that might occupy that space, then 
enhancement of processing should occur for any object occupying that 
space. If, instead, enhancement of processing depends on which object 
occupies that space, we have a case for thinking of this object-specific 
exercise as being attention to the object. The evidence comes from a set of 
experiments, conducted on subjects with normal vision, by Roger Remington 
and Charles Folk, published in Remington and Folk (2001). 
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Remington and Folk begin by noting that 
 
“… there seems to be widespread agreement on two related assumptions common to 
both space-based and object-based selection [one of which is] when a location or 
object has been attended, all features of the attended object are selected regardless of 
their relevance to the immediate task..."67 
 
Remington and Folk set out to test this assumption by separating the effects 
of task-relevant and task-irrelevant features of the presented stimuli while 
also precisely controlling the allocation of spatial attention. 
 
The set-up is a bit complicated, but necessary to fully understand how they 
go about showing that the enhancement of processing following spatially 
allocated attention is sensitive to the properties of the object which occupies 
the space. The key points of the first set of trials are as follows. The feature 
dimension of the target stimulus subjects were expected to respond to was 
indicated at the start of each trial: its identity – whether it was a 'T' or a 'L', or 
its orientation – whether it was tilted left or right. Every presentation included 
stimuli (both target and distractors) with both feature dimensions ('T' or 'L' 
letters tilted one way or the other), so subjects had to ignore the irrelevant 
feature dimension. 
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There were four clearly defined locations on the display at which stimuli 
appeared, only one of which was the target stimulus. The target stimulus was 
clearly identifiable by its colour (it was the only red letter). Distractors (non-
target stimuli) included 'foils' with target characteristics (they were also tilted 
'T' or 'L', but in white) and others ('neutral' distractors) with only non-target 
characteristics (the letters 'E' and 'F', upright and in white). Before the stimuli 
were presented, one of the four locations was cued. The cued location was 
not always the location where the target stimulus was subsequently 
presented (the target stimulus appeared only 25% of the time at the cued 
location). 
 
What subjects were required to respond to was either the orientation of the 
target (right or left), or its identity ('T' or 'L'). In identification trials (i.e. trials 
where the subjects were expected to identify whether the target was a 'T' or 
'L', ignoring its tilt) if the target was 'T', subjects were to respond by pressing 
their right index finger, and if the target was 'L' subjects were to respond by 
pressing their right middle finger. In orientation trials (i.e. trials where 
subjects had to identify right or left tilt of the target, ignoring whether it was a 
'T' or 'L'), if the target was tilting to the left responses were made by pressing 
the right index finger, right-tilting target responses were made by pressing 
the right middle finger. Responses to 'T' (identification) and left-tilt 
(orientation) were both 'compatible' (i.e. made by pressing the right index 
finger). In contrast, responses to 'T' and right-tilt were incompatible (i.e. 
made by pressing different fingers). 
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Response times were fastest for cued irrelevant-dimension compatible 
targets, and slowest for cued relevant-dimension incompatible foils. So if, for 
example, on an orientation trial, the target was a left-tilted 'T', and it was 
cued, the response time would be much faster than if a right-tilted foil had 
been cued. What is of particular interest is that, while there was a significant 
difference in response time between compatible and incompatible irrelevant 
features of the target (cued or not), there was no significant difference in 
response time between compatible and incompatible irrelevant features of 
the foil (cued or not). So for example in an orientation trial, if the target's 
irrelevant feature (its identity – whether 'T' or 'L') was incompatible with its 
relevant feature (i.e. required a different finger press response), the response 
would be slower than if its irrelevant feature was compatible. However, in an 
orientation trial, whether the irrelevant feature (identity) of the foils was 
compatible with their orientation or not made no significant difference in 
response time. In other words, the task-irrelevant features of foils were just 
ignored. Remington and Folk take their results to provide evidence against 
the assumption that ‘all features of the attended object are selected 
regardless of their relevance to the immediate task’: even when the foil was 
cued, whether its irrelevant feature was compatible or not made no 
significant difference in response time. 
 
How does this evidence support Kentridge, de-Wit and Heywood's rejection 
of the distinction between attention to a location and attention to an object at 
that location, on which they base their claim that "attention can act without 
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consciousness"?68 The fact that there was no significant difference in response 
time between cued and un-cued non-target items with incompatible irrelevant 
features shows, they say, that “spatial attention can be deployed in order to 
determine whether objects with a specific property are present”, and as “the facilitation 
of processing in attended space only applies to objects with that specific property”,69 it 
doesn’t make sense to them to argue that it is the space and whatever 
objects occupy it that are being attended to. Even if we suppose, as I 
suggested we should for the moment, that GY was attending to a portion of 
his blind field, Remington and Folk’s results are not decisive. The Remington 
and Folk experiment shows that when our visual attention is spatially cued, 
we can exercise discrimination regarding whether what we find at that 
location is relevant. The subjects in the experiment were visually aware of 
the colour of the object at the cued location, and were able to ignore it if it 
was not red. It does not follow from this that blindseers, who lack any visual 
awareness of objects in their blind field, could selectively ignore objects 
based on their colour in this way. We have to further suppose that blindseers 
can exercise some equivalent discriminative capacity. 
 
Once we drop the assumption that GY was visually attending to a portion of 
his blind field, Kentridge and his colleagues are once again faced with the 
challenge I posed in the previous section. The challenge I posed in the 
previous section asked whether, when what is cued is within a blindseer’s 
blind field, it still makes sense to think that the Posner task is measuring the 
effects of attention at all. Subjects in the Remington and Folk experiments 
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were visually aware of the cued targets. The reason we ought to think of the 
Posner task as a measure of the effects of visual attention, I have said, is its 
similarity to the use of pointing to visually attract someone’s attention to 
something. When a blindseer is asked to attempt the Posner task, whatever 
it is that is facilitating the speeding of his response times is not conscious. 
We can, therefore, quite legitimately question whether it is attention at all. 
 
Kentridge, de-Wit and Heywood present, by reference to the Remington and 
Folk experiment, a compelling case for the enhancement of processing (in 
terms of speed of response) that cuing a location can bring about being 
sensitive to the properties of the object at the cued location. This shows that 
the selection of a location does not simply mean everything at that location 
receives enhanced processing. It also shows that what it is that receives 
enhanced processing can depend on the intentions of the attending subject 
(in the experiment described, the subject’s intention to report the orientation 
or identity of the red target rather than the white distractors). All this is, as far 
as I can tell, quite consistent with the way we normally think of looking for 
something. Abstracting from the complexities of Remington and Folk’s 
experiment, if I am looking for something and I am directed to the right place, 
I will find it more quickly. If, instead, I am directed to a location occupied by 
something that is clearly not what I am looking for, my search will be 
delayed. But it seems quite plausible, even without the experimental 
evidence, that the properties of the unwanted object will not affect the length 
of the delay. What is interesting about Remington and Folk’s results is that 
we learn something about the circumstances under which we cannot ignore 
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irrelevant information. (According to their results, the task-irrelevant 
dimension of the target did affect response times, so it seems we cannot 
always ignore what is irrelevant when it is a property of the object we are 
looking for). 
 
However, what Remington and Folk’s results do not show is that in the very 
different circumstances of the experiments with GY, what was being 
measured was attention. If visual attention, conceived as sufficient for 
awareness, can explain our visually based thoughts and actions in a way that 
blindseers’ selection and enhancement cannot, we can be confident that 
visual attention plays a distinctive and therefore indispensable role. In that 
case, Remington and Folk’s results will not motivate the revision of what we 
mean by ‘attention’, from something that is essentially a conscious 
phenomenon to something that is not.  
 
There is a further twist to the exchange between Mole and Kentridge. In 
response to newer experimental data produced by Kentridge and 
colleagues,70 Mole has conceded that attention to an object is not sufficient 
for awareness of it.71 Does this new evidence settle the question against the 
sufficiency of visual attention for awareness? Norman, Heywood and 
Kentridge made use of a task in which (normally sighted) subjects are 
required to register (by pressing a button) the appearance of a target which 
may or may not be validly cued. 72 In this task, the target is located within one 
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of two identical rectangular shapes displayed. The two rectangles are either 
both positioned vertically, or both positioned horizontally. In both horizontal 
and vertical positions, the cue and target could appear at either end of either 
of the rectangles. When the rectangles are positioned vertically, the distance 
between the top of one and the top of the other is the same as their height; 
when they are positioned horizontally, the distance between the left (or right) 
end of one and the left (or right) end of the other is the same as their length. 
The task is constructed to test whether there is a reaction time advantage 
when the target is invalidly cued with the cue appearing in the opposite end 
of the same rectangle compared to the invalid cue appearing in the other 
rectangle. Since the distance between cue and target in both cases is the 
same, the fact that reaction times are reduced when the invalid cue is 
located within the same shape as the target suggests that attention is being 
directed to the object (the shape) and not just a spatial location. The 
innovation to this task introduced by Norman, Heywood and Kentridge was to 
mask the rectangles, so subjects had no visual awareness of them. Despite 
subjects being unaware of the rectangles, there was a small reaction time 
advantage when the invalid cue was located within the same rectangle. 
 
So what do these results prove? Do they prove that, even in the case of 
normally sighted subjects, attention can be directed to objects that they are 
visually unaware of? As with the Remington and Folk data, the proper 
response is to insist that visual attention – conceived as sufficient for 
awareness – is indispensable if it can explain our visually based thoughts 
and actions in a way that unconscious selection and enhancement cannot. It 
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should be clear this is a perfectly legitimate response, since the question 
being considered is what we mean by ‘attention’ in visual perception. There 
is a prima facie case for visual attention being sufficient for awareness: you 
will struggle to pay attention to the colour of an object you are not aware of. 
Before beginning any investigation into whether visual selection of an object 
and subsequent enhanced processing of it can be dissociated from visual 
awareness of it, we need to determine what (if any) distinctive role visual 
attention (conceived as sufficient for awareness) plays. If visual attention so 
conceived plays a distinctive role by explaining some aspect of our visually 
based thoughts and actions that unconscious selection and enhancement 
cannot, any motivation for investigating whether visual attention and 
awareness can dissociate is undermined. In very plain terms, our first move 
should be to ask what visual attention does for us. It is only once we have 
determined what it does for us that we can consider whether it can continue 
to play that role even if it is detached from visual awareness. 
 
Instead of thinking of Kentridge and his colleagues – as they themselves do 
– as having proved the insufficiency of attention for awareness, we should 
think of them as sharpening a preliminary and distinctively philosophical 
question: what (if any) role does visual attention – conceived as sufficient for 
awareness – play that the selection and enhancement blindseers are 
capable of cannot? It is the task of the next chapter to try and answer that 
question. 
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In the next and final section of this chapter I turn to the second of the two 
questions raised in the previous section: how we should understand GY’s 
description of himself as ‘trying to attend to a part of his blind field’. Is this 
best understood in terms of his selecting a part of his blind field? In 
particular, I examine what is involved in making a selection, to see if we can 
understand GY’s description in terms of the two components of Kentridge et 
al.’s characterisation of visual attention (selection and enhancement). 
 
7. The Role of Selection 
 
To end this chapter, I want to try and understand GY’s description of himself 
as ‘trying to attend to a part of his blind field’, and elaborate a little on some 
of the details that emerge. I start by looking again at the characterisation of 
visual attention used by Kentridge and his co-authors, according to which  
 
“Attention… involves a process of selection (withdrawal of processing from parts of the 
world in favour of other parts) and enhancement (the selective concentration of resources 
results in enhanced processing of the object of attention).”73 
 
What I want to do is place some constraints on how we think of the exercise 
of the first of these two components, selection. What I will argue is that it 
makes even less sense, if anything, to understand GY’s claim in terms of his 
making a selection of a part of his blind field than it does to think of him as, in 
one sense, attending to it. I should emphasise from the outset that I am not 
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suggesting this is the interpretation Kentridge and colleagues intend in their 
use of ‘selection’. It is reasonably clear when they use ‘selection’ in relation 
to blindsight they are attributing the capacity for selection to a part or parts of 
the visual system, and not to the subject. I’m interested in trying to 
understand GY’s claim, and one potential gloss I want to investigate – and 
reject – is that he was trying to select a part of his blind field. The first 
question I want to ask is when it makes sense to say, of a subject engaged in 
the Posner task, that it is the subject herself who is selecting the object that 
receives enhanced processing. 
 
I think we can say two things about what it is for a subject to make a 
selection. The first is that making a selection is an intentional activity, and as 
such must be an activity that the subject consciously engages in. Anscombe 
tells us what is distinctive about intentional actions is that to them, “a certain 
sense of the question ‘why?’ has application”.74 As Anscombe goes on to say, “This 
question is refused application by the answer: ‘I was not aware I was doing that’.”75 I 
might intentionally be doing something – turning a light switch on, for 
example – but that does not mean I am intentionally alerting the prowler 
lurking outside. Even if it transpired that there was a causal connection 
between my turning on the light and the prowler’s presence – a sound, 
perhaps, of which I remained unaware but which could be shown to have 
affected my behaviour – I could not be described as intentionally alerting the 
prowler to my presence. How could I? I wasn’t aware of his presence. So it 
seems someone who is unaware of a stimulus cannot respond to it 
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intentionally. In the experiments with GY, his response to the auditory tone, 
of which he was aware, was intentional. The response he chose may have 
been influenced by his visual system detecting the presence of the target 
stimulus, but his intention cannot have been to respond to that stimulus, 
since he was unaware of it. 
 
The second thing we can say is that selection is an activity that involves 
making a choice in light of alternatives. Whether I select a cake from a 
counter full of cakes, or select the only available shelter to take cover from 
the rain, I am making a choice in light of alternatives (other cakes, and 
getting wet, respectively). What’s more, when I make a selection, I need to 
be aware of the available possibilities before making the choice – that is what 
distinguishes making a selection from having my choice made for me, or 
having no choice at all. If I have my choice made for me, or there are no 
alternatives to choose from, I am not making a selection.76 
 
To see how this relates to GY we need to first distinguish between being 
unaware of something because it is occluded or masked in some way, and 
just being unaware of it. If I was trapped in a dense fog where all I could see 
was a uniform grey, I might still be able to select a part of my visual field. If I 
was blind, however – lacking any sensation whatsoever – it no longer makes 
sense to say I am selecting a part of my visual field. This was Sorensen’s 
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 Some selections will involve deliberation, and explicit reasons for the selection of one 
object rather than any other, but this is not a requirement for making a selection. As 
Anscombe also tells us, the sense of the question ‘Why?’ that is applicable to intentional 
actions is applicable even when the answer is ‘For no reason’ (Anscombe (1957/1963) p. 
25). Similarly, what matters for the making of a selection is that it is made in the light of an 
alternative or alternatives, not that it must be the result of an explicit reason or process of 
deliberation. 
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reason for denying blindseers can perceive darkness. GY’s visual deficit only 
affects part of his visual field, but we should not think of it as resembling my 
situation in the fog, adjusted to affect only part of his visual field. We need to 
think of it as a blindness, a complete absence of sensation, in the affected 
part of his visual field. That is, we should think of GY’s blindsight as making 
his visual field smaller, rather than as obscuring part of it. Once we think of it 
in this way, it just doesn’t make sense to say he can select part of his blind 
field. Some of GY’s comments, reported by Kentridge and Heywood, point to 
this way of thinking of his visual deficit. In response to inquiries about his 
experience of cues, he said “I’d be none the wiser if you weren’t putting any cues up 
just to confuse me.” and “I just listen for the beep and press a button.”77 The blindseer 
DB, in the interview conducted by Lawrence Weiskrantz following the initial 
tests of his visual abilities, expressed surprise at his success. 
 
“In the interview that followed, and which was recorded, DB expressed considerable 
surprise. ‘Did you know how well you had done?’, he was asked. ‘No,’ he replied, ‘I didn’t 
– because I couldn’t see anything; I couldn’t see a darn thing.’ ‘Can you say how you 
guessed – what it was that allowed you to say whether it [a stick held up in his blind 
field] was vertical or horizontal?’ ‘No, I could not because I did not see anything; I just 
don’t know.’ Finally, he was asked, ‘So you really did not know you were getting them 
right?’ ‘No,’ he replied, still with something of an air of incredulity.”78 
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 Kentridge and Heywood (2001) p. 174. 
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 Weiskrantz (2009) p. 87. 
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There is no suggestion of their visual field being obscured, and explicit 
descriptions of ‘absolute blindness’ in the affected area (e.g. Weiskrantz 
(2009) p. 86), which strongly indicates that we should think of all blindseer’s 
visual fields as reduced in size by the extent of their blind field, rather than as 
obscured or ‘fogged’ in some way. 
 
To return to GY, we can certainly admit he is attentively listening for an 
auditory tone, and making a selection in terms of his response following the 
tone, but we should not conclude he is selecting a part of his blind field. So 
what is he doing? Recall the remark of his that inspired the attention-in-
blindsight experiments: 
 
“Quite by chance, during one of the breaks in testing, GY remarked that he had just 
realized that the stimuli were sometimes being presented well above the horizontal and so 
now he was trying to pay attention higher up in his blind visual field.”79 
 
Contrast that with other remarks of his, also reported by Kentridge and 
colleagues: 
 
“’When I am aware [of the cue] I can try to attend to the other [i.e. valid] location… when I 
was not aware of any of the cues [during low-contrast cue experiments] I could not try to 
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 Kentridge and Heywood (2001) p. 168. GY’s visual deficit means he is not aware of what, 
without the deficit, he would see with the right half of both of his eyes (right homonymous 
hemianopia). His vision in the left half of both his eyes is normal. 
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switch my attention.’ In other words, GY could only voluntarily direct his attention when he 
had awareness of the cue location.”80 
 
This second remark makes it very clear that whatever GY is doing, it is 
intentional. We have seen that it doesn’t make sense to describe GY as 
selecting something of which he is not aware. I have also argued, in the 
previous section, that it does not follow from the simple fact that the Posner 
spatial cueing task measures the effects of conscious visual attention that it 
is also measuring the effects of visual attention in GY’s case. Pending an 
explanation of why visual attention is sufficient for visual awareness, we 
should remain sceptical about GY visually attending to objects in his blind 
field. So what sense can we make of his ‘attending’ to parts of his blind field? 
 
What follows must be speculative, in the absence of an account from GY 
himself describing the relevant phenomenology in detail. Mole’s defence of 
sufficiency relied on a non-visual construal of attention, according to which 
 
“One can, even with one's eyes closed, direct one's attention to different parts of the 
space around one's head...”81 
 
Perhaps this is the best way to understand GY’s description of himself as 
‘attending’. He was thinking about a location in his blind field; not visually 
attending to it, but attending to it in thought. Exactly what the nature of the 
connection is between GY’s thinking about a location in his blind field and his 
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performance in the Posner task, I leave as a question for further 
phenomenological and psychological investigation. 
 
Before moving on, in the next chapter, to considering explanations of why 
visual attention is sufficient for visual awareness, I want to rule out a potential 
explanation that may be suggested by considerations in this section. It might 
be tempting to think that attention is sufficient for awareness because 
attending is an intentional activity, and we are aware of our intentional 
activities. I will end this chapter by rejecting this route to arguing for the 
sufficiency. I am going to question whether visual attention is always 
intentionally exercised. Specifically, when attention is involuntarily drawn or 
shifted to something, that shift of attention may not be intentional. 
 
GY’s second comment, about awareness of the cue, highlights an important 
aspect of attention I have not yet examined. Some – but only some – 
exercises of visual attention are voluntary. We can be distracted from what 
we are paying attention to.82 I might be distracted from what I am attending 
to by peripheral movement, or a bright light. An involuntary shift of attention 
triggered by movement in the periphery of my visual field might alert me to 
the presence of an animal; the prowler looking at one window might be 
distracted by a light coming on at another. Though we are aware of what we 
attend to, and we are aware that our attention has shifted, the involuntary 
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 I am not saying here: we can always be distracted from what we are paying attention to, 
regardless of how much we are concentrating on it. I mean only that it is possible for us to 
be distracted. 
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shifting of attention is, arguably, not intentional.83 To exemplify, if while 
paying attention to the book in my hand I am distracted by a flashing light in 
the periphery of my visual field, there is a sense in which my shift of 
attention, from the book to the flashing light, is unintentional. That is, there is 
a sense in which I did not mean to shift my attention from the book, it just 
happened. When we contrast this with an example of a voluntary shift of 
attention, the point is brought out more clearly. I can visually single out – 
attend to – one book in a pile of books while remaining aware of the other 
books in the pile. I might decide to shift my attention from one book to 
another. In this case, I am antecedently aware of the object to which I am 
going to shift my attention; the shift of attention is voluntary and intentional. 
While coming to attend to something we see may not be intentional for the 
reasons just given, the voluntary maintaining of attention is more clearly 
intentional. Of course, this characterisation of visual attention as sufficient 
but not necessary for awareness needs arguing for on both counts, and that 
is the work of the next two chapters. 
 
So I will not be attempting to defend the sufficiency of visual attention for 
visual awareness on the basis of the activity of visually attending being an 
intentional activity, because I am not sure that it is always exercised 
intentionally. Nevertheless, as I will argue in the next chapter, I believe there 
is a close connection between attention and intentional action. The most 
important point I have tried to make in this chapter is that there is an 
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 Though Anscombe is discouraging about the prospect of illuminating intentional action by 
appeal to the difference between voluntary and involuntary action (Anscombe (1957/1963) 
pp. 10-11), she does go on to say “It is also clear that one is refusing application to the 
question ‘Why?’ (in the relevant sense) if one says ‘It was involuntary’…” (Anscombe 
(1957/1963) p. 12). 
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underlying assumption supporting Kentridge et al.’s claim that GY is visually 
attending to stimuli he is visually unaware of. The assumption is that the 
Posner task, which measures the effects of conscious visual attention on 
response times and accuracy with normally sighted subjects, also measures 
the effects of visual attention in the case of a subject with blindsight. But to 
make this assumption is just to beg the question against the conception of 
visual attention as sufficient for visual awareness. To say that the Posner 
task can measure the effects of attention regardless of whether or not the 
subject being tested is aware of the stimuli is in effect to admit that a decision 
has already been made about the role attention plays: it selects object to 
receive enhanced processing. I have been arguing that decision is 
premature. The way we typically think of visual attention is as sufficient for 
awareness – it would be to misunderstand or misuse the word to ask 
someone who is not visually aware of an object to pay attention to it. Given 
that, our first step needs to be to determine whether attention conceived in 
this way plays a distinctive and therefore indispensable role.  
 
One possible reaction to the Kentridge et al. (1999) results is to dismiss them 
as irrelevant to this conception of attention. I think that would be a mistake. 
Instead, we should see the results as posing a characteristically 
philosophical question: why do we think of attention as an essentially 
conscious phenomenon? What role does visual attention so conceived play 
that the selection and enhancement blindseers are capable of does not? In 
the next chapter, I consider four potential answers to this question. 
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Chapter 3: The Sufficiency of Visual Attention 
 
The task of this chapter is to identify how visual 
attention, conceived as sufficient for awareness, 
explains our visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions in a way that the selective enhancement the 
blindseer is capable of does not. I consider four 
candidates for this explanatory role. In §2 I consider 
whether visual attention enables us to have 
spontaneous (unprompted) visually based object-
directed thoughts and actions; in §3 I look at Declan 
Smithies’ Rational Access account of the explanatory 
role of attention; in §4 I look at John Campbell’s 
Relational View account of the explanatory role of 
attention, and in §5 I propose my own reasons-based 
account. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We are considering the question of whether a subject’s visual attention to an 
object is sufficient for her to be visually aware of the object. On the face of it, 
this seems like an easy question to answer. Whether I am turning my 
attention to each of the items on my desk as I look for a particular one, or my 
attention is grabbed by a flashing light, I am visually aware of what I am 
visually attending to. As we saw in the preceding chapter, however, this 
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everyday way of talking about attending to objects that we see faces a 
challenge exemplified by the abilities of a subject with blindsight. According 
to Robert Kentridge and colleagues, 
 
“Attention… involves a process of selection (withdrawal of processing from parts of the 
world in favour of other parts) and enhancement (the selective concentration of resources 
results in enhanced processing of the object of attention).”84 
 
They also think that data from their spatial cuing experiments with the 
blindseer GY have helped establish that 
 
“selective enhancement of an object’s properties by spatial attention can occur without 
any conscious experience of those properties or their enhancement.”85 
 
The selection and enhancement that visual attention involves co-occur with 
visual awareness in ordinary cases, but this may be merely a co-incidence, 
as it were. According to the Kentridge picture, visual attention is not 
essentially conscious: attention is not sufficient for awareness. 
 
Reflection on the role of visual experience seems to suggest otherwise. If 
you ask me how I know how the magician performed his trick, and I say it’s 
because I was paying attention to his hands and I saw him palm the coin, my 
answer seems to settle the question. In contrast if I say I don’t know, or 
(more inexplicably still) I say it’s because I was paying attention to his hands 
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 Kentridge et al. (2008) p. 106. 
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 Kentridge et al. (2008) p. 110. 
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though I wasn’t aware of anything, or I attribute my success to a part of my 
visual system, that would just raise further questions. Of course, someone 
impressed by the blindsight data might interject here that this merely reflects 
our lack of familiarity with attention in the absence of awareness. A 
constructive approach to defending the sufficiency of attention for awareness 
will not, therefore, appeal to custom and habit. Instead, a constructive 
approach will seek to arrive at a deeper understanding of the nature of visual 
attention by asking why attention should be conscious. Fortunately, we 
already have a preliminary answer. Conscious attention to an object explains 
our visually based thoughts and actions with respect to it: my paying 
attention to the magician’s hands explains how I know how he did his trick – I 
was aware of him palming the coin. So also when I hit the bullseye with my 
arrow, or correctly read out the letters on an eye chart. My paying attention to 
the object (the target, or each letter on the chart) implies my awareness of it, 
and my awareness of it, in a way to be illuminated, explains my thoughts and 
actions. 
 
Clearly, to mount a credible defence of the claim that visual attention to an 
object is sufficient for visual awareness of it, the explanation attributed to 
visual attention cannot be one that is also available as an explanation of the 
blindseer’s visually based object-directed thoughts and actions. So the 
correct response to Kentridge’s evidence against sufficiency is to identify 
how visual attention to objects explains our thoughts and actions in a 
distinctive way. 
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An obvious starting point is to look for differences between the visually based 
abilities of blindseers and those of normally sighted people. Blindseers lack 
visual awareness of course, but if that is the most we can say, it will be hard 
to motivate a defence of the sufficiency of attention for awareness. It will be 
difficult, that is, to give any sense to our natural inclination to think of visual 
awareness as explaining our visually based thoughts and actions. As a 
consequence, it will also be difficult to avoid the charge that it is purely on the 
basis of habit that we cling on to our conception of visual attention as 
sufficient for visual awareness. So we need to ask whether there are, in 
addition to the lack of awareness, any further deficits. In particular, are there 
any visually based deficits which will answer the question: What is it that 
visual attention to an object enables us to do that the selective enhancement 
of blindseers does not enable them to do? An answer to that question could 
provide a convincing candidate for the explanatory role of visual attention. 
 
To get a fix on the kind of answer we are looking for, it may be helpful to 
briefly consider a possible candidate that we can reject quite quickly. A good 
example for this purpose is the detailed visual information that people with 
normal sight enjoy, and that GY’s blindsight lacks. After some consideration, 
it becomes apparent that providing detailed visual information turns out not to 
be a good candidate for the explanatory role of visual attention. The main 
reason is that portraying the difference between blindsight and normal vision 
as a matter of degree, a difference between minimal visual information and 
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detailed visual information, simply mischaracterises the difference. 86 Daniel 
Dennett tries to argue for this characterisation of the difference.87 Dennett 
suggests that the difference between a blindseer and someone with normal 
vision is a difference in the quantity of available information (‘richness of 
content’).88 He points to the possibility of training a blindseer to improve his 
performance through practice, and by learning to prompt himself. There is 
good evidence that blindseers can improve their performance with practice, 
some of which we saw in the last chapter. GY improved his performance with 
practice on the indirect peripheral cueing condition. There is also evidence, 
which we will see in §2.2, that blindseers can perform a range of actions 
without needing to be prompted. I am, however, aware of no evidence that 
blindseers can learn to prompt themselves in the sense Dennett means. He 
asks whether a blindseer could be trained to function normally by learning to 
prompt himself.89 In §2.1 I try to show why I don’t think this is a coherent 
possibility. But I hope there is some initial plausibility to the thought that it is 
just a mistake to characterise the difference between blindsight and normal 
visual experience as a difference in the quantity of available information. 
What makes the abilities of blindseers so remarkable, and of considerable 
philosophical interest, is that they are exercised in the complete absence of 
visual awareness.90 
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 Cf. Weiskrantz (2009b).There is also evidence of a blindseer demonstrating visual 
discrimination of objects in his blind field well beyond the capabilities of normally sighted 
subjects. The blindseer DB’s performance identifying very low contrast stimuli in his blind 
field was better than the performance of normally sighted subjects (Trevethan et al. (2007)). 
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 Dennett (1991) pp. 325-343 and Dennett’s (1995) commentary in Block (1995) pp. 252-
253. 
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89
 Dennett (1991) pp. 330-331. He actually wonders whether a blindseer could ‘become 
conscious’ in this way. 
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 This is the case with pure or ‘type 1’ blindsight. I touch on type 2 blindsight in §2.2 below. 
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A companion consideration is that visual attention can be deployed covertly, 
i.e. to the periphery of the visual field, outside central foveal vision (all the 
attention orienting experiments with GY relied on this). The visual experience 
of someone who is covertly attending to an object will lack the detailed visual 
information of the object that overt (foveal) attention to it would provide, and 
in that sense covert attention lacks the quantity of information provided by 
overt attention. But covert attention is still conscious, the person is still 
visually aware of the object. So describing the difference between blindsight 
and normal visual experience in purely quantitative terms does not explain 
why in one case but not the other there is visual awareness of the object. 
 
There are better candidates for the explanatory role of visual attention. In this 
chapter I will consider four of them, one each in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5. The 
first takes as its inspiration the fact that blindseers need to be prompted to 
make guesses about objects in their blind field. Visual attention to an object 
obviates the need to be prompted to consider it. Could this be evidence that 
the explanatory role of visual attention is to make visual information 
spontaneously accessible for use in the control of thought and action? I look 
at an argument Ned Block has put forward against the inference from a 
deficiency in blindsight to a function of visual awareness (§2.1). If Block is 
right, visual awareness is not necessary for visual information to be 
spontaneously accessible for thought and action, and therefore that cannot 
be the explanatory role that visual attention plays. I consider an ability of 
blindseers we did not come across in the previous chapter, their ability to 
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spontaneously act with respect to objects in their blind field, which indicates 
that the connection between spontaneous visually based object-directed 
action and awareness is not the same as the connection between 
spontaneous visually based object-directed thought and awareness (§2.2). I 
outline some evidence for David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s theory that 
there are two separate visual systems (§2.3). This presents a choice. Either 
we reconceive visual attention as actually composed of two varieties of 
attention, with only one being conscious, or we continue to treat it as a single 
phenomenon. I opt for continuing to treat visual attention as a single, 
conscious phenomenon. When we pay attention to objects we see, 
regardless of whether the attention is a prelude to action, or it is attention 
paid just out of curiosity, we don’t think of attention as possible in the 
absence of awareness. To keep hold of this pre-theoretical view of attention, 
we need to treat visual attention as a conscious phenomenon. Consequently, 
we have to give up explaining the distinctive role of visual attention as 
making information spontaneously accessible for thought and action. 
 
In Section 3, I consider a different proposal: visual attention explains our 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions by justifying them. 
Declan Smithies has argued that visual attention to an object provides us 
with justifying reasons for our visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions. A blindseer may think about an object in his blind field, or act upon it 
because he can visually detect it, but he lacks access to justifying reasons 
for his thoughts and actions. 
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In Section 4, I consider the role visual attention plays in grounding our 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions. John Campbell has 
argued that blindseers lack the distinctive way of knowing which physical 
object a demonstrative refers to that visually attending to it provides. Visual 
attention to objects provides us with knowledge of the reference of 
demonstratives, and justifies our thinking of objects as mind-independent. 
The visual selection and enhancement that is preserved in blindsight does 
not provide blindseers with knowledge of the reference of demonstratives, or 
with justification to conceive of objects as mind-independent. 
 
In Section 5 I set out an alternative to both Smithies’ and Campbell’s views, 
which identifies an explanatory role for visual attention that neither Smithies 
nor Campbell give due weight to. Visual attention to an object, I argue, 
explains how our thoughts about it, and our actions with respect to it, are 
integrated. Visual attention to an object also prioritises responding to that 
object over other intentional, visually based responses. 
 
2. Spontaneous Accessibility 
 
In this section I consider the proposal that visual attention makes information 
spontaneously accessible for use in the control of thought and action. The 
motivation for this view of the explanatory role of attention comes from the 
observation that blindseers need to be prompted to make guesses about 
objects in their blind field. As we saw in Chapter 1, GY is able to detect the 
presence of a target displayed to his blind field; he is able to do this well 
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above chance and his response time is faster following a valid than a 
misleading cue. In those experiments, the presentation of the target stimulus 
was signalled to GY by an auditory tone, which was also his cue to 
respond.91 This marks a substantial difference between GY’s ability to detect 
objects in his blind field and the ability of normally sighted people (and, 
presumably, GY when he uses his intact hemifield). When we open our eyes 
we are confronted by the world: our thoughts about the objects we see and 
our actions with respect to those objects generally need no prompting. It is 
very tempting to conclude, therefore, that the distinctive way in which visual 
attention explains visually based object-directed thoughts and actions is by 
prompting them. When I am visually attending to an object, in addition to the 
selection and enhancement of processing of the object by my visual system, 
I am aware of it. Being aware of it in this way – attentively aware of it, so to 
speak – seems to explain why I don’t need to be prompted to think about it, 
or act with respect to it. This suggests that the explanatory role of visual 
attention to an object is to make visual information from that object 
spontaneously accessible for the purpose of thought about the object, and 
action with respect to it. 
 
Ned Block (e.g. Block (1995)) has argued, in effect, that the inference to an 
explanatory role for visual attention from the inability of subjects with 
blindsight to prompt themselves is not valid. In §2.1 I look at his argument, 
which makes use of the hypothetical condition of ‘super blindsight’. I question 
the coherence of super blindsight as described by Block. I conclude that 
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Block is right to question the validity of the inference, but that because of the 
questionable coherence of super blindsight, the issue is one which needs to 
be resolved by looking at actual cases. In §2.2 I look at empirical evidence 
from both a monkey and a human that seems to support the existence of a 
partial kind of ‘super’ blindsight. Both demonstrate spontaneous visually 
based object-directed actions in the absence of visual awareness. In §2.3 I 
outline an influential hypothesis, David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s two 
visual systems hypothesis, that purports to explain how this partial super 
blindsight is possible. The empirical evidence from ‘partial super blindsight’ 
along with the evidence Milner and Goodale draw on for their hypothesis 
strongly indicates that visual attention to an object is not necessary for visual 
information from it to be spontaneously accessible for the purpose of action 
with respect to it. This presents a choice. Either visual attention is no longer 
treated as a unitary, conscious phenomenon and the defence of the pre-
theoretical conception of attention as sufficient for awareness is given up, or 
a different explanatory role for attention is found. Sections 3-5 of this chapter 
all consider explanatory roles for attention conceived as a unitary, conscious 
phenomenon. 
 
2.1 Blindsight and Super Blindsight 
 
When we talk of paying attention to things we see, part of what we mean is 
that we are aware of the things we are paying attention to. I cannot pay 
attention to the magician’s card trick while remaining completely unaware of 
it. Robert Kentridge and others have challenged this conception of attention, 
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arguing that GY’s visual abilities demonstrate that attending to an object is 
not sufficient for being aware of it. I have responded that a recognisable and 
quite typical way of talking about attending to things we see – what I have 
called visual attention – points to a conception of visual attention that plays 
an explanatory role for us: visual attention explains, for example, how I know 
what I am looking at. If visual attention plays an explanatory role that cannot 
be played by the visual selection and enhancement the blindseer is capable 
of, we have the basis of a defence of the sufficiency of visual attention for 
visual awareness. The challenge is to identify what this explanatory role is, 
and why it cannot be played by the visual selection and enhancement the 
blindseer is capable of. A promising first step in identifying the explanatory 
role of visual attention is to compare the abilities of blindseers and the 
normally sighted. Blindseers, it appears, are unable to make reports about 
objects in their blind field unless they are prompted to do so. Accordingly, the 
proposal we are considering here is that visual attention is necessary for us 
to be able to spontaneously access visual information in the service of 
object-directed thought and action. 
 
The strategy behind this proposal faces a challenge brought by Ned Block. 
Block (Block (1995)) has argued against drawing conclusions about the 
function of consciousness from the deficits exhibited by blindseers. 
According to Block, blindseers lack not only visual awareness, but also a 
functionally defined kind of consciousness. Block argues for a distinction 
between what he calls phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness (or ‘P-consciousness’) is 
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“… experience. P-conscious properties are experiential ones. P-conscious states are 
experiential, that is, a state is P-conscious if it has experiential properties. The totality of 
the experiential properties of a state are ‘what it is like’ to have it.”92 
 
The state of being visually aware of an object is an example of a 
phenomenally conscious state. It is noteworthy that phenomenally conscious 
properties are not to be identified with any cognitive, intentional or functional 
properties.93 
 
We correctly attribute an access conscious (or ‘A-conscious’) state to a 
subject when a representation of the content of the state is 
 
“… poised for use as a premise in reasoning,… poised for rational control in action, and… 
poised for rational control of speech.”94 
 
On Block’s analysis, blindseers lack visual representations of objects 
presented to their blind fields that are P-conscious, but those representations 
are also not A-conscious, and their inability to spontaneously report the 
presence of the objects is due to the lack of access consciousness. Block’s 
main aim in his (1995) is to demonstrate how one kind of argument about the 
function of what he calls phenomenal consciousness is invalid. The kind of 
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argument he is targeting infers from the fact that the blindseer’s lack of visual 
awareness is accompanied by an inability to spontaneously report the 
presence of objects in his blind field that a function of visual awareness is to 
make visual information accessible for spontaneous report. This argument is 
invalid, Block maintains, because there could be (and Block thinks there is) 
something else missing in blindsight, and it is the lack of this further 
component of normal functioning (‘access consciousness’) that is 
responsible for the blindseer’s inability to spontaneously report objects 
presented to their blind field. 
 
To support his case, Block considers the hypothetical possibility of super 
blindsight. The super blindseer can prompt himself to make guesses about 
what is in his blind field in such a way that 
 
“Visual information from his blind field simply pops into his thoughts in the way that 
solutions to problems we’ve been worrying about pop into our thoughts, or in the way 
some people just know the time or which way is North without having any perceptual 
experience of it.”95 
 
Visual information is access conscious for the super blindseer without being 
phenomenally conscious. The super blindseer is able to spontaneously 
report the presence of objects in his blind field. To accept super blindsight as 
a coherent possibility is to accept that we can conceive of access 
consciousness in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. If we can 
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conceive of access consciousness in the absence of phenomenal 
consciousness, phenomenal consciousness – and therefore visual 
awareness – cannot be conceptually necessary for the availability of visual 
information for spontaneous response. Yet it seems very plausible that visual 
awareness is necessary for spontaneous, visually based thoughts and 
actions. According to the pre-theoretical conception I have described, it is 
because I am aware of (and attending to) the magician’s hands that I come 
to know how he does his trick. The surprising abilities of subjects with 
blindsight appear to challenge this view. Blindseers can acquire visually 
based information about their environment in the absence of any awareness. 
However, in the experiments with GY described in the last chapter, the 
unconscious visual information he acquired was not available to him for 
spontaneous responses. A modified view therefore suggested itself: visual 
awareness is necessary for visually based information to be used 
spontaneously. If the super blindseer can do everything his normally sighted 
counterpart can do, even this modified view is incorrect. 
 
So it is a pressing question to ask whether super blindsight as envisaged by 
Block is a coherent possibility. The sketch Block provides suggests the super 
blindseer prompts himself to guess about what is in his blind field, following 
which answers ‘simply pop into his head’. What the sketch does not make 
clear is exactly how the super blindseer’s self-prompting is supposed to 
work. In actual cases of blindsight (even the remarkable discrimination and 
identification abilities demonstrated by DB96), the blindseer has to be 
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prompted by the experimenters to respond when a stimulus is presented to 
his blind field.97 Perhaps we can we fill out Block’s sketch by trying to 
imagine how super blindsight might work. 
 
Suppose a super blindseer is sat in front of a blank monitor screen, and his 
task is to press a button when he thinks something is presented on the 
screen. He doesn’t have to identify it, just press the button as soon as he 
thinks it appears. He may become quite good at this if the stimulus is 
presented in the first few seconds, or minutes. But what if there is a much 
longer delay? In the controlled environment of a laboratory, with clear 
instructions explaining his task, this might be feasible. But in a natural 
environment, with unpredictable eventualities, how does the super blindseer 
know when to prompt himself, or in which direction to look? And how does he 
interpret his ‘guesses’? As he watches an empty bus stop, let us suppose he 
detects a woman walking up to it. He prompts himself again, and again 
detects a woman at the bus stop. Is it the same woman? He may detect the 
same properties again, but given the discrete, periodic nature of his visual 
information about the world, mistaking one thing for another very similar one 
will always be more of a possibility for him than for a normal subject. More 
generally, it seems he is prone to missing events that occur, as it were, ‘in 
between prompts’. Perhaps there is some way of augmenting his abilities to 
deal with this, but it seems like we will have to attribute yet more ill-defined 
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abilities to him for it to be plausible that his self-prompting will enable him to 
function like a normally sighted person. 
 
There are other ways in which the super blindseer’s lack of visual awareness 
will affect what he can do on the basis of unconscious visual information. As I 
have characterised the relationship between visual awareness and attention, 
people who enjoy normal vision are, on occasion, prompted to attend to 
something because of their visual awareness of it. I may be looking for a 
particular book among a pile of books, and shift my attention over each of the 
books in turn to determine if it is the right one. I know which direction to shift 
my attention in, because I am aware of all the books in the pile and I know 
which ones I have just looked at. How does the super blindseer know which 
direction to shift his attention in? Our visual environment is typically quite 
complex, and often includes moving objects (e.g. people, other animals, and 
vehicles). If the super blindseer shifts his visual ‘selection’ from one object to 
another, he will no longer be receiving any visual information about the first 
object, and could therefore lose track of it. In contrast, I can continue to be 
aware of objects I am not attending to, including moving objects. My 
characterisation of the relationship between visual attention and visual 
awareness on which these claims rely is defended in chapter 4. But I think 
even without these questions about the coherence of super blindsight, we 
should be sceptical. 
 
How could a periodic source of information, derived from someone 
repeatedly prompting themselves to guess what is in their environment, 
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provide the sort of continuous flow of information visual experience can 
provide us with? I suppose someone could insist that super blindsight could 
provide a continuous flow of information, but the nature of this information, 
and the way the super blindseer manages it, then become mysterious. How 
could someone who has learned to prompt himself do so both voluntarily and 
continuously? And if he receives continuous information, what form would 
this information take? Would it be like a running commentary on the objects 
in his line of sight? How, without some sort of guidance, would he be able to 
voluntarily focus his visual attention on particular objects? I cannot myself 
make much sense of how any of this this would work. 
 
If the super blindseer does not receive a continuous flow of visual 
information, his visual abilities would appear to be functionally (and not just 
phenomenally) different. To borrow John McDowell’s memorable phrase, 
when we open our eyes we are ‘saddled with content’.98 The super blindseer 
is not saddled with content; he has to pull out information a piece at a time, 
and it is arguable that for that reason the kind of visual information he has 
access to is qualitatively different. Suppose someone with normal vision was 
to look at an event proceeding, such as an object moving, or changing 
colour. If she attended to the object without blinking or looking away, she 
would see the object moving, or changing colour. Put in the same position, 
the super blindseer would only detect different stages of the event. Arguably, 
this is not just a difference in quantity of information, it is also a difference in 
the kind of information. A subject with normal vision is able to perceive the 
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continuous progress of events. The super blindseer is only able to detect 
discrete states of the world. 
 
There may well be ingenious ways of adding to Block’s sketch, and 
answering the questions about super blindsight I have raised. But the 
important point, I think, is this. Super blindsight was introduced by Block as a 
device to help us understand the possibility of access consciousness without 
phenomenal consciousness. Instead, it has raised more questions than it has 
answered. As a way of illustrating a conceptual possibility, it has not 
delivered. 
 
Block is, however, right to conclude that the concurrent absence of visual 
awareness and the ability to spontaneously report the presence of objects 
does not of itself prove that the lack of the first causes the lack of the second. 
It is logically possible that the absence of the ability to spontaneously report 
is unrelated to the absence of visual awareness, or that a third factor is 
responsible for the absence of both. This possibility notwithstanding, it 
remains very plausible that visual awareness of objects has some role to 
play in prompting object-directed thoughts and actions. When we speak of 
being distracted by something we see, what we mean is that something we 
see captures our attention, and we start thinking about it because we are 
conscious of it. It isn’t obvious how a person could be distracted by 
something she was not aware of. Block’s sketch of super blindsight is 
inconclusive, since it simply doesn’t provide enough information for us to 
envisage it working. What we need to decide whether spontaneous visually 
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based object-directed thoughts and actions are possible in the absence of 
visual awareness of those objects is an actual case of super blindsight. 
Interestingly, it turns out that there are actual cases, albeit in a limited kind of 
way. 
 
In §2.2 below, I consider two cases that could be described as ‘partial super 
blindsight’. The first case is of a monkey named Helen whose visual cortex 
(the area damaged in subjects with blindsight) was removed. The 
psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, who studied Helen closely over a long 
period of time, not only provides a clear description of her ‘super blindsight’ 
like abilities, but also offers what I think are intriguing pointers to 
understanding what her abilities are missing. The second case is of a human 
blindseer, TN, with bilateral blindsight (i.e. a complete lack of visual 
awareness). Both Helen and TN have demonstrated some astonishing 
visually based abilities in the absence of visual awareness. 
 
2.2 Helen and TN 
 
What might ‘super blindsight’ actually be like? Two cases of partial super 
blindsight, one involving a monkey, the other a human with bilateral 
blindsight (i.e. a lack of visual awareness across the whole visual field), 
provide some answers. The first case, which I describe in some detail, 
concerns a female rhesus monkey named Helen. Helen had her visual cortex 
surgically removed when she was an adolescent (visual cortex is the area of 
the brain damaged in humans with blindsight). Nicholas Humphrey spent 
89 
 
eight years training and observing Helen after her operation. His 
observations of the changes in her behaviour, and his surmises about her 
visual abilities and deficits are, I think, both intriguing and suggestive. 
 
Humphrey describes how immediately following the operation, Helen 
appeared to be entirely blind.99 For the first year, she showed little sign of 
any change, though he noticed that Helen sometimes appeared to turn her 
head or move her eyes in the direction of a moving object. Nineteen months 
after surgery, Humphrey started training Helen to reach through the bars of 
her cage for morsels of food he was holding in his hand.100 If he kept his 
hand stationary, Helen would reach at random for it. If he waved his hand, or 
waggled his fingers, Helen was able to reach in roughly the right direction, 
and she improved with practice. To make sure Helen wasn’t using her sense 
of hearing, or some other non-visual cue, Humphrey tested her ability to 
reach for the food in complete darkness and found her performance fell to 
chance levels.101 Initially, Helen could not tell whether the object was within 
her reach or not.102 Following a hiatus in training, Helen’s abilities improved 
to the extent that she was able to reach for stationary objects (black objects 
against a light background).103 The size of the objects she was able to detect 
also decreased, from hands to ¼ inch cubes to black dots 2 millimetres wide. 
There were, however, some noteworthy differences in Helen’s reaching 
behaviour from that of a normal monkey: 
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“Her reaches were always either preceded or accompanied by fixation eye movements. 
These eye movements appeared to be normal saccades, bringing the fixated object to the 
centre of the retinae. To fixate an object before reaching for it is natural to any foveate 
animal, but it is worth noting that Helen was never seen to do something which is certainly 
within the capacity of a normal monkey – namely to reach for an object which was neither 
presently nor just previously in the direct line of sight. While her eyes could locate an 
object in the peripheral field, her hand, it seemed, did no more than follow her eyes.”104 
 
Even more dramatic improvements in Helen’s abilities were to come. When 
Humphrey moved (with Helen) to Cambridge, he started taking her on a 
leash for walks outside. 
 
“To begin with, as might have been predicted from her previous behaviour, these walks 
were fairly hazardous. She continually bumped into obstacles, she collided with my legs, 
and she several times fell into a pond. But then, day by day, there was an extraordinary 
change in her behaviour. On the one hand she began systematically to anticipate and skirt 
round obstacles in her path, while on the other she began actually to approach the trees in 
the field, turning towards them as we passed by, walking up and reaching out to grasp 
their trunks. There was an old elm tree which she specially liked to climb, and, with her 
perched in a hole in its trunk, I would hold up bits of fruit and nuts for her to reach for; and 
now she did something else she had not done before – she would reach out when the 
target was within arm's length but ignore it if it was too far away. It was clear that, given at 
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least the experience of three-dimensional space, she was quickly developing a kind of 
three-dimensional spatial vision.”105 
 
While Helen would only reach for small objects if she first fixated them, she 
was able to use her peripheral vision to avoid obstacles, though as 
Humphrey explains, her spatial vision was not quite normal. 
 
“All in all, Helen had made a remarkable recovery, yet no one who observed her for long 
would have been persuaded that even the grosser aspects of her spatial vision were in 
fact entirely normal. It was hard to pinpoint what was wrong. But my impression was that 
her visual space was a purely subjective, self-centred space in which she could place 
things in relation to her own body but could not place them in any more stable spatial 
framework. When, for instance, a small bit of black tape was stuck to the floor in the 
presence of surrounding obstacles she would return to try to pick it up again and again, 
never learning to ignore it on the basis of where it lay in relation to the stable objects 
round about it; every time she moved away and then caught sight of the tape again she 
appeared to treat it as a new discovery. By contrast, when a bit of tape was stuck to the 
table in front of her cage she would reach to it once or twice and then ignore it, while 
continuing to take currants from other parts of the table. In the latter case she did not 
move her body and consequently could keep track of the tape's position.”106 
 
Something else he notes about Helen’s visual abilities is that if she became 
distracted by anything her visual abilities deserted her. 
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“A door slamming behind her or an unexpected pinch on her flank might be enough to 
make her quite oblivious of the obstacles in the arena. Despite the apparent effortlessness 
of her performance when she was relaxed, vision never became entirely ‘second nature’ 
to her.”107 
 
When after eight years Helen was euthanized to allow her brain to be 
examined, it was discovered that a small area of visual cortex had not been 
removed. It was estimated that the spared area of cortex corresponded to a 
small area in the upper right-hand quadrant of her visual field. Humphrey is 
quite sure that this small area of spared vision could not explain Helen’s 
spatial visual capabilities: “… it would have taken more than a magician to have done 
what Helen did by some clever kind of squinting.”108  
 
The picture Humphrey paints of the development of Helen’s abilities, and of 
her persisting deficits, is suggestive. Helen went from only being able to 
detect movement to being able to discriminate stationary black objects as 
small as a couple of millimetres from a light background, reminiscent of 
Block’s hypothetical super blindseer ‘trained to prompt himself’. Though she 
became able to detect whether objects were within her reach or not, 
Humphrey says she was never observed reaching for an object that was 
‘neither presently nor just previously in her direct line of sight’. It seems that 
though she could detect and avoid objects in her peripheral vision, she was 
unable to use vision to direct her reaching unless she fixated the objects first. 
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In contrast, normally sighted humans (and monkeys, as Humphrey points 
out) can quite easily reach for an object in their peripheral view. It is difficult 
to reconcile her skill at avoiding obstacles with her more limited ability to 
reach for them. If she could visually detect peripheral obstacles well enough 
to avoid them, why wasn’t she able to reach for them? The answer 
suggested by this disparity seems to be that the two forms of visual detection 
functioned differently, one for obstacle avoidance, the other for reaching. 
 
Humphrey also describes how Helen would keep returning to a bit of black 
tape stuck to the floor and try to pick it up, ‘never learning to ignore it’. He 
speculates that Helen’s sense of space was ‘a purely subjective, self-centred 
space in which she could place things in relation to her own body but could 
not place them in any more stable spatial framework’. Helen could reliably 
detect objects in her direct line of sight, but seemed unable to maintain a 
sense of where objects she had previously encountered were located. Why 
might this be the case? Presumably, given enough time, she could learn to 
find her way around a fixed environment using touch, in the same way as 
someone who is blind. She had, however, become so adept at visual 
detection that 
 
“When twenty-five currants were scattered at random over an area of 5m2 she took only 
55s on average (over four trials) to pick up every one.”109 
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It seems unlikely she could use touch to get a sense of her position in her 
environment while moving that quickly. A monkey with normal vision would 
probably not have mistaken the tape for food, but even with a more 
convincing decoy, having investigated the decoy once, would probably work 
out from the thing’s location that it was the same object. Helen lacked any 
visual awareness of her environment, and therefore also lacked visual 
reference points for remembering the location of objects. While her ability to 
visually detect objects became quite acute, it was not accompanied by any 
visual sense of a stable physical environment in which she was located. In 
contrast, when she remained stationary, she could use her own position as a 
stable reference point to locate objects in relation to. 
 
Perhaps most difficult of all to comprehend is Humphrey’s description of 
Helen as systematically anticipating and avoiding obstacles in her path, and 
even turning towards trees as she passed them. Humphrey’s speculation 
that Helen’s sense of space was ‘a purely subjective, self-centred space’ that 
lacked an independently stable spatial framework suggests a way into 
understanding these incredible-seeming abilities of Helen’s. In the absence 
of any visual spatial awareness, with (presumably) no auditory or olfactory 
spatial awareness, Helen’s sense of space extending beyond her touch 
consisted only of the range of movements she was able to intuit she could 
make that would culminate in contact with something familiar, such as a bit of 
food, or a tree to climb. With intact visual experience we can be visually 
aware of objects before we move towards them; we move towards them 
because we are first visually aware of them. Helen’s case seems, in this 
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respect, reversed. Her perceptual – tactile – awareness of objects followed 
her movement; she moved and then she experienced the thing she was 
moving towards. Her movements were motivated by her expectations of what 
she would end up with, and her expectations were based on her past 
experience, in a way rather like any behaviourally trained performance. The 
difference is that the movements were in many cases the sorts of 
movements monkeys naturally make, and at least some of the ‘rewards’ (a 
bit of food, or a tree to climb) could be directly accessed by making the 
movements, and were not dispensed by a trainer. 
 
Humphrey’s observations of Helen also suggest a difference between her 
spontaneous visually based object-directed actions, and the hypothesized 
abilities of Block’s super blindseer. With Helen’s growing confidence in her 
abilities based on her past success, she grew better at determining which 
movements (if any) would result in her coming into contact with the objects 
she detected. If that is the right description of her visually based abilities, 
they fall well short of the spontaneous guesses credited to the super 
blindseer. The super blindseer is supposed to be able to spontaneously 
visually identify and locate objects as effectively as a normally sighted 
person. Helen’s visually based abilities, in contrast, only allowed her to 
determine what movement she had to make to come into contact with the 
object she detected. 
 
Drawing clear conclusions from Helen’s case is, of course, problematic. The 
kind of subjective reports of awareness that can be provided by human 
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subjects, and the descriptions of their experience and intentions, could not 
be provided by her. Lawrence Weiskrantz (Weiskrantz (2009)) has reported 
the existence of what he has dubbed ‘blindsight type 2’ (Weiskrantz (2009) 
pp. 41-42), where the blindseer has an experience of some sort, though not 
one they describe as seeing.110 Type 2 blindsight can co-vary with stimulus 
parameters (it seems to with GY, though not always with another blindseer, 
DB – Weiskrantz (2009) p. 42), and therefore could be interpreted as a kind 
of visual awareness.111 Typically, type 2 blindsight occurs when the stimuli 
are fast moving, or have a high contrast and appear or disappear abruptly. It 
is likely that Helen’s early detection of stimuli, which was the basis of her 
early training, was of this kind. It is also possible that some of Helen’s later 
abilities were due to something like type 2 blindsight. While Humphrey is 
convinced the small area of visual cortex that Helen retained could not 
explain the majority of her abilities, that it had some effect on Helen’s 
behaviour cannot be ruled out. Another reason that it is difficult to compare 
Helen’s situation to human cases of blindsight in people like GY is that most 
human cases involve the loss of much smaller parts of the visual field. In 
GY’s case, for example, only the right half (hemifield) of both of his eyes is 
affected, the vision from the left half of both of his eyes is intact. 
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The discovery of a human who suffers from a visual field defect of both 
hemifields is, therefore, significant. Recently, Beatrice de Gelder and others 
carried out a test on a human subject with bilateral blindsight (i.e. the loss of 
visual awareness of his whole visual field).112 The subject, TN, “… walked like a 
blind man, using his stick to track obstacles and requiring guidance by another person 
when walking around the various laboratory buildings during testing.”113 
 
De Gelder and her colleagues persuaded TN to participate in a test to see if 
he would be able to use his blindsight to avoid obstacles in the sort of way 
Helen had learned to. They 
 
“… constructed a complex obstacle course consisting of boxes, chairs, and so on, 
arranged randomly along a long corridor, without any person to guide him and with the 
removal of his walking cane. An experimenter always followed behind him during his 
traversing the course in case of a fall or collision, which seemed a real possibility given his 
clinical blindness. Astonishingly, he negotiated it perfectly and never once collided with 
any obstacle, as witnessed by several colleagues who applauded spontaneously when he 
completed the course.”114 
 
Though de Gelder and her co-authors concede that they cannot completely 
rule out the possibility that TN might have used non-visual cues such as 
some form of echolocation, they think this very unlikely, as neither he nor the 
person following behind him were heard to make any sound. While TN’s 
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negotiation of the obstacle-laden corridor is fascinating, and provides useful 
corroboration of the evidence from Helen, it is, in my view, a great pity and a 
missed opportunity that the investigators did not conduct an in depth 
interview with him to determine how he viewed the exercise. What did he 
think he was doing, as he avoided obstacles in his path? What, in short, 
motivated him to move one way rather than another? An answer to this 
question would be of great help in understanding the phenomenon from the 
subject’s point of view. 
 
With Helen and TN, in stark contrast to their remarkable abilities to perform 
visually based object-directed actions, there is no evidence of comparable 
spontaneous visually based object-directed thoughts. As Humphrey puts the 
point in relation to Helen, 
 
“After years of experience she never showed any signs of recognising even those objects 
most familiar to her, whether the object was a carrot, another monkey, or myself.”115 
 
Unlike Helen, human blindseers can accurately identify objects when 
prompted to do so, but there is still no evidence they can do this in the 
spontaneous way that they can perform visually guided actions. An obvious 
question at this point is why this should be the case. In §2.3 below, I outline 
an influential answer to this question, David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s 
two visual system hypothesis. According to Milner and Goodale, there are 
distinct visual systems serving perception and action that function in parallel. 
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Visual awareness depends only on the former system; ‘perception for action’ 
functions to an extent independently of awareness. One possibility, therefore, 
is that instead of having a single conception of visual attention, we ought to 
have two, one corresponding to each visual system. This is Milner and 
Goodale’s proposal. Visual attention comes in two varieties, only one of 
which is conscious. 
 
2.3 Two Visual Streams 
 
Using evidence from a range of sources including lesion studies in animals 
and pathological and normal vision in humans, David Milner and Melvyn 
Goodale have argued for the existence of two visual systems or ‘streams’, 
one (the ventral stream) specialising in functions related to visual awareness 
(‘vision for perception’), and the other (the dorsal stream) specialising in 
functions related to action (‘vision for action’). 
 
“The visual system… has to be able to accommodate two somewhat distinct functions – 
one concerned with acting on the world and the other with representing it. How does the 
brain achieve these different ends? In theory, a single multipurpose visual system could 
serve both the guidance of actions and the perceptual representation of the world. In 
practice, however, we believe that evolution has solved the problem of reconciling the 
differing demands of these two functions by segregating them in two separate and quasi-
independent ‘visual brains’. In brief, it is our contention that, despite the protestations of 
100 
 
phenomenology, visual perception and the visual control of action depend on functionally 
and neurally independent systems.”116 
 
“… we do not wish to deny the obvious fact that when carrying out a visuomotor act a 
person is typically visually aware of the stimulus to which their action is directed, and of 
the limb that is making that action. It is our claim, however, that all of this visual 
awareness will be mediated by processing in the ventral stream and that this processing 
will typically unfold independently of, and in parallel with, the visual control of the action 
itself. This does not contradict our claim that the visual information used by the dorsal 
stream to specify and control the constituent movements of a goal-directed action 
(including an eye movement) is inaccessible to consciousness. The compelling nature of 
visual consciousness makes it difficult to resist the intuition that it is one’s perception of 
the goal object that is guiding the action. But sometimes the truth can be 
counterintuitive…”117 
 
There are, for our purposes, two significant claims being made. The first is 
that the two visual systems or streams are to a significant extent independent 
of each other (to exactly what extent is the subject of debate). The second is 
that only one of the systems gives rise to visual awareness – we are only 
visually aware of what is processed in the ventral stream. I want next to look 
at some of the evidence Milner and Goodale draw on for their hypothesis, 
and how they think the two visual systems work together in normal vision, 
before ending this section by considering whether the two visual systems 
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hypothesis places any further constraints on the explanatory role of visual 
attention than already imposed by the visually based abilities of Helen and 
TN. 
 
Milner and Goodale note that in some non-human vertebrates visual 
processing for different visually guided behaviours is known to be carried out 
separately, and that this is also generally accepted for some visually guided 
behaviour in primates, such as saccadic eye movements.118 In addition, they 
argue there are several ways in which the inputs, processing and outputs for 
visually guided actions differ from those of object recognition. 
 
“… to fixate and then reach towards a goal object, it is necessary that the location and 
motion of that object be specified in egocentric coordinates (that is, coded with respect to 
the observer). But the particular coordinate system used (centred with respect to the 
retina, head, or body) will depend on the particular effector system to be employed (that 
is, eyes, hand, or both)… In addition, since the relative positions of the observer and the 
goal object will change from moment to moment, it is obvious that the egocentric 
coordinates of the object’s location and its surface and/or contours must be computed on 
each occasion that the action occurs. A consequence of this last requirement will be that 
the visuomotor system is likely to have a very short ‘memory’… In sharp contrast to the 
viewer-based coding required for visuomotor control, visual coding for the purposes of 
perception must deliver the identity of the object independent of any particular viewpoint… 
Whatever the particular coding mechanisms might be (and they could vary across 
different classes of objects), the essential problem for the perceptual system is to code 
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(and later recover) object identity… It is objects, not object views, that the perceptual 
system is ultimately designed to deliver. As a consequence, human perception is 
characterized by ‘constancies’ of shape, size, colour, lightness, and location, so that the 
enduring characteristics of objects can be maintained across different viewing conditions. 
The outputs provided by this type of processing are well suited for the long-term storage 
of the identities of objects and their spatial arrangements.”119 
 
Computations for visually guided actions are carried out immediately prior to 
the action being performed, and rely on metrically accurate information.120 
Processing in the ventral stream, instead, relies on a ‘scene-based frame of 
reference’, which “preserves the relations between the object parts and its 
surroundings without requiring precise information about the absolute size of the object or 
its exact position with respect to the observer”.121 
 
According to Milner and Goodale, blindsight is not best characterised as a 
form of unconscious perception, but rather ought to be thought of as “a 
collection of residual visuomotor responses”.122 This sits somewhat awkwardly with 
the abilities of blindseers to detect and identify stimuli in their blind field. 
Addressing this point, Milner and Goodale suggest that blindseers “might be 
able to use information derived from visuomotor control systems to generate above-
chance performance even on a forced-choice test of detection or discrimination”.123 
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From the mass of evidence that Milner and Goodale marshal in support of 
their two visual streams hypothesis, I want to mention two well-known 
neurological deficits. The first is visual form agnosia, where patients who 
have “roughly intact visual sensory function… are severely impaired at recognizing, 
matching, copying, or discriminating simple visual stimuli.”124 Milner and Goodale 
tested a patient known as DF, who demonstrated the ability to perform 
various actions which required her to correctly adjust her hand movements, 
including reaching for and grasping objects, and ‘posting’ a card through a 
variably oriented slot.125 Despite being able to perform all these actions 
without difficulty, DF was unable to identify what the objects she was 
reaching for were, or the orientation of the slot through which she 
successfully ‘posted’ a card.126 Unlike patients with blindsight, however, DF 
was aware of and could visually identify surface properties (i.e. surface 
textures) and colours. What she was unable to do was identify objects by 
their shape or orientation. 
 
“[DF] said that objects seemed to ‘run into each other’, so that two adjacent objects of a 
similar colour such as a knife and fork will often look to her like a single indefinable ‘blob’. 
Conversely, she will sometimes see two differently coloured parts of a single object as two 
different objects.”127 
 
                                                                                                                           
low contrast outline objects given an indication of which general category to expect, he was 
able to identify some photographed objects without any indication of what to expect. 
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The second condition I want to mention is optic ataxia, which usually occurs 
as part of a group of symptoms known as Bálint’s syndrome. Patients with 
optic ataxia cannot use visual information about the location of a target to 
reach for it, 128 and can struggle to adjust their hand movements to grasp 
objects properly, and to complete the ‘posting’ task that DF was proficient at. 
Patients with this condition can, however, give accurate verbal descriptions 
of the relative locations of the objects which they struggle to reach for and 
grasp, and distinguish between differently sized and oriented objects.129 In 
optic ataxia, the deficits seem to correspond to what is spared in visual form 
agnosia – in the latter, there seems to be action without visual awareness, 
and in the former visual awareness is accompanied by difficulties executing 
visually guided actions. This indicates that visuomotor abilities can function 
independently from reports of visual awareness, and that reports of visual 
awareness can function independently from effective visually guided action. 
 
Visually based object-directed actions can also dissociate from visual 
awareness in non-pathological cases. In experiments carried out by Bruce 
Bridgeman and colleagues, normally sighted subjects were asked to move a 
pointer, which was hidden from their view, to point to the location of a 
displayed target (rather like pointing under a table to a person on the 
opposite side). On some occasions, the target was moved during a saccade 
(i.e. one of the routine rapid movements between fixations our eyes make, 
and of which we are generally unaware). On one set of trials, the display was 
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turned off before subjects were asked to point. Despite the subjects’ lack of 
awareness that the target had moved while their eyes were saccading, their 
pointing was influenced by its movement (they moved the pointer to point 
towards where the target had actually been, and not in the direction it had 
previously occupied).130 
 
This selection of evidence is, I think, enough to show that visually guided 
actions and visual awareness can be dissociated from each other in both 
pathological and normal cases. As we have seen, Milner and Goodale’s 
hypothesis is that ‘vision for action’ and ‘vision for perception’ function to an 
extent independently of each other. With normal vision, according to Milner 
and Goodale, the two visual systems interact in a way analogous to the way 
a human might control a semi-autonomous robot. The ventral stream, which 
gives rise to visual awareness, is involved in ‘flagging’ target objects, and 
specifying the kind of action to be carried out. The dorsal stream, which 
operates outside conscious awareness, carries out the body-centred 
metrically precise computations for the action to be performed.131 The extent 
to which the two systems are independent of each other is a matter of 
debate132 and contention,133 but the details of those debates are not 
important for our purposes. There are two points to take from the evidence 
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for Milner and Goodale’s hypothesis outlined here. The first is further 
confirmation that visual awareness of an object is not necessary for 
performing spontaneous (i.e. un-prompted) visually based object-directed 
actions. What we saw evidence of with Helen the monkey and TN (who has 
bilateral blindsight), is reinforced with evidence from normal subjects 
(Bridgeman et al. (1979)). The second and related point is that visually based 
object-directed actions and thoughts dissociate in both directions. Some 
visually based actions can occur without accompanying visually based 
thoughts (e.g. Bridgeman’s experiments on movement during saccades). 
Some visually based thoughts can also occur without a commensurate ability 
to carry out visually based actions (as reported by Goodale and Milner of 
some Bálint’s patients). The evidence from Helen and TN, and visual form 
agnosia, optic ataxia and Bridgeman’s experiments together strongly 
indicates that visual awareness is not necessary for spontaneous visually 
based actions. There is, however, no evidence that spontaneous visually 
based thoughts are possible in the absence of visual awareness.134 
 
Milner and Goodale’s proposal is that there are two kinds of visual attention. 
 
“… there is more than one substrate supporting selective visual attention and… only one 
of these substrates is linked with conscious experience. In particular, we would propose 
that attentional mechanisms associated with the ventral stream are critical in determining 
visual awareness of objects and events in the world. Yet at the same time, we believe that 
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there are also selective attentional mechanisms in the dorsal stream… that are not 
obligatorily linked to awareness. In the blindsight example, the argument would be that 
when the patient points to a target in his blind field, that target must have been ‘selected’ 
by attentional mechanisms in the dorsal stream (and/or associated subcortical structures) 
so that the appropriate visuomotor transformations could be facilitated. But since in most 
blindsight patients the target stimulus would have no access to mechanisms in the ventral 
stream, perceptual or attentional, no visual awareness of the target would be possible.”135 
 
But is this conclusion forced on us? If we accept this explanation of the 
dissociation evidence, we can no longer conceive of visual attention involved 
in visually based object-directed thoughts and actions as a unitary, conscious 
phenomenon. ‘Dorsal attention’ could (and in the cases considered would) 
be unconscious. But visual attention – attention to objects we see – as we 
typically think of it, does not distinguish attending for the purposes of acting 
on an object from attending for the purposes of thinking about the object. 
Regardless of my purpose in paying attention to an object I see, the way we 
usually think of attention, my attending to an object implies I am aware of it. 
 
The motivation for resisting Milner and Goodale’s proposal that there are two 
kinds of visual attention is the same as the motivation for resisting the claim 
by Kentridge and colleagues that GY is attending to stimuli in his blind field. 
Visual attention paid to an object explains our visually based thoughts and 
actions with respect to it. When I hit the bullseye with my arrow, or correctly 
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read out the letters on an eye chart, my paying attention to the object (the 
target, or each letter on the chart) implies my awareness of it, and my 
awareness of it provides an explanation of how my actions are successful. Of 
course, in the face of the evidence for visually based abilities without visual 
awareness, this explanation needs to be supplemented with an account of 
what is distinctive about the contribution that conscious attention makes, and 
that is the goal of this enquiry. The evidence from Helen and TN, together 
with the further evidence from Milner and Goodale, leaves little room for 
doubt that the distinctive explanatory role of visual attention is not to make 
visual information accessible for spontaneous object-directed thoughts and 
actions. But this does not force Milner and Goodale’s conclusion on us. 
 
In the next section, I consider a different proposal for the role of visual 
attention. According to Declan Smithies, visual attention to an object 
provides us with reasons for our visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions. A blindseer may think about an object in his blind field, or act upon it 
because he can visually detect it, but he lacks access to justifying reasons 
for his thoughts and actions. 
 
3. Rational Access 
 
In this section I consider Declan Smithies proposal that visual attention to an 
object provides us with reasons for our visually based object-directed 
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thoughts and actions (Smithies (2011a)).136 Smithies’ strategy is to steer a 
course between two opposed views of attention, both of which he cautions 
against. On one of these views, attention is characterized purely in 
phenomenological terms, without any regard for the function it might fulfil; the 
other view makes the opposite claim. As Smithies points out, in our ordinary 
way of thinking about attention, it makes a phenomenal difference to visual 
experience, but also fulfils a function – it influences what we think about and 
do. Not only are disagreements between the two views liable to be the result 
of mutual misunderstanding, but more importantly, both fail to capture 
something essential to the nature of attention. Ordinarily, I know what I am 
visually attending to, and it affects what I think or do. 
 
Though Smithies’ aim is to provide an account of attention that identifies the 
function it fulfils, his characterization is primarily phenomenal. 
 
“… attention is essentially a phenomenon of consciousness. If attention is understood in 
terms of its distinctive phenomenology, then it is built into the concept of attention that 
there is a phenomenal contrast to be drawn between attentive and inattentive modes of 
consciousness. On this view, attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, so there is 
consciousness without attention, but there is no attention without consciousness.”137 
 
There are two, related, aspects of the phenomenology of attention that 
Smithies emphasises. The first is that attention structures the stream of 
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consciousness into an attended foreground and an unattended background, 
where the difference is marked by a phenomenal contrast between 
foreground and background. The second is that the structuring of 
consciousness into foreground and background involves a ‘competition for 
selection’, where, echoing William James, attention to an object can be seen 
as the result of selection from ‘several simultaneously possible objects’. 
 
With regard to the function that attention fulfils, Smithies’ preliminary 
proposal is that “… attention selects information and makes it accessible for use in the 
control of action, reasoning, and verbal report.”138 As empirical support for this 
proposal he cites a famous set of experiments conducted by George 
Sperling on visual persistence in subjects with normal vision.139 Sperling 
used a tachistoscope to briefly illuminate (for 50 milliseconds) a stimulus 
consisting of a row or rows of letters and numbers, which subjects had to try 
to report immediately afterwards.140 Despite varying the number and 
arrangement of the characters141, the average number the subjects were 
able to write down was between 4 and 5.142 
 
In the third set of experiments, Sperling changed the subjects’ task from 
trying to write down all the displayed characters in the right order to trying to 
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write down a specific subset of them. Subjects were trained to respond 
selectively: immediately after the brief presentation of the stimulus they 
heard one of three different tones that signalled to them which of the three 
rows (top, middle or bottom) of the grid they were supposed to record. This 
partial report task produced some interesting results. Subjects were able to 
record an average of around 4 characters from the 3x4 grid.143 Since the 
subjects did not know in advance which of the three rows they would be 
required to record, Sperling assumed that their partial reports ought to be 
treated as a random sample of the total number of characters they had 
available for report. Quite how these results should be interpreted is a matter 
of contention. Block has claimed that the Sperling experiments are evidence 
that “… perceptual consciousness is richer (i.e. has a higher capacity) than cognitive 
access”.144 Ian Phillips has pointed to the possibility that, at the very small 
timescales of the experiments, the tone might have a postdictive effect. That 
is, the perception of the stimulus grid could be affected by the tone, even 
though the tone followed the presentation of the grid.145 For Smithies’ 
purposes, that debate is not critical; what is important is that the row of 
characters the subjects recorded depended on their attention being cued to it 
by the tone. Attention to a particular row of characters – the selection of 
those characters – made them accessible for report (in this case, written 
rather than spoken). And we should be able to draw a more general 
conclusion, abstracting from the circumstances of the Sperling experiments. 
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If I visually attend to an object in my environment, I am able to use what I see 
for the purposes of action, reasoning and verbal report. 
 
While this provides a very plausible explanation of what, under normal 
circumstances, visual attention enables us to do, it fails to make the case for 
the sufficiency of attention for awareness. As we know, blindseers are also 
able to use visual information for the purposes of action and report in the 
absence of visual awareness. (Given that they can identify objects without 
being aware of them, there appears to be no impediment to blindseers using 
that information in reasoning either.) But selection for access is only a 
preliminary characterisation of the function of attention. Attention is sufficient 
for awareness, according to Smithies, because it makes information 
accessible in a specific way. Attention makes information “fully accessible for 
use in the rational control of thought and action.”146 
 
While visual awareness of an object may not be necessary for visually based 
thoughts or actions with respect to it, “… unconscious visual information… is not 
rationally accessible to the subject as a justifying reason for belief or action.”147 A 
blindseer may acquire a theoretical grasp of why his guesses and actions are 
reliable, by understanding theoretical explanations of how his visual system 
is supposed to process visual information of which he remains unaware. 
Smithies allows that he may use that as a reason for becoming confident in 
his guesses and actions. However, that would not make it the case that the 
unconscious visual information that the blindseer’s guesses and actions are 
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influenced by is accessible to him as a reason for those thoughts and 
actions. Rather, it would be his theoretical grasp of why his guesses and 
actions are reliable that constitutes his reason for placing confidence in them. 
Something similar would be true of Helen the monkey, or TN the bilaterally 
blindsighted subject. Their actions might be (or become) fluent and confident 
because unconscious visual information was spontaneously accessible for 
the control of their actions but, says Smithies, 
 
“… the mere feeling of confidence is not sufficient for justifying one’s beliefs and actions – 
justification is not so easy to come by!”148 
 
We can agree that a feeling of confidence may not be sufficient for justifying 
beliefs and actions, but we should also acknowledge that in day to day life 
some of our beliefs are adopted, and some of our actions are performed, 
because we are confident about them. I might be utterly confident that I have 
the answer to a quiz question right, or that I remember where I left my keys, 
and I might act accordingly, because of my feeling of confidence. But this, we 
might also think, is an important difference between memory and perception. 
149 It would be most unusual for someone to form a visually based object-
directed belief, or to try to perform visually based object-directed actions, in 
the complete absence of visual awareness of the relevant object. This is 
what makes blindsight so remarkable. So, we might think, on Smithies’ view 
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it is visual experience of the object that justifies visually based object-
directed beliefs and actions. But as we will see, this is not quite his view. 
 
“The basic intuition is that it is no more rational to believe or act on the basis of 
unconscious visual information than it is to believe or act on the basis of blind guesswork. 
After all, there is nothing that is accessible to the subject on the basis of introspection that 
distinguishes the one case from the other. This diagnosis relies on a crucial assumption, 
which is that the rationality of one’s beliefs and actions depends solely on factors that are 
accessible to the subject on the basis of introspection. The underlying rationale for this 
assumption is that these are ultimately the only facts that one has to go on in engaging in 
critical reflection about what to believe and do.”150 
 
This explains what seems so unusual about someone coming to believe, or 
acting, purely on the basis of unconscious visual information: it would be 
irrational and unjustified, in the same way that beliefs and actions based on 
guesswork would be. Now, what is motivating Smithies’ intuition is a 
particular view of the nature of rationality and justification. According to this 
view, ‘the rationality of one’s beliefs and actions depends solely on factors 
that are accessible to the subject on the basis of introspection alone’. 
Rationality and justification do not depend on how reliably true one’s beliefs 
are, or how reliably successful one’s actions are. Rationality and justification, 
on Smithies’ view, depend (in a particular way) on the mental states of the 
believer. 
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Unlike blindseers, people with normal vision are able to consciously attend to 
objects, and this provides them with justification for their visually based 
object-directed beliefs and actions. According to Smithies, visual awareness 
provides a subject with justification by providing her with reasons for belief. 
Blindseers lack these reasons for belief and action because they lack visual 
awareness. But Smithies also wants to accommodate another intuition, 
according to which 
 
“My envatted mental duplicate has justification to form beliefs on the basis of perceptual 
experience, memory, testimony and so on, although forming beliefs in this way is 
unreliable in the circumstances.”151 
 
The thought here seems to be that justification does not depend on the facts 
that obtain, but only on the mental states and dispositions of the subject. 
Specifying those mental states and dispositions is itself something of a 
delicate matter. On externalist theories of content, the content of at least 
some beliefs will, in one case but not the other, depend on objects and 
features of the external world. But before looking at some of the potentially 
problematic aspects of Smithies’ view, there is an obvious but important point 
I want to emphasise. We can find the central insight of the first intuition – call 
it the Blindsight Guessing Intuition – plausible without that committing us to 
finding the second, which I will dub the Vat Justification Intuition, plausible. 
We can agree that blindseers’ lack of visual awareness leaves their visually 
based beliefs without introspectively accessible reasons. We are not thereby 
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obliged to agree that the visual experience available in a vat provides a level 
of epistemic justification comparable to visual experience of the external 
world. An ancillary point is that we can also agree there is something 
interesting in common between a properly embodied individual (call her 
‘World’) and her vat-connected duplicate (‘Mind’), without agreeing it is 
epistemic justification. 
 
The combination of the Blindsight Guessing Intuition and the Vat Justification 
Intuition draw Smithies to what he calls Phenomenal Mentalism: 
 
“One’s phenomenally individuated mental states determine which doxastic attitudes one 
has justification to hold.”152 
 
The thought here is that it is non-epistemic facts, facts about the phenomenal 
character of mental states that are true of both Mind and World, that provide 
the basis for epistemic justification. The qualification that it is phenomenally 
individuated mental states, rather than simply phenomenally conscious 
mental states is required because, as Smithies notes, that a mental state is 
phenomenally conscious is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to provide 
epistemic justification.153 It is not sufficient because factive mental states, 
such as seeing that there is a face at the window, do not provide epistemic 
justification. If they did, Mind and World would differ in the epistemic 
justification their beliefs have. It is not necessary, because many beliefs will 
be partly justified by other beliefs, for example background beliefs, and 
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background beliefs are not phenomenally conscious states. However, beliefs 
are ‘disposed to cause phenomenally conscious states of judgement’.154 It 
will be a matter for contention whether background beliefs can be effectively 
separated from other states lacking phenomenal consciousness, including 
the unconscious states involved in blindsight, in this way. To enter this 
debate would, however, take us too far afield. 
 
Timothy Williamson (Williamson (2007)) has highlighted a number of 
potential problems for internalist theories of epistemic justification like 
Smithies’, targeted at the Vat Justification Intuition. The Vat Justification 
Intuition is (at least part of) Smithies’ motivation for thinking, for example, that 
factive perceptual states such as seeing that there is a face at the window 
provide no additional justification for believing that there is a face at the 
window by virtue of being factive. Put another way, the aspects of their visual 
experiences that Mind and World do not have in common contribute nothing 
to justifying their beliefs. Now, Williamson is prepared to concede that Mind 
has some justification to believe what she does on the basis of her visual 
experience, but insists that World has more justification.155 But accepting this 
undermines the Vat Justification Intuition, according to which they are both 
equally justified. 
 
Smithies cites Stewart Cohen’s ‘new evil demon’ hypothesis in (Cohen 
(1984)) as inspiration for the Vat Justification Intuition. In that paper, Cohen’s 
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purpose is to question the plausibility of reliabilist theories of justification. 
Early in the paper, Cohen presses the point that belief forming processes 
that are unreliable can nevertheless produce justified beliefs.156 This is quite 
consistent with the claim that false beliefs are less justified than true ones. 
To say that that false beliefs and true beliefs are equally justified is to make a 
stronger claim. 
 
One motivation for making the stronger claim is an identification of epistemic 
justification with something like responsibility or culpability. This is Cohen’s 
view. 
 
“Intuitively, if [someone’s] belief is appropriate to the available evidence, he is not to be 
held responsible for circumstances beyond his ken.”157 
 
But now consider this: 
 
“Beliefs produced by good reasoning are paradigm cases of justified belief and beliefs 
arrived at through fallacious or arbitrary reasoning are paradigm cases of unjustified 
belief. Whether or not reasoning results in false belief, even if this happens more often 
than not, is irrelevant to the question of whether the reasoning is good.”158 
 
There is a clear sense in which someone who has taken all available 
precautions should not be held responsible for circumstances beyond his 
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control. But, of course, someone may think they have taken all available 
precautions without that being the case. And someone may think they have 
reasoned well and carefully, without that being the case. We can vary 
Cohen’s ‘new evil demon’ hypothesis and suppose not only that Brian the 
brain-in-a-vat’s conscious experiences are generated by a computer, but 
also that his ability to reason has been tampered with. Brian, as far as he can 
tell, has taken every epistemic precaution, and is, as far as he can tell, 
reasoning well and carefully. In fact, however, Brian is simply guessing. 
According to Smithies, ‘it is no more rational to believe or act on the basis of 
unconscious visual information than on the basis of blind guesswork' 
because 'there is nothing that is accessible to the subject on the basis of 
introspection that distinguishes the one case from the other'. In Brian’s case, 
too, there is nothing that is accessible to him on the basis of introspection 
that distinguishes his actual situation from the one he takes himself to be in. 
But it is quite a stretch to conclude that Brian’s beliefs, arrived at on the basis 
of guesswork, are justified. This suggests that justification is not purely 
determined by what is accessible to the subject on the basis of introspection. 
 
This by no means constitutes a ‘knockdown’ argument against the Vat 
Justification Intuition. Smithies could, for example, insist that the Vat 
Justification Intuition is premised on the basis of one of the mental duplicates 
actually having veridical perceptual experiences, and having a capacity for 
reasoning that is intact. But if that was the response, it would only serve to 
lend support to the thought that justification does, after all, have some 
connection to truth, and to undermine the idea that the mental states of 
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subjects, narrowly construed, can justify their beliefs independently of any 
such connection.159 
 
Once the notion of epistemic justification is broadened to include evidence 
which may not be accessible to the subject by introspection, some of the 
motivation for the Blindsight Guessing Intuition is also undermined. 
According to the Blindsight Guessing Intuition, the blindseer has no more 
reason for believing or acting on the basis of unconscious visual information 
than someone who is just guessing. But if what is motivating the comparison 
is an appeal to what is accessible to introspection in both cases, the 
comparison becomes suspect. Despite this, the central thought, that 
blindseers lack reasons for their visually based thoughts and actions, 
remains very plausible. The challenge is to explain why. In other words, the 
challenge is to identify a plausible explanatory role for conscious attention 
where visual awareness is doing the explanatory work. 
 
Smithies’ proposal is that attention is sufficient for awareness because 
attention makes information fully accessible for use in rational thought and 
action. A thought or action is ‘rational’ in Smithies’ sense if the subject has 
access to a reason which justifies that thought or action. Blindseers are 
capable of using unconscious visual information to think and act, but those 
thoughts and actions are no more rational than thoughts and actions based 
on blind guesses. Thinking or acting on the basis of a blind guess is not 
justified because no reason for the thought or action is accessible by 
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introspection alone. In the case of blindsight, the visual information that 
would justify the thought or action is also not accessible by introspection 
alone. I have tried to show that what is accessible on the basis of 
introspection alone is not always sufficient for justification. Someone might 
be so deceived that they think they are not guessing when in fact they are. If 
that is right, the explanatory role of visual attention cannot be to make visual 
information accessible for use in rational thought and action, because what is 
accessible on the basis of introspection alone is not always sufficient to 
constitute a justifying reason for thought and action. 
 
Visual attention may still play an epistemic role. In the next section, I 
consider the role of visual attention in providing us with a distinctive way of 
understanding demonstrative expressions, and grounding our conception of 
physical objects as mind-independent. John Campbell has argued that visual 
attention to an object is necessary to have knowledge of the reference of 
visual demonstratives. Blindseers lack that distinctive kind of knowledge, and 
consequently vision does not provide them with justification to conceive of 
objects as mind-independent. 
 
4. The Relational View 
 
According to John Campbell (Campbell (2002)) to know the reference of a 
visual demonstrative expression (e.g. ‘that car’ in an utterance of ‘That car is 
red’, where the speaker is referring to a car she sees), it is necessary to be 
visually aware of it, and visually attend to it. (Equivalently, to know the 
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reference of a visual demonstrative expression it is necessary that visual 
attention be conceived as sufficient for awareness. My intended use of 
‘visual attention’ from this point will be this conception of it.) Blindseers may 
be able to refer to objects in their blind field by means of descriptions, like 
‘The car in my blind field’, but they lack our distinctive knowledge of the 
reference of visual demonstratives. Why should this be? Campbell uses a 
pair of contrasting cases to give the claim initial plausibility. He then develops 
a theoretical explanation of why blindseers lack this distinctive knowledge. 
 
I start in §4.1 with the pair of contrasting cases Campbell uses to illustrate 
why visual attention is necessary for understanding visual demonstratives. 
They provide some useful initial purchase on the connection between 
attention and demonstratives, but also prompt some questions. In §4.2 I look 
at the connection Campbell makes between understanding visual 
demonstratives and psychological views of attention. Understanding a 
proposition should not depend on being able to determine whether it is true, 
but should determine how to verify it. Correspondingly, on Campbell’s view, 
knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative determines ways of verifying 
what is said using it. Campbell’s theoretical account of the explanatory role of 
visual attention relies on maintaining a separation between visual experience 
of an object and visually based thoughts about it. Visually experiencing 
objects does not depend on the use of language. Young children, for 
example, can visually experience objects before they have mastered 
sufficient language to refer to or describe them. However, there will normally 
also be some connection between visual experience and visually based 
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thoughts. Visual experience must play a role in our verifying that an object, 
for example the car referred to in ‘That car is red’, is in fact red. To provide 
an account of this connection – in our example, how visual experience of the 
car is related to the way we verify its colour – Campbell draws on 
psychological theories of visual attention. 
 
I said the distinction between visual experience of an object and visually 
based thought about it is an important part of Campbell’s theory. This is 
because visual attention is supposed to explain how we have a particular 
kind of visually based object-directed thought – thoughts expressed by 
utterances containing visual demonstratives – and how we perform a 
particular kind of visually based object-directed action – actions that are 
intentional under a description containing a visual demonstrative. To play this 
explanatory role, visual attention must be both distinct from and more basic 
than the thoughts and actions it explains. Campbell’s characterisation of 
visual attention to an object is as a basic, unanalysable relationship between 
subject and object, which he calls the Relational View. But as we have seen, 
blindseers also have visually based object-directed thoughts, and perform 
visually based object-directed actions. Visual attention might explain our 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions, but how is this different 
from what the blindseer can do? Unless visual attention plays a distinctive 
explanatory role, we have no appropriate basis for distinguishing attention 
conceived as conscious from the selection and enhancement of blindsight. 
Campbell’s response is that visual attention to objects is what enables us to 
refer to them using visual demonstratives, and what grounds our conception 
124 
 
of objects as mind-independent. The selection and enhancement of 
blindsight, in contrast, does not enable blindseers to refer to objects using 
visual demonstratives, and cannot provide them with a conception of objects 
as mind-independent. I look at Campbell’s Relational View in §4.3. 
 
4.1 The Sea of Faces 
 
To illustrate the way in which visual attention is necessary for understanding 
visual demonstratives, Campbell makes use of a pair of contrasting cases. 
To make referring to them easier, I’ll call the first ‘the Cityscape’, and the 
second ‘the Sea of Faces’. 
 
The Cityscape: 
 
“Suppose… that you and I are sitting side by side looking at a cityscape, a panorama of 
buildings. If I am to think about any one of those buildings, if I am to formulate conjectures 
or questions about any of those buildings, if I am to be able to refer to any one of those 
buildings in my own thoughts, it is not enough that the building should simply be there, 
somewhere or other in my field of view. If it is simply there in my field of view, though 
unnoticed by me, I am not yet in a position to refer to it; I cannot yet think about it. If I am 
to think about it, I have to single out the building visually: I have to attend to it. And if I 
want to refer to that building, to make a remark about that building for your benefit, I have 
to draw your attention to it. That is what pointing is. Pointing is at once the most basic kind 
of reference to objects, and the single most useful way of drawing someone else's 
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attention to an object… the attention that is needed here is, as it were, a matter of 
experiential highlighting of the object…”160 
 
In the next chapter, I will question whether to have a visually based thought 
about an object we have to attend to it. It seems quite obvious to me that, for 
example, I can attend to a single book in a pile of books while remaining 
aware of the rest of the pile, and therefore am able to refer to ‘the pile’. 
(There is experimental evidence that purports to show attention is necessary 
for awareness. I look at, and respond to that evidence in the next chapter.) 
The key claim for present purposes is that, in the normal case, in order to 
refer to an object on the basis of perception, and in order to understand such 
reference, we need to perceptually attend to the object. To give us a sense 
of why this is, Campbell asks us to consider a different sort of case, where 
visual attention is missing. 
 
The Sea of Faces: 
 
“I think that the simplest way to grasp the common-sense difference between the 
blindseer and the ordinary subject is to consider an ordinary case in which you and I are 
sitting at a dinner table with a large number of people around and you make a remark to 
me about 'that woman'. There are a lot of people around; I can't yet visually single out 
which one you mean. So on anyone's account, I do not yet know which woman you are 
talking about. Suppose now that we add to the example. My visual experience remains as 
before: a sea of faces. I cannot consciously single out the person you mean. All I get 
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consciously is the sea of faces. But now we add some of what the blindseer has. You 
refuse to give me any further clues as to which person you mean, but you say, ‘Try to 
point to the woman I mean’. As first I protest that I can't do that, since I don't know who 
you're talking about, but I do try to point, and to my surprise you say I'm pointing right at 
the person you mean. Suppose now that my conscious experience remains a sea of 
faces, but we extend the reach of my reliable guessing so that it encompasses everything 
the blindseer can do. So I can make reliable guesses about what the person is eating, 
wearing, and so on, as well as reaching and pointing appropriately. But so long as my 
conscious experience remains a sea of faces, there is an ordinary sense in which I do not 
know who you mean. The problem here does not have to do with whether I am reliable: 
we can suppose that I am quite reliable in my guesses and we establish this over a series 
of such cases. The point is rather that I do not know who you mean until I finally look at 
where my finger is pointing, or look to see who is wearing the clothes I described in my 
guesses. It is only when I have finally managed to single out the woman in my experience 
of the room, when it ceases to be a sea of faces and in my experience I focus on that 
person, that I would ordinarily be said to know who was being referred to. So it does seem 
to be compelling to common sense that conscious attention to the object is needed for an 
understanding of the demonstrative.”161 
 
There is a helpful similarity between the ‘panorama of buildings’ in the 
Cityscape, and the ‘sea of faces’: in both cases there is, in a sense, an 
undifferentiated view or scene, of which we have a ‘gist’. Clearly, we need 
more than just the gist of a scene to be able to refer to a particular object 
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within it. To refer to a particular object within the scene requires picking that 
object out, like pulling out a single wire from a tangle of wires. The 
conclusion Campbell is guiding us towards is that picking an object out 
requires visually attending to it. But isn’t this a little quick? Why, we might 
wonder, should the visual singling out be conscious? The purpose of the Sea 
of Faces is to provide some initial plausibility for the need for visual attention 
(conceived as sufficient for awareness). The crucial point is epistemic. I 
come to know which of the diners my companion is referring to by visually 
attending to the woman. 
 
But suppose we continue to put pressure on the role visual attention is 
supposed to play. After all, I seem to have all the right answers to questions 
about the person, and I can even point to her. All my behaviour indicates I do 
know which woman is being referred to. Why should my lack of visual 
attention to her make a difference? The question being pressed here is a 
question about the explanatory role of visual attention: what is the blindseer 
not able to do because of his lack of visual attention? To answer this 
question, we need to begin at the level of our communicative intentions. 
Whether I am pointing at an object to attract your attention to it, or using a 
perceptual demonstrative to communicate something about it, my intention is 
to attract your attention to the object. There is no other sensible way of 
understanding my behaviour. As Campbell says, 
 
“… at the highest level of determining the objectives of the subject, there simply is no 
alternative to appealing to the beliefs and intentions of the agent, and that includes the 
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demonstrative beliefs and intentions of the agent. If we were blocked from appealing to 
the agent’s intentions, we would simply have no idea where to begin in giving a model of 
control of the agent’s mental operations… and appeal to the agent’s demonstrative 
intentions requires us to appeal to the agent’s conscious attention to objects…”162 
 
My intention is not just to attract your attention to some object or other, but to 
a particular visible object. To do that using a visual demonstrative, I need to 
visually select the object, and as we saw in the last chapter, for someone to 
select something, they need to be aware of it. To know which object I am 
referring to, you need to visually select the same object. But for Campbell 
visual experience of objects is more than this, it is more than just a way of 
coordinating behaviour. Visual attention to objects is what explains how we 
can refer to them using visual demonstratives, and verify the propositions 
expressed by utterances that include visual demonstratives (‘demonstrative 
propositions’). To refer to objects in our environment using visual 
demonstratives, and to verify demonstrative propositions about them, we 
need to have experience of the objects themselves: we need to visually 
attend to those very things. Visual attention to an object is what enables me 
to visually select that very object to think about, to refer to, or to verify 
something said about it. Now, if visual attention to the object is what enables 
me to have demonstrative thoughts163 about it, and verify demonstrative 
propositions about it, attending to the object can’t itself depend on verifying 
propositions about its appearance (for example, that it is a car and is red). To 
                                            
162
 Campbell (2002) pp. 13-14. 
163
 That is, demonstrative propositions that are the content of conscious thoughts (e.g. 
occurrent beliefs or desires). 
129 
 
illustrate how visual attention to an object does not depend on first visually 
verifying its properties, Campbell turns to information processing theories of 
attention. Attention to an object sets the target for the underlying information 
processing necessary to experience it. As Campbell puts it, conscious 
attention to the object ‘causes and justifies’ the information processing 
necessary to experience it, and also to verify what is said about it.164 At the 
level of thought about objects, Campbell separates understanding a 
proposition from verifying it. Understanding a proposition determines how, 
given the opportunity, we will try to verify it. The connection between 
understanding and verification is also couched in terms of our understanding 
of the proposition causing and justifying our methods of verification. 
Campbell calls this connection between understanding and verification the 
Classical View. The Classical View sets out the connection between 
understanding and verification, and attention and information processing. 
 
4.2 The Classical View 
 
We need to know what, on Campbell’s view, is the connection between 
knowledge of reference and verifying a proposition on the one hand, and 
visual attention on the other. I will start with the distinction between 
understanding a proposition (knowing what it is for it to be true) and verifying 
the proposition. It is very plausible that we can understand claims about the 
distant past, for example ‘Cleopatra died from an asp bite’, that we may not 
be in a position to conclusively verify. While it is possible to understand a 
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proposition without being able to determine whether it is true, or its 
significance for the truth of other propositions and for action, our 
understanding of the proposition surely affects how we would go about 
determining its truth, and what its significance for other propositions and 
possible action is. 
 
Campbell’s analysis of the relation between understanding and determining 
the truth of a proposition is that our understanding of it both causes and 
justifies the way we would go about verifying, finding the implications of or 
acting upon it. So if we are in a position to verify the claim that ‘Cleopatra 
died from an asp bite’ by reading an eyewitness account of her last 
moments, our verifying the proposition in that way is caused by our 
understanding of the claim. Our method of verification is also justified by our 
understanding of the claim – reading the eyewitness account is the right way 
of verifying the claim. This combination of causal and justifying theses 
Campbell calls the Classical View.165 
 
The distinction in the Classical View between understanding and verification 
also applies to the contribution perceptual demonstratives make to the 
propositions they are used to express. In the case of utterances containing 
perceptual demonstratives, knowledge of the reference of the demonstrative 
is what causes and justifies ways of verifying what is said about the object. 
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Knowledge of the reference of the demonstrative is provided by visual 
attention to the object. Visual attention causes and justifies the visual 
information processing necessary for acting on or verifying uses of 
perceptual demonstratives. When the information processing is in the service 
of an action, such as reaching for ‘that book’, Campbell’s view closely 
resembles Milner and Goodale’s two visual systems hypothesis (§2.3). 
Visual attention sets the target for action, after which information processing 
procedures, which need not be conscious, take over. 
 
For visual attention to play the distinctive explanatory role it does in 
Campbell’s theory, it is vital that visual experience of objects is distinguished 
from visually based thoughts about them, including judgements about their 
visible properties, like colour or shape. In the case of their visible properties, 
however, this distinction might seem difficult to maintain. It might seem 
difficult, that is, to see the redness of a car without seeing that it is red. To 
maintain the distinction of experience from thought for such cases, Campbell 
differentiates between ‘using an object’s possession of a property to single it 
out visually’, and ‘verifying a proposition to the effect that the object has that 
property’.166 Both the notions of visually singling an object out on the basis of 
its appearance and determining its visible properties are fleshed out by 
reference to information processing accounts of attention, in the first instance 
Feature Integration Theory. 
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As Anne Treisman describes Feature Integration Theory (FIT) in her 1988 
Bartlett Memorial lecture (Treisman (1988)), different sensory features such 
as colour, orientation and size are processed separately, automatically, in 
parallel, and pre-attentively.167 So perceived shapes are processed 
separately from perceived colours, and both are registered automatically, in 
parallel, and without attention. There are separate ‘feature maps’ of the 
properties registered (for example, a feature map for red, another for blue 
and a third for green). Attention uses location as the key to recombine the 
features, which are integrated into the representation of the object we are 
conscious of. Some of the evidence for FIT comes from experiments in which 
subjects had to engage in visual search tasks. When the targets were 
defined by a disjunction of features (e.g. a blue letter or the letter ‘S’) none of 
which were shared by any of the distractors, the number of distractors did not 
significantly affect the length of time to locate the target (the target with the 
unique feature ‘calls attention to its location’, or ‘pops out’). When targets 
were defined by a conjunction of features (e.g. green and the letter ‘T’) and 
distractors shared one or other of those features, search time increased with 
the number of distractors.168 
 
Campbell uses FIT to illustrate the distinction between being visually aware 
of an object and forming visually based judgements about its appearance. 
Someone can ‘visually single out’ an object on the basis of its colour, which 
is to say they can discriminate the object from its surrounding environment 
on the basis of its colour, without knowing which colour it is (e.g. without 
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knowing it is ‘red’). The role of attention in FIT, to recombine features of the 
object, is necessary for visual experience of the object. The object can be 
visually experienced, however, without forming judgements about its 
appearance, such as what colour it is. For example, young children can see 
objects before they have mastered the language necessary to refer to or 
describe them. 
 
Campbell notes that the ‘spatial attention’ in FIT that is responsible for 
recombining features of objects ‘may be a relatively low-level phenomenon’ 
for which ‘there is no very evident reason to think it is a phenomenon of 
consciousness’.169 In connection with this he briefly mentions the Kentridge 
et al. experiments with GY detailed in the last chapter, describing them as a 
‘striking example of spatial attention without awareness’. This should make 
us pause. To begin with, the distinction between visual attention and ‘spatial 
attention’ is not self-evident. Campbell has this to say on the distinction: 
 
“This kind of spatial attention is a precondition of consciousness of the object. The 
features must be bound for there to be experience of the thing. But the spatial attention 
itself may be a relatively low-level phenomenon. The kind of low-level exercise of attention 
that Treisman’s model argues is required for binding, contrasts with the kind of exercise of 
conscious attention that I am arguing is required for knowledge of the reference of the 
demonstrative.”170 
 
and 
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“Experience of an object is the upshot of low-level attention to a particular location. But 
once you have experience of the object, you can now attend to it consciously…”171 
 
It seems that Campbell is distinguishing between two kinds of visual 
attention, a ‘low-level’ kind, and a conscious kind. There is always a danger 
of confusing homophones, but that is a minor consideration. More significant 
is the lack of any corresponding distinction in FIT between ‘low-level 
attention’ and conscious attention. Most significant of all is that Kentridge and 
his colleagues do not take themselves to be making a claim about a kind of 
‘low-level’ attention that comfortably co-exists with conscious attention. As 
we have seen in the last chapter, they are making a claim about visual 
attention. In both the original paper (Kentridge et al. (1999)), and in the reply 
to Mole (Kentridge et al. (2008)), it could not be clearer: 
 
“It has long been assumed that attention and awareness are inextricably linked (James 
1890) and the assumption is implicit in many contemporary theories of consciousness… 
To examine the question of whether attention and awareness are inextricably linked or 
whether the operation of selective attention is demonstrable in the absence of awareness, 
we tested the ability of a blindsight patient, GY…”172 
 
“Some authors, including ourselves, claim that the fact that the processing of unseen 
objects can be modulated by spatial attention (e.g. Kentridge et al., 1999; 2004; 2008; 
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Marzouki et al., 2007; Sumner et al., 2006) demonstrates that visual attention is not a 
sufficient precondition for visual awareness.”173 
 
Far from being content with making a claim concerning a separate kind of 
‘low-level attention’, Kentridge and his colleagues are mounting a challenge 
to the conception of visual attention as sufficient for visual awareness, the 
very same conception Campbell is trying to defend. This misunderstanding 
on Campbell’s part is not critical for his project, but it serves to emphasise 
the gulf between some psychological conceptions of visual attention, and the 
typical pre-theoretical conception of it I am defending. 
 
To return to the main point: Campbell uses FIT to flesh out the distinction 
between visually experiencing an object and visually based thoughts about it, 
even when those thoughts involve judgements about its appearance. He also 
uses the role location plays in FIT as the basis for his explanation of the 
connection between experience of an object and thought about it. 174 
According to FIT, the integration of features that is the product of what 
Campbell calls ‘low-level attention’ makes experience of the object possible. 
Obviously, it is critical that features of objects are recombined in the right 
way – if I’m looking at a red circle and a green triangle, my visual system 
should not recombine them as a green circle and a red triangle. The means 
by which ‘low-level attention’ correctly integrates the object’s features is 
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location.175 Location also plays a key role, on Campbell’s view, when it 
comes to verifying judgements about an object’s appearance: 
 
“… the way in which you experience the object has to retain the capacity to single out the 
correct location, at the level of the feature map, when you attempt to verify the proposition. 
If your grasp of the demonstrative is to be capable of causing and justifying your use of 
feature maps to verify propositions about the observational properties of the object, then 
your grasp of the demonstrative must include information about the location of the thing. 
Hence, your experience of the object must include information about the location of the 
thing.”176 
 
Given that the main contribution FIT makes to Campbell’s theory is to 
highlight the role of location in visual processing, and given also the quite 
different conception of attention FIT employs from the conscious attention 
Campbell is interested in, there is room for doubt about how snugly it fits with 
the rest of Campbell’s project. 
 
In later work,177 Campbell changes the emphasis of the role of attention 
somewhat. Instead of emphasising the necessity of attention for verifying 
demonstrative propositions, visual attention is identified with the selection of 
an object or region. This change of emphasis is made with reference to the 
Boolean Map theory of Liqiang Huang and Harold Pashler (Huang and 
Pashler (2007)). Boolean Map theory sets out to provide answers to two 
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questions: ‘What can an observer visually consciously access at one 
moment?’, and ‘How do observers select what to access?’.178 Answering 
these questions requires distinguishing selection from access, and it is this 
distinction that Campbell is particularly interested in. As Campbell puts the 
distinction, it is between “Selecting a region or object by using some property of it, 
such as its colour or texture” and “Accessing a property of that selected region or 
object.”179 
 
For Huang and Pashler, selection is exemplified by what the subject has to 
do to distinguish the target stimulus from distractors in visual search 
experiments (the more distractors there are, the more difficult the task of 
selecting the target is).180 What the subject can access is what the subject 
‘apprehends’, and is also what the subject is visually aware of at an 
instant.181 (What subjects apprehend may not correspond to what they report 
since what they report may be based on introspection, and “…observers may 
be unable to distinguish between actually having certain information explicitly represented 
in awareness and having the ability to access that information quickly whenever they want 
it…”182) 
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A crucial difference between the way Huang and Pashler understand 
selection and access, and the way that Campbell understands them, is that 
Campbell identifies conscious attention with selection183 while Huang and 
Pashler identify conscious attention with access. We get an idea of what 
Campbell means by access through some examples of behaviours that 
require accessing a colour property. Campbell mentions reporting the colour, 
using the colour in reasoning (e.g. inductive reasoning about other objects 
with the same colour), and matching the colour to other instances of the 
same colour (e.g. grouping objects with the same colour together).184 
 
We started with Campbell’s common sense-motivated connection between 
visual attention and the reference of visual demonstratives (the Sea of 
Faces). The accompanying theoretical account of the Classical View of 
propositions added depth by distinguishing understanding from verification. 
The parallel distinction between conscious attention and the underlying 
information processing it causes and justifies provided a characteristic 
picture of the relation between the two. The graft of psychological views of 
attention onto this essentially common sense-motivated picture is not, in my 
view, either very neat or entirely necessary. Neither Anne Treisman’s FIT, 
where the role of attention is to ‘glue’ features processed separately back 
together,185 nor Huang and Pashler’s Boolean Map theory, where we are 
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momentarily conscious only of single features at a time, have much in 
common with the phenomenology of visual experience, or the pre-theoretical 
conception of visual attention I am defending. Moreover, the contributions 
they make to Campbell’s theory – the importance of location, and the 
selection/access distinction – could be made without them. The greatest 
danger, however, as I have tried to show with regard to Campbell’s gloss on 
Kentridge et al. (1999), is that in trying to combine two very differently 
motivated approaches to the explanation of human behaviour, a false 
impression of harmonious co-existence between them is created. 
 
Putting that point to one side, we can now see three different levels of 
explanation in Campbell’s view, and how they fit together: conceptual 
thought (in particular, demonstrative thoughts about perceived objects), 
conscious attention (in particular, visual attention to objects), and information 
processing (FIT and Boolean Map theory). Now, someone who was sceptical 
about the need for attention to be conscious may be quite happy to think that 
something must play the role that conscious attention plays for Campbell, but 
insist this role can be played adequately by attention as conceived by Robert 
Kentridge, or Anne Treisman. I suggested that demonstrative reference to an 
object on the basis of seeing it requires selecting the object, and selecting 
something requires prior awareness of it. For Campbell, the explanatory role 
of visual attention is something deeper. It is not just that the blindseer lacks 
visual sensations, for example, but that the blindseer’s selective 
enhancement does not entitle him to think about objects in the way that, by 
consciously attending to them, we can. Visual attention to objects is what 
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justifies our conception of them as mind independent. If we want visual 
experience to play this role, however, we need to adopt a Relational View of 
experience. 
 
4.3 The Relational View of Experience 
 
Reflection on the nature of visual experience and attention appears to show 
that visual attention, conceived as sufficient for awareness, is necessary for 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions. If I want to pick up a 
particular object, or refer to it using a demonstrative, I need to visually attend 
to it. The remarkable abilities of blindseers, who can perform some quite 
astonishing visually based object-directed actions, and have visually based 
object-directed thoughts, both in the absence of any awareness of the 
relevant objects, proves that visual attention is not in general necessary for 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions. Robert Kentridge and 
colleagues have seized on the evidence from blindsight as proof that visual 
attention and visual awareness can come apart: visually attending to an 
object is not sufficient for being visually aware of it. We need not accept this 
conclusion if we can identify something distinctive about the way in which 
visual attention explains our visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions. Campbell’s proposal is that blindseers cannot have the kind of 
knowledge of the reference of a visual demonstrative that someone who 
consciously attends to the referent can. Before looking at why he thinks this, 
I want to briefly return to the Sea of Faces to highlight something about it that 
seems a little surprising. 
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In the Sea of Faces we were asked to imagine someone who was capable of 
visually based thoughts and actions in response to a visual demonstrative, 
without being able to consciously attend to the woman being referred to. 
Though hardly mundane, this would not be surprising if the reference of the 
demonstrative was singled out by pointing at her, given the results of GY’s 
performance at the Posner cueing task that we saw in the last chapter. But 
that was not how the Sea of Faces was presented, and that is not necessary 
for using demonstratives. Demonstratives don’t need to be accompanied by 
pointing. It may just be obvious which object a speaker is referring to. Gareth 
Evans puts this very clearly: 
 
“A common way in which audiences are enabled to know which object is the referent of an 
expression in a particular context is by virtue of the speaker’s exploitation of the object’s 
salience. The salience can be brought about by the speaker himself, as when he 
accompanies the utterance of a demonstrative expression by a pointing gesture… 
Alternatively, a speaker can exploit some extreme or heightened salience which an object 
has anyway (without his bringing it about)…”186 
 
The stated purpose of the Sea of Faces is to bring out the difference 
between the blindseer and the ordinary subject. What is surprising, therefore, 
is the suggestion that a blindseer could be capable of visually based 
thoughts and actions in response to a visual demonstrative without an 
accompanying cue. How would the blindseer notice, to use Evans’ phrase, 
                                            
186
 Evans (1982) p. 312, emphasis in original. 
142 
 
the ‘heightened salience’ of an object in his environment? To do that would 
seem to require more than just the ability to isolate an object from its 
background for it to receive enhanced processing and be identified. It would 
seem to require the ability to compare the contextually determined salience 
of, potentially, a whole range of objects. If what I said in §2.1 (this chapter) 
regarding the discontinuous and selective manner in which blindseers 
exercise their abilities is correct, they cannot access potentially varied 
information (e.g. hair colour) about a group of objects all at once. This also 
highlights an important disanalogy between the Sea of Faces and genuine 
blindsight. The evidence from experiments involving subjects with blindsight 
supports the ascription of a selective enhancement of processing, not an 
unconscious ability to determine the gist of a scene.187 The situation in the 
Sea of Faces is exactly the reverse. 
 
This, however, isn’t the kind of difference Campbell focuses on as significant 
for providing knowledge of reference. Instead, Campbell focuses on the way 
in which visual experience grounds our thoughts of objects as mind-
independent, and as the source of the physical properties (e.g. being round 
and rigid) that determine their behaviour (e.g. rolling). To highlight the way in 
which our visual experience of objects does this, Campbell uses an exercise 
of imagination, which I will call the House Next Door: 
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He asks us to imagine compiling indirect evidence of the inhabitants and 
contents of the house next door. On the basis of the sounds we hear, we 
build a series of hypotheses concerning what the people are like, and the 
things they own. So we might hear their voices, or the sounds of drilling or 
hammering, or a guitar being played. Some of the objects we hypothesise 
our neighbours owning may not even make a noise. Hearing the sound of a 
television, we hypothesise the existence of plug sockets. We could end up 
with a fairly substantial number of hypotheses, which through careful 
listening and cross-referencing we are able to test. As a result, we are able 
to confirm the existence of the hypothesized objects, can uniquely identify 
them, and on that basis refer to them. So what difference will it make, 
Campbell asks, when we finally meet the neighbours and see their 
possessions? 
 
“The contrast between the knowledge you have now, on the basis of a look at the objects, 
and the knowledge you had before of the existence of objects with particular functional 
roles, is that when you see the thing, you are confronted by the individual substance itself. 
On seeing it, you no longer have knowledge of the object merely as the postulated 
occupant of a particular functional role. Your experience of the object, when you see it, 
provides you with knowledge of the categorical grounds of the collections of dispositions 
you had earlier postulated.”188 
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Visual experience of the objects makes a difference, by providing us with 
(knowledge of) the source of the evidence we have gathered. Before seeing 
the objects, we were only aware of, as it were, indirect (though not 
necessarily inconclusive) evidence of their nature (the sounds they made). 
When we see them, it is not just their potential behaviours, such as a 
propensity to break, or roll, that we experience.189 Nor is it just the 
opportunities they afford us to interact with them that we experience, like 
reaching for and grasping them.190 Nor, again, is it that the objects just 
produce sensations in us, 191 or that we experience the changes in our visual 
systems the objects cause.192 It is, rather, their intrinsic nature that is evident 
in our experience of them: in seeing an object we are ‘confronted by the 
individual substance itself’. 
 
The difference between hearing the sounds of activity from the house next 
door, and being ‘confronted by the individual substance itself' has the ring of 
something revelatory, which might distract from a quite straightforward point 
about the difference between hearing the sounds, and seeing the sound-
emitting objects. The sounds that objects make do not have any very obvious 
connection with the intrinsic spatial properties of those objects, such as 
(spatial) volume, or mass, or shape.193 The buzz of the electric shaver, the 
creak of floorboards and the sound of doors slamming all require background 
information to identify which objects are responsible. The same point does 
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not usually hold for seeing objects: in seeing an object, we are usually left in 
no doubt which object is responsible for our seeing it. The source of the 
experience is evident in the experience itself.194 
 
Campbell thinks of the difference between the blindseer’s and the normally 
sighted subject’s visually based abilities along the same sort of lines as the 
‘before’ and ‘after’ of the House Next Door. He makes the point with 
reference to what James Gibson called affordances: 
 
“Suppose you had a blindsighted subject who lacked awareness of the contents of his 
blind field, but had a great deal of visual information about them and could act on the 
objects in his blind field just as rapidly and accurately as an ordinary subject. What would 
this subject be missing? Suppose this subject had an object in his blind field, say a lamp. 
Why should we not say that this subject is in a position to understand the demonstrative, 
‘that lamp’? Of course, the subject can formulate descriptions such as ‘whatever is in my 
blind field’ that might uniquely identify the thing. But why should we not say that the 
subject can interpret the demonstrative ‘that lamp’ in just the way that we ordinarily do, 
without having to form descriptions singling out the thing?... In Gibson’s terms, the 
blindsighted subject could be said to have information about many of the ‘affordances’ 
provided by the object; an ‘affordance’ being something that the object will provide you 
with if you act suitably on it… An affordance is a dispositional characteristic of the thing, a 
tendency it has to yield a certain result if treated in a particular way … The natural view to 
oppose to Gibson is that visual experience does not provide us with knowledge of 
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affordances. It provides us with knowledge of the categorical properties of objects which 
are the reasons why the objects have the affordances they do.”195 
 
It is in our experience of objects, Campbell says, that we are confronted with 
the categorical things themselves. In contrast, the blindseer’s reaching and 
pointing towards objects is merely the performance of actions he senses he 
can make, and not a response to his experience of the objects. I think 
Campbell is right that the blindseer’s visually based object-directed thoughts 
and actions are different from the corresponding thoughts and actions of a 
normal subject but, I will be arguing, I don’t think Campbell’s characterisation 
of our experience of objects best captures this difference. 
 
On Campbell’s Relational View, visual experience of objects provides us with 
our conception of objects as mind-independent. To have a working idea of 
how the Relational View is supposed to do this, we need to have an idea of 
the following two things: the difference between the Relational View and the 
alternative ‘Representational View’ of visual experience, and what, in 
Campbell’s opinion, is wrong with the Representational View. According to 
the Relational View, the qualitative or phenomenal character of our visual 
experience is constituted by the things and properties we see (more on 
phenomenal character shortly). A little more precisely, in my case it is the 
visible properties of the objects, such as their shape and colour, and their 
spatial arrangement, from my (spatiotemporal) point of view.196 Visual 
experience is a relation between the spatially arranged objects and their 
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properties, the subject, and the subject’s point of view. It is a corollary of the 
Relational View that visual experience is not identical to, nor wholly 
constituted by the visual processing carried out by the visual system.197 
 
The key difference between the Representational and Relational Views is 
also what, in Campbell’s opinion, is wrong with the Representational View. 
This is the Representational View’s characterisation of the qualitative or 
phenomenal character of visual experience as something that could be 
common to both seeing an object, and an indistinguishable hallucination as 
of the object. Some explanation is in order here. The ‘phenomenal character’ 
of a visual experience is made up of its qualitative properties, properties such 
as the greyness of clouds, the curve of a smile and the brightness of the sun. 
Of course, if I am hallucinating clouds, whatever I am experiencing is not 
clouds, but I may still be experiencing greyness.198 (I should make explicit at 
this point what I assume throughout this thesis, that I am located in a 
physical environment which I visually experience, and my experiences – for 
the most part, anyway – are veridical.) The point is that the Representational 
View has a substantive explanation of why a veridical visual experience of 
mine is indistinguishable, on the basis of introspection alone, from a 
hallucinatory visual experience. 
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To illustrate, suppose my neighbour has, without my knowledge, implanted a 
virtual reality device in my head which can provide all the same sorts of input 
to my nervous system that it would receive were I going about my daily 
business. I am quite unaware that he has switched it on while I am sitting, 
typing away on my laptop. The hallucinatory experiences I subsequently start 
having seem in every way to me to be an uninterrupted continuation of my 
previous veridical experiences. I cannot by attending to my experiences (i.e. 
engaging in the process of introspection) tell that I am hallucinating. I should 
emphasise here that the mere fact that I cannot distinguish the veridical 
experience from the hallucinatory experience does not fully capture the 
situation I have in mind. I might not be able to distinguish my experience at 
one moment from my experience at the next moment for a variety of 
reasons. The difference between the first and second experience might be 
very subtle, or my ability to engage in the process of introspection might be 
compromised.199 In the situation I am describing, however, I am able to 
engage in the process of introspection effectively, and I am attending to all 
the subtleties of my experience. I am also assuming that I can meaningfully 
declare my visual experience at one moment the same as my visual 
experience at the next moment – that is, there are qualitative aspects of the 
experiences to be compared. To complete the picture of the 
Representational View, I am assuming that, given these conditions, for my 
visual experience at one moment to have the same qualitative aspects 
(which is to say, phenomenal character) as my visual experience at the next 
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moment, it is sufficient that my nervous system receives the same inputs at 
both moments. (Put a little differently, given these conditions it is sufficient 
that my neurophysiological state is the same at both moments.) In contrast, 
on the Relational View my veridical and hallucinatory experiences do not 
have the same phenomenal character, they are merely indistinguishable to 
me. 
 
The first question Campbell poses for the Representational View asks, if we 
think of the phenomenal character of visual experience as something that is 
common to both seeing and hallucinating, how can we visually experience 
the intrinsic nature of objects? The distinction Campbell uses, between the 
intrinsic or categorical properties of objects and their dispositional properties 
is not, I think, either self-evident or uncontentious, but there are some fairly 
uncontroversial examples. An example of a categorical property is shape. An 
example of a dispositional property that Campbell gives is the propensity to 
roll. If, for the moment, we set aside issues over the distinction, we can get a 
sense of the point Campbell is driving at. He is interested in the way we think 
about ‘medium sized physical objects’.200 We think of the physical objects we 
see, like the books, chairs, houses and ballpoint pens we encounter every 
day, as existing whether or not we are perceiving them. We think of them as 
possessing the physical properties that determine their behaviour; to use one 
of Campbell’s examples, we think of the roundness and rigidity of an object 
as explaining its propensity to roll. We also think of them as public objects 
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that can be encountered by different observers.201 Visual experience has to 
explain how we can conceive of objects in this way, Campbell says.202 In 
saying this, I don’t believe he is thinking exclusively of our acquisition of 
concepts like ‘book’, ‘chair’ or ‘house’.203 The Representational View can 
provide an account of the acquisition of those concepts. I think what 
Campbell is most concerned with is that visual experience has to justify how 
we think about objects. He says 
 
“We cannot extract the conception of a mind-independent world from a mind-dependent 
image.”204 
 
There is, as far as I can tell, nothing self-evidently absurd about someone 
whose experiences have all been hallucinations conceiving of the ‘world’ 
they experience as mind-independent. That is just the kind of claim a sceptic 
about the external world would make. The only way I see of making sense of 
the ‘extraction’ of the conception of a mind-independent world is in terms of 
justification: we cannot justify our conception of a mind-independent world on 
the basis of a mind-dependent image. 205 If we focus on the case of visual 
experience, our visual attention to objects provides us with justification to 
think of them as existing unperceived, as the source of the physical 
properties that determine their behaviour, and as public. How, Campbell 
asks, can visual experience as conceived on the Representational View 
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provide us with justification for these ways of thinking about objects? 
Campbell offers what he thinks is the best response an advocate of the 
Representational View can make: visual experience, according to the 
Representational View, ‘provides the conception of an objective world simply 
by displaying the world as objective’, and ‘involves grasping demonstrative 
propositions as the contents of experiences’.206 This seems like the right 
direction for someone who believed in the Representational View to move in. 
To return to my example of the diabolical virtual reality device implanted in 
me by my nefarious neighbour, it would certainly seem to me when I am 
hallucinating that I am confronted by physical objects that exist whether or 
not they are perceived by me, have the physical properties such as 
roundness and rigidity that explain their dispositions to do things like roll, and 
are public. I would be wrong on all counts, but nothing about my visual 
experience would reveal that I was. It is in his counter-response against the 
Representational View that Campbell appeals to the explanatory role of 
visual experience. 
 
“Experience is what explains our grasp of the concepts of objects. But if you think of 
experience as intentional, as merely one among many ways of grasping thoughts, you 
cannot allow it this explanatory role… if all there is to experience of objects is the grasping 
of demonstrative thoughts about them, then experience of objects is just one among many 
ways in which you can exercise your conceptual skills. At this point we do not have any 
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way of explaining why there should be anything fundamental to our grasp of concepts 
about experience of objects.”207 
 
The point being made here is not just that explanandum and explanans must 
be distinct. It could be argued that our demonstrative thoughts about objects 
have a different phenomenology from our visual experience of them, or it 
could be argued that visual experience of objects is non-conceptual.208 The 
deeper point is rather that in terms of reference and justification, ‘experience 
of objects has to be something more primitive than the ability to think about 
objects, in terms of which the ability to think about objects can be 
explained’.209 For my visual experience of the car to explain my ability to 
refer to it demonstratively, and understand demonstrative reference to it, my 
visual experience of the car must include – be in part constituted by – the car 
itself. For visual experience of objects to justify the way we think about them, 
as existing unperceived, as the source of the physical properties that 
determine their behaviour, and as public, the objects themselves must be 
constituents of our experience. If that is not how we conceive of perceptual 
experience, we are not entitled to think that we can refer demonstratively to 
objects, or that the way we think about physical objects is justified by the 
nature of the objects themselves. 
 
Taking these points in turn, if the car is not a constituent of my visual 
experience, my attempt at demonstratively referring to it may fall short of it (it 
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may only seem to me that I am demonstratively referring to it). According to 
one line of thought tracing its ancestry to Russell,210 the distinction between 
definite descriptions and singular terms like demonstrative expressions and 
proper names depends in part on the latter needing a referent to be truth-
evaluable. Evans writes 
 
“A genuine referring expression has as its sole function the identification of an object such 
that if it satisfies the predicate, the sentence [containing it] is true, and if it fails to satisfy 
the predicate, the sentence is false. But if the expression fails to identify an object at all, 
then the truth-evaluation of the sentence cannot get started, and the whole sentence is an 
aberration.”211 
 
The line of thought continues, which object I mean to refer to is determined 
by which object I have in mind. When I say ‘That car is red’ intending to 
demonstratively refer to a car, the proposition expressed by my utterance is 
only truth-evaluable if I have a particular car in mind (typically, the car I am 
visually attending to). On the occasions when my attempt at demonstrative 
reference fails to refer to the object I take myself to be referring to, for 
example because I am hallucinating a red car, there is no particular physical 
car I have in mind. If my intention is to refer to the particular physical car I am 
having a visual experience of, and there is no physical car I am experiencing, 
the demonstrative picks nothing out. One of Campbell’s criticisms of the 
Representational View is that if the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience is the same whether I am seeing the car or hallucinating, the 
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phenomenal character of my visual experience cannot determine which 
particular car I have in mind. If, on the other hand, the car is a constituent of 
my visual experience of it, the phenomenal character of my visual experience 
can determine which particular car I have in mind: the car I have in mind is 
the car that is a constituent of my visual experience. 
 
The way in which visual experience justifies our conception of objects as 
mind-independent (i.e. as existing unperceived, as the source of the physical 
properties that determine their behaviour, and as public) is analogous. If my 
visual experience is to justify my thinking of objects as mind-independent, my 
visual experience had better be of mind-independent objects. For the same 
reasons I cited earlier in this chapter (§3), Brian the brain-in-a-vat is not 
justified in believing he is confronted by mind-independent objects, and 
neither am I when the virtual reality device is causing me to hallucinate. But if 
the phenomenal character of my visual experience is the same whether I am 
seeing the car or hallucinating, the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience cannot justify my conception of objects as mind-independent. If, 
on the other hand, objects are constituents of my visual experience, the 
phenomenal character of my experience – composed of the various 
properties of the objects constituting it – can justify my conception of objects 
as mind-independent. 
 
These are powerful points but not, I think, fatal for the Representational 
View. One line of response begins with the thought that demonstrative 
reference, and justification of our conception of objects as mind-independent, 
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need not depend solely on the phenomenal character of visual experience. 
The phenomenal character of my visual experience of the car is necessary, 
but does not guarantee that I succeed in demonstratively referring to it; the 
phenomenal character of my visual experience of objects more generally is 
necessary, but not sufficient to justify my conception of them as mind-
independent. In both cases, the world also needs to be a certain way, and 
whether it is or not may not be evident from the phenomenal character of my 
visual experience of it. I will return to both these points shortly. 
 
As will be obvious by now, Campbell thinks the blindseer’s visual abilities 
cannot justify his conceiving of objects as mind-independent, and they do not 
enable him to demonstratively refer to objects. Though he might be able to 
point at an object in his blind field, for example a lamp, and having done so 
use the expression ‘that lamp’, the expression is really just a disguised 
description, ‘the lamp I am pointing at’. Before I turn to critically examining 
the explanatory role of visual attention as envisaged by Campbell, I want to 
briefly take stock. 
 
The question that has been driving this chapter asks what distinctive role 
visual attention plays. The obvious answer, that it is necessary for us to think 
about and act upon objects in our environment, turns out not to be true. 
Blindseers can have visually based thoughts about objects in their 
environment, and perform visually based actions on objects in their 
environment, all without any visual awareness of those objects. Despite this, 
I have said, it remains very plausible that visual attention does, in some way, 
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explain how we think about, and act upon, the objects we see, and moreover 
it remains plausible that this explanatory role is not shared with the selective 
enhancement blindseers are capable of. Campbell’s proposal for the 
explanatory role of visual attention is that it enables us to understand 
demonstrative reference to objects, and justifies our conception of objects as 
mind-independent. According to Campbell, if we want attention to play this 
explanatory role, we have to accept the Relational View of visual experience. 
Looking ahead, I will outline a commitment of the Relational View that I find 
unacceptable. I will, in the next section (§5), propose an alternative 
explanatory role for visual attention to Campbell’s that does not carry that 
commitment. I return first to the connection between demonstrative reference 
and the Relational View. 
 
I will not challenge Campbell’s point that blindseers cannot demonstratively 
refer to objects, as I think he is right. I do, however, want to put some 
pressure on his explanation for this. According to Campbell, the blindseer 
cannot demonstratively refer to objects because though he may acquire 
visual information about the dispositional characteristics of objects (e.g. he 
may perceive that an object affords him the opportunity to reach for or point 
to it), he cannot visually acquire knowledge of the categorical properties of 
objects that are the basis for those dispositional characteristics. I have 
suggested a much simpler explanation: to use a visual demonstrative to refer 
to an object, I have to first visually select the object, and to visually select the 
object I have to be visually aware of it. In short, I have to visually attend to it. 
I pointed out at the end of Chapter 1 that selecting something requires prior 
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awareness of it, and of the range of items from which it is selected (this is 
what it means to make a selection). Much the same can be said of the most 
typical conditions in which we demonstratively refer to an object: we are 
visually aware of a range of objects from which we select (i.e. visually attend 
to) one to refer to. It seems very plausible, therefore, that demonstratively 
referring to an object requires the object to be visually selected – this, at any 
rate, is the point I take from the Sea of Faces. Cast in the role of the 
protagonist of the Sea of Faces, I manage to describe and point at the 
woman referred to in a demonstrative proposition. Despite this, I am not able 
to visually pick her out from the sea of faces. But suppose instead of 
responding to someone else’s use of a demonstrative, I attempt to use a 
demonstrative myself, while my visual experience remains a sea of faces. My 
utterance of ‘That woman is tall’ could not possibly refer to a particular 
woman I see, since I don’t see any particular woman, just a sea of faces. 
(Precisely the same could be said about pointing at an object in that 
situation.) It is only having visually selected a particular woman that I would 
normally go about trying to demonstratively refer to her. Blindseers, lacking 
any visual experience whatsoever, are also unable to visually select 
particular objects to demonstratively refer to. Suppose a blindseer is asked to 
guess what is directly ahead in his blind field, and suppose he guesses it is a 
woman, and can describe her. The best way for him in conversation to refer 
to the woman he has visually detected is to use a description like ‘The 
woman I have detected in my blind field’. Any other way of verbally 
identifying her runs the risk of being true of multiple referents.212 In contrast, 
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his normally sighted companions, who we can presume are able at once to 
be visually aware of the ‘gist’ of the scene (and therefore of all contextually 
relevant women) can be sure of qualifying their use of a demonstrative in 
such a way as to leave no doubt who they are referring to (e.g. ‘That woman 
wearing a hat’). Given that these considerations are suggested by 
Campbell’s Sea of Faces, why doesn’t he make use of a similar argument? 
 
I think Campbell doesn’t use a similar argument, despite it being suggested 
by his Sea of Faces scenario, because he thinks the phenomenal character 
of perceptual experience, and visual experience in particular, plays a more 
fundamental role in demonstrative reference, and in justifying our conception 
of objects as mind-independent. If the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience is to determine which object I have in mind when I attempt to 
demonstratively refer, then the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience does need to be constituted by the objects that my experience is 
of. Since, on the Representational View, the phenomenal character of my 
veridical and hallucinatory experiences is the same, the phenomenal 
character cannot determine which object I have in mind when I attempt to 
demonstratively refer. On the Relational View, the phenomenal character of 
my visual experience is constituted by the objects it is an experience of, so 
the phenomenal character of my experience does determine which object I 
have in mind when I attempt to demonstratively refer. Similarly, if the 
phenomenal character of my visual experience is to justify my conception of 
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objects as mind-independent, then it does need to be constituted by the 
objects that my experience is of. But we don’t have to agree with Campbell 
about this. We don’t have to agree that the phenomenal character of visual 
experience has to play this sort of fundamental role. We might think that the 
phenomenal character of visual experience, together with the way the world 
is, determines which object I have in mind when I attempt to demonstratively 
refer. Whether the world is the way it appears to be may not be evident from 
the phenomenal character of my visual experience of it. 
 
There is another reason to think that the phenomenal character of visual 
experience does not play the role Campbell thinks it does with regard to 
demonstrative reference. We use visual demonstratives to refer to people we 
see on television. I might say, of a politician I see on television, ‘That man 
has blood on his hands’. The reference of the demonstrative expression is 
not physically present, but my visual attention still plays a role, and the 
demonstrative still functions as a singular term. An alternative reading of 
‘deferred’ demonstratives like this is to treat them as disguised 
descriptions.213 Emma Borg (Borg (2002)) has argued that deferred 
demonstratives should not be treated as descriptions, on the grounds that 
their behaviour in modal contexts and their behaviour when no reference is 
picked out is in accordance with what we expect of singular terms rather than 
descriptions. If I say ‘That man has blood on his hands’ referring to the man I 
see on television, I mean that particular man. In contrast if I use the definite 
description ‘The man on television has blood on his hands’, the man picked 
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out may vary depending on the modal context (in different possible worlds, 
different men might be picked out). In a situation where there is no such man 
– say because the television is off – the proposition expressed using the 
deferred demonstrative has no truth value. The equivalent description comes 
out false, since there is no man who satisfies the description.214 This isn’t 
intended to be a robust defence of Borg’s account of deferred 
demonstratives. Rather, it suggests a way in which visual attention can play 
a role in determining which object I have in mind when I attempt to 
demonstratively refer, without the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience playing the fundamental role Campbell sees it as playing. 
 
If I am right about the connection between visual selection and 
demonstrative reference, there is an alternative explanation of why 
blindseers cannot demonstratively refer to objects. According to this 
alternative explanation – that demonstrative reference requires conscious 
visual selection (i.e. visual attention) – visual experience does not need to be 
constituted by the objects it is an experience of. When I attempt to 
demonstratively refer to an object, the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience, together with the way the world is, determines which object I 
have in mind. The blindseer, lacking any visual experience, has no particular 
object in mind. 
 
In the next and final section of this chapter (§5), I will outline an alternative 
explanation to the one Campbell provides of why our visual experience 
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inclines us to think of objects as existing unperceived. The alternative I 
describe does not require visual experience to be constituted by the objects it 
is an experience of. In §5 I will also propose that visual attention plays an 
explanatory role similar to the one proposed by Declan Smithies. I want to 
end this section by identifying a commitment of the Relational View that I find 
unacceptable. It is this commitment that is my principle reason for resisting 
the Relational View. 
 
According to the Representational View, when I am having a veridical visual 
experience, and when (due to the diabolical virtual reality implant) I am 
having an indistinguishable hallucination, I can be in a position to know the 
phenomenal character of my visual experience. What is unique about my 
position as the subject of both the hallucinatory and veridical experiences 
can be partly explained by the position I am in with regard to knowing the 
phenomenal character of my visual experience. I think this captures a natural 
conviction for people to have, of being authoritative regarding their own 
thoughts and experiences. Of course, this kind of authority is not infallible. I 
might still use the wrong words to describe my experiences, or fail to pay 
proper attention to my experiences and therefore fail to grasp their 
phenomenal character. 215 Nevertheless, according to the Representational 
View, I can be in a position to know the phenomenal character of my 
experience whether I am hallucinating or not. The same cannot be said for 
the Relational View. On the Relational View, in the veridical case the 
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physical objects themselves are constituents of my visual experience. The 
situation when I am hallucinating is, in that respect, utterly different: the 
physical objects I seem to be experiencing are not constituents of my 
experience. The Relational View still allows, despite this significant difference 
between my hallucinatory and veridical experiences, that the two visual 
experiences may be in principle indistinguishable on the basis of 
introspection.216 Now, if the phenomenal character of my veridical visual 
experience is constituted by the physical objects and properties it is an 
experience of, it follows that either my hallucinatory visual experience must 
lack phenomenal character altogether (since it is not an experience of 
physical objects), or it must have a different phenomenal character – my 
hallucinatory and veridical visual experiences do not, according to the 
Relational View, have the same phenomenal character. In either case, I am 
evidently not able to introspectively determine the phenomenal character of 
my hallucinatory visual experience: I cannot even in principle be in a position 
to know the phenomenal character of my hallucinatory experiences. This 
implication of the Relational View, I suggest, is fundamentally at odds with a 
very natural conviction for us to have, of being authoritative regarding our 
own thoughts and experiences. It is certainly at odds with my conviction that I 
can be in a position to know the phenomenal character of my visual 
experience when I am hallucinating. Some may think setting limits to 
introspection is in itself a good thing. Timothy Williamson has argued against 
the view that we can take refuge in “a cognitive home in which everything lies open 
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to our view.”217 Others, and I number myself among them, feel aggrieved and 
not a little resentful at these efforts to evict us from our ‘cognitive homes’. 
 
I am not labouring under the illusion that the considerations in favour of the 
Representational View that I have sketched will prove persuasive. I am not 
able to do justice to the complexities or details of the debate between the two 
views here. Nor do I want to suggest that I have provided persuasive 
reasons for anyone to reject the Relational View. There is a wealth of 
argument and considerations in Campbell’s work that I have, of necessity, 
passed over. My concern has been to give an indication of my motivation for 
rejecting the Relational View. In the next and final section of this chapter, I 
outline an alternative explanatory role for visual attention that does not 
depend on accepting the Relational View of experience. 
 
In my discussion of Campbell I have tried to show how the explanatory role 
of visual experience as he conceives it provides a defence of the sufficiency 
of visual attention to an object for visual awareness of it. Campbell uses the 
Cityscape and Sea of Faces to make a prima facie case for the necessity of 
visual attention to the way we understand visual demonstratives. In the Sea 
of Faces, our inability to pick out the reference of the demonstrative in our 
visual experience, Campbell suggests, shows we do not know who is being 
referred to. This provides initial motivation for his theoretical account of the 
role of visual attention. To know the reference of a visual demonstrative, we 
need to visually attend to the object being referred to. Knowledge of the 
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reference of a demonstrative contributes not just to our understanding of the 
proposition expressed using it, but also in verifying whether that proposition 
is true. The distinction between understanding a proposition and verifying 
whether it is true characterises what Campbell calls the Classical View. On 
the Classical View, knowledge of the reference of a demonstrative causes 
and justifies the way we go about verifying propositions it is used to express, 
acting upon those propositions, and reasoning on the basis of those 
propositions. Visual attention to an object causes and justifies (i.e. sets the 
objective for) the information processing necessary for verifying what is said 
about the object, and acting on the object. There is also the visual 
processing that enables us to attend to objects in the first place, and to 
illustrate how these are two different stages of visual information processing, 
Campbell appeals to Treisman's Feature Integration Theory and Huang and 
Pashler's Boolean Map theory. Distinguishing visual experience of objects 
from visually based thoughts and judgements about them allows Campbell to 
propose that visual attention plays the explanatory role of anchoring 
demonstrative reference, and justifying our conception of objects as mind-
independent. The selection and enhancement blindseers are capable of can 
neither provide them with the same understanding of the reference of 
demonstratives, nor justify them in conceiving of objects as mind-
independent. If we accept Campbell’s proposal for the role of visual attention, 
we are entitled to conclude that it is sufficient for visual awareness. 
Accepting Campbell’s proposal does, however, carry with it a commitment to 
the Relational View. I have outlined my motivation for not wanting to accept 
the Relational View, as a result of which I have an alternative proposal for 
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the explanatory role of visual attention that does not carry the commitments 
of the Relational View, a proposal that moreover can also provide an account 
of why we are inclined to conceive of objects in our environment as mind-
independent. Setting out that proposal is the task of the next and final 
section of this chapter. 
 
5. The Integration View218 
 
There is a crucial difference between, on the one hand how the blindseer’s 
unconscious visual information is connected to his visually based thoughts 
and actions, and on the other how a normally sighted person’s visual 
experience is connected to her visually based thoughts and actions. When I 
say ‘That car is red’ while visually attending to the car, my thoughts about the 
car are connected to what I am saying about it by my awareness of it. In 
contrast, when the blindseer makes a guess about the colour of a stimulus, 
what connects his thoughts to his utterance is only the unconscious visual 
information that inclines him to make his guess. As Smithies carefully pointed 
out (§3), there is, for the blindseer, no introspectively accessible reason for 
his thoughts and actions. There I argued, against Smithies, that the 
explanatory role of visual attention could not be to provide justifying reasons 
for our visually based thoughts and actions. My disagreement with Smithies 
stems from his characterisation of justifying reasons as derived solely from 
what is introspectively accessible to the subject. I find it compelling that, out 
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of two people who both have qualitatively indistinguishable visual 
experiences, the one whose experiences are veridical is more justified than 
the other. But suppose we separate Smithies’ initial insight, that blindseers 
lack reasons for their visually based thoughts and actions, from the further 
claim about the nature of epistemic justification. If we do that, I think we have 
a candidate for the explanatory role of visual attention. 
 
The thought is that when we ask someone with normal vision why they are 
performing a visually based object-directed action, assuming they answer 
honestly and sincerely, their visual attention to the object will provide their 
reason. Similarly, if we ask ourselves why we are having the visually based 
object-directed thoughts we are, our answer will rely on our visual attention 
to the objects we are thinking about. These reasons need not, however, be 
like the justifying reasons in Smithies’ proposal. If, unbeknownst to me, I am 
hallucinating a red car, and cite the apparent object of my visual experience 
as part of my reason for acting, that is, in a perfectly ordinary sense of 
‘reason’, a reason for my so acting, though not much of a justification. I have 
explained why I pointed and said ‘That car is red’ – I have given my 
reason.219 Similarly, we can speak of someone’s reason for acting in a 
certain way, or thinking a certain thing, even when the person in question 
agrees, after the event, that they were wrong to act in that way, or think that 
thing. When my neighbour’s fiendish prank, of implanting me with a virtual 
reality device, is revealed to me, I can give reasons for my thoughts and 
actions while under the influence of the device by explaining that (and what) I 
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was hallucinating. But the role of visual awareness in providing reasons is 
not restricted to language-users. Visual awareness can also provide non-
linguistic animals and pre-linguistic infants with reasons for acting: the 
objects or properties experienced can constitute reasons for their actions. My 
visual awareness of the bear can provide me with a reason for moving away 
(or towards) it, but the bear’s visual awareness of me can also provide the 
bear with a reason to move towards (or away) from me. The objects or 
properties experienced from the subject’s point of view can constitute 
reasons for their actions, and (in the case of language-using subjects) 
reasons for their beliefs. This, I think, captures the essence of what I called 
Smithies’ Blindsight Guessing Intuition. 
 
As an explanatory role for visual attention this needs further development, of 
course. A blindseer who learns about his condition could, just as honestly 
and sincerely, cite unconscious visual information as a reason for his 
guessing there is a picture of a horse in his blind field, or as a reason for his 
pointing in the direction of the stimulus presented to his blind field. To 
distinguish this sort of reason from the kind we are interested in, we need to 
add the condition that the reason must be accessible on the basis of 
introspection alone. Since the reason is provided by perceptual awareness of 
the object or property, both the bear’s actions on seeing me, and my beliefs 
and actions on seeing the bear can be explained by reference to our visual 
experience of each other. With this condition in place, reasons based on 
unconscious visual information or information processing are ruled out. This 
includes cases of unconscious visually based action in subjects with normal 
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vision, such as the unconscious adjustment of pointing observed in the 
experiments carried out by Bruce Bridgeman and colleagues (Bridgeman et 
al. (1979), outlined in §2.3 above). 
 
This still falls short of what we are looking for. A practiced blindseer could 
honestly and sincerely give as his reason for successfully performing a 
visually based action his confidence that he would succeed. In §2.2 I 
described the case of TN, the man with bilateral blindsight (i.e. a lack of 
visual awareness extending over the whole of the visual field) who 
successfully navigated his way along a corridor, past a series of obstacles, 
without the use of his cane. It is quite plausible that, had TN been asked why 
he chose to take the particular steps along that corridor that he did, he would 
have given as his reason that he felt confident taking the steps he did. It isn’t 
clear from the paper documenting TN’s navigation of the obstacle course (de 
Gelder et al. (2008)) whether he had in fact navigated obstacles like that 
before, but it makes perfect sense that the more familiar and practiced 
someone gets at an activity, the more likely they are to perform it with 
confidence. To rule out this sort of confidence as the kind of reason for 
visually based object-directed actions we are interested in, we need to 
consider the role visual attention plays in integrating our behaviour. My 
proposal is that visual attention to an object or property (perhaps together 
with other conscious sensory information) can provide us with reasons for 
thinking about the object or property and acting upon the object. Those 
reasons, constituted by the experienced object or property, are accessible on 
the basis of introspection alone, and integrate our thoughts and experiences 
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with our actions. When I have a visually based thought about a red car, that 
thought is integrated with my pointing at the car by my visual attention to the 
car: from my point of view, my visual experience of the car, my pointing at it 
and thinking about it are all explained by the car I am visually attending to. If I 
was visually aware but not attending to the car, my thoughts and actions 
would not be directed towards it – it is visual attention to an object that 
makes it possible to consciously select it for the purpose of visually based 
object-directed thought or action. My reason for having the experience, 
having the thought, and performing the action is the same. Similarly, the 
bear’s visual experience of me, and its subsequent turning away from me, 
are integrated: they are both explained by the same reason, namely that the 
bear was visually attending to me. From the bear’s point of view, its turning 
away from me followed an assessment of me as uninteresting (or whatever), 
an assessment which depended on the bear visually attending to me (though 
it is unlikely the bear would put it in those terms). Could the blindseer’s 
confidence integrate his visually based object-directed thoughts and actions? 
What makes confidence even slightly plausible as a candidate is, I take it, 
that it suggests success. Someone who is practiced at an activity is, we 
would hope, also successful at it. How, though, is the blindseer to judge his 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions as successful? If the 
blindseer has a reason for thinking he is pointing at a red car, it will be 
because he is told he is doing this; if he has a reason for his thought to the 
effect there is a red car, it will be because he is told there is one. More 
generally, the reasons the blindseer will have for ‘guesses’ to the effect that 
there is some object or other in his environment will be based on the 
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testimony of others, or on his own non-visual perception (e.g. touch, or 
hearing). In contrast, visual attention provides us with reasons for our visually 
based object-directed thoughts and actions: we consciously select the object 
or property which our thoughts and actions are directed towards. In providing 
objects or properties as reasons for our visually based object-directed 
thoughts and actions, visual attention also makes apparent the way in which 
we encounter the objects our thoughts and actions are directed towards – we 
encounter them visually. Visual attention stitches our visually based object-
directed thoughts and actions together. 
 
In my argument against Smithies’ account of the explanatory role of 
conscious attention, I used a sceptical scenario to argue against his account 
of visual attention providing us with justifying reasons. I pointed to the 
possibility of someone being deceived in such a way that they took 
themselves to have reasons for their thoughts and actions based on their 
visual experience, when in fact they didn’t, because their ability to reason 
had been tampered with. Is my reasons-based account susceptible to the 
same sort of sceptical challenge? I believe it is, which is why it needs to be 
cast in a conditional form: if a subject is visually attending to an object (or 
having a hallucinatory experience as of attending to an object), the reason 
for any thoughts she might have about the object is the same as the reason 
for any actions she might direct towards the object: namely, her experience 
of the object. If, instead, she merely thinks she is having a visual experience, 
and in fact is not, her thoughts and actions are not integrated in the way she 
takes them to be. I however do take myself not just to be genuinely having 
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visual experiences with the phenomenal character they appear to have, but 
also to be veridically visually experiencing the world around me. On that 
assumption, the reasons for my object-directed thoughts and actions are the 
same – the objects themselves. What is more, I am able to explain my 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions in a way that the 
blindseer cannot. I am also able to explain my visually based object-directed 
thoughts and actions in a way that bears and pre-linguistic children cannot, 
but bears and pre-linguistic children, unlike blindseers, have reasons for their 
experiences and actions that integrate those experiences and actions. 
 
Visual attention to objects provides subjects with introspectively accessible 
reasons for their visually based object-directed thoughts and actions that 
integrate those thoughts and actions. In the case of language-using subjects, 
visual attention to objects also provides them with reasons they can give for 
their thoughts and actions. There is something else that visual attention to 
objects does. Visual attention to objects puts us in a position to respond 
intentionally to them. When we pay visual attention to an object, our 
attending to it puts us in a position to intentionally respond to it, where that 
response takes precedence over other intentional visually based responses 
we might be in a position to make. Visually attending to an object gives it, in 
that way, priority of intentional response. This is true both when our attention 
is voluntarily exercised, as it is when looking for a particular book among a 
pile of books, and when our attention is involuntarily captured, as it might be 
by an unexpected flash of light. In both cases, we are poised to respond 
intentionally to the object of attention, and our response to it will take priority 
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over any other visually based intentional responses we may be in a position 
to make. This characterisation of the role of visual attention with respect to 
intentional actions captures something that is central to the pre-theoretical 
conception of attention I have identified. If I am visually attending to a book, 
my next visually based intentional action will be directed at the book. If I want 
to act with respect to another object in my environment, I have to first shift 
my attention, whether overtly or covertly, to it. I can also shift my attention 
between tasks, so a task like juggling that requires a reasonable amount of 
sustained visual attention can be performed in addition to an unrelated task, 
such as walking, that requires infrequent visual attention. Actions that require 
concentrated visual attention, like playing the ‘wire loop’ (or ‘buzz wire’) 
game, where I have to guide a metal loop along a length of wire without 
either coming into contact, probably cannot be performed alongside any 
other visually based intentional actions, though I may continue to make 
unconscious visually based movements like saccades. The thought 
motivating this way of thinking of the relation between visual attention and 
intentional action is that when we visually attend to an object, the object is 
uppermost in our minds, and therefore it has priority with respect to any 
visually based purposive action we perform. This suggests a difference 
between the blindseer’s visually based object-directed actions and our own. 
What is uppermost in the blindseer’s mind is likely to be the action, rather 
than the object towards which the action is directed. But this is not to say that 
the blindseer cannot prioritise his intentional visually based object-directed 
actions on the basis of his unconscious selective enhancement of 
processing. It seems quite possible that he can. TN’s negotiation of 
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obstacles while walking along a corridor seems to be an example of 
prioritised intentional visually based object-directed actions. What blindseers 
cannot do is shift their visual selection from one object to another on the 
basis of prior visual awareness of the second object. I will argue in the next 
chapter that this is something that those of us with normal vision can do, and 
frequently do. 
 
There are some similarities between my account of the relation between 
visual attention to an object and intentional action, and Wayne Wu’s account 
(Wu (2011)) of attention as selection for action. Attention, according to Wu, is 
a subject-level phenomenon, but one for which he provides different 
explanations depending on whether the attention is voluntary (selection for 
intentional action) or involuntary (selection for unintentional action).220 The 
most crucial difference between Wu’s account and the one offered here, 
however, is that on Wu’s account, attention need not be conscious. On Wu’s 
account, GY’s performance in the Posner task is an instance of attention.221 
Wu’s account of attention is not, by that fact alone, going to be of any help in 
explaining why visual attention is sufficient for visual awareness. 
 
At the end of §4 I promised an alternative to Campbell’s account of our 
inclination to think of objects as existing unperceived. Providing this account 
will be my final task for this section. The account I am going to sketch comes 
from Gareth Evans’ paper Things Without the Mind.222 In this seminal paper, 
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Evans links spatial perception with the conception of objects as existing 
unperceived. 
 
It seems undeniable that most of us do think of physical objects as existing 
whether or not they are being perceived. If visual experience contributes to 
our conception of objects as existing unperceived, what contribution does it 
make? According to Campbell, nothing short of the object being a constituent 
of the experience will entitle us to conceive of the object as existing 
unperceived. As I have tried to show in the previous section, this brings with 
it a substantial commitment. It is not a commitment that I am prepared to 
make. Evans’ Kantian argument for the role of spatial perception in our 
conception of objects existing unperceived offers the prospect of an 
alternative explanation without having to make the commitment of the 
Relational View. 
 
Evans observes that 
 
“… the idea of unperceived existence, or rather the idea of existence now perceived, now 
unperceived, is not an idea that can stand on its own, stand without any surrounding 
theory. How is it possible that phenomena of the very same kind as those of which [one] 
has experience should occur in the absence of any experience? Such phenomena are 
evidently perceptible; why should they not be perceived? To answer this question, some 
rudimentary theory, or form of a theory of perception is required.”223 
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The rudimentary theory of spatial perception needed must link our 
conception of objects as things that can exist unperceived with conditions of 
our spatial world, conditions on the way the world must be for us to perceive 
objects. Examples of the sort of condition include such things as there being 
sufficient available light for us to see the object, our eyes working properly, 
the object being close enough and large enough to see, and so on. The point 
being made here does not depend on providing an exhaustive list of the 
conditions upon which successfully perceiving an object depends. Rather, 
the point is that in grasping the rudimentary theory of spatial perception, we 
grasp that there are such conditions on the way the world (including us as 
perceivers) must be, and we understand these conditions must be met to 
successfully perceive objects. We need also to be able to detect (or think we 
can detect) whether, for at least some of these conditions, they have been 
met or not. 
 
An object may exist and be perceptible yet still not be perceived because the 
conditions for perception are not met. If we believe that some of the relevant 
conditions for perception have not been met, we have a reason that is 
sufficient for explaining why we are not perceiving the object. This also 
means that we do not need to think of an object’s existence as dependent on 
our perception of it – we do not need to think it ceases to exist when we stop 
perceiving it, because we have other sufficient reasons for not perceiving it. 
Additional constraints (the conditions necessary for perception) have been 
placed on our perceiving an object over and above the object simply being 
perceptible (i.e. simply being such that it could be seen). I may not be 
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currently visually experiencing an object I was earlier visually experiencing 
because it is at another location not visible from my own, or because it is 
occluded by another object, or because it is too dark, or for a range of other 
reasons consistent with my understanding of the necessary conditions for 
visually experiencing objects. 
 
Evans’ account can also be used to explain why, when my devious 
neighbour switches on the virtual reality device he has implanted in my head, 
I continue to think – quite wrongly now – of the objects I am hallucinating as 
existing unperceived. My hallucinatory experience appears to be spatial, and 
in conjunction with my grasp of the conditions necessary for perception (the 
‘rudimentary theory of perception’), gives me a reason – though not a 
justifying reason – for thinking the objects I am hallucinating can exist 
unperceived. So Evans’ account can be used to explain why spatial visual 
experience (whether veridical or hallucinatory) together with a grasp of the 
conditions necessary for perception, gives us a reason for conceiving of 
objects as existing unperceived. Evans’ account does not, of course, provide 
us with justification for any thoughts about hallucinatory objects. 
 
Once we acknowledge the part played by the spatial dimension of our visual 
experience in our conception of objects as existing unperceived, we also 
have the basis for an account of why we think of objects as public, and as 
the source of the physical properties that determine their behaviour. I won’t 
spell out the account – I think it is pretty obvious how it would go. 
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I began this chapter with the question of whether a subject’s visual attention 
to an object is sufficient for her to be visually aware of the object. The most 
natural answer is that it is. It is natural to think that without visual awareness 
of objects we could not have visually based object-directed thoughts and 
perform visually based object-directed actions. The visually based abilities of 
blindseers show this is wrong: visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions are possible without visual awareness of the relevant objects. The 
sufficiency of visual attention for visual awareness cannot be defended by 
appealing to the necessity of attention for having visually based object-
directed thoughts and performing visually based object-directed actions. I 
argued, therefore, that we needed to identify another explanatory role for 
visual attention, a distinctive way in which visual attention explains our 
visually based object-directed thoughts and actions, an explanatory role that 
the selective enhancement blindseers are capable of does not make 
available to them. 
 
The first proposal I considered (§2) was that visual attention makes visual 
information spontaneously accessible for the purpose of visually based 
object-directed thoughts and actions. The cases of Helen the monkey, and 
TN the bilaterally blindsighted human (§2.2), showed that visual attention is 
not necessary for visual information to be spontaneously accessible for the 
purpose of visually based object-directed thoughts and actions, since both 
Helen and TN were capable of using visual information, spontaneously (i.e. 
without prompting), for the purpose of visually based object-directed action. 
In §2.3 I set out some evidence in support of Milner and Goodale’s two visual 
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systems hypothesis. The evidence is, I accepted, decisively in favour of 
visual awareness dissociating from visually based actions in both directions: 
visually based object-directed actions can be performed in the absence of 
visual awareness of the relevant objects, and visual awareness of objects is 
possible without a commensurate capacity to act on those objects. Milner 
and Goodale conclude that attention also comes in two varieties, one 
conscious and one unconscious. I rejected their conclusion, but conceded 
that the explanatory role of visual attention could not be to make visual 
information spontaneously accessible for the purpose of visually based 
object-directed thoughts and actions. 
 
The second proposal for the explanatory role of visual attention I considered 
in this chapter was Declan Smithies’ Rational Access View (§3). Smithies 
argued that attention makes visual information fully accessible for the rational 
control of thought and action. However, the kind of reasons visual attention 
provides, according to Smithies, are justifying reasons, which must be 
accessible on the basis of introspection alone. I argued that reasons 
accessible on the basis of introspection alone might fail to justify our 
thoughts and actions. For example, my cognitive abilities might be 
compromised, and I might think I am acting on the basis of a visual 
experience, when in fact I am not, because I am acting on the basis of a 
guess. There remains, nonetheless, something very plausible about the 
central piece of Smithies’ view, that visual experience provides us with 
reasons. 
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The third proposal I considered is John Campbell’s view according to which 
visual attention to objects grounds our ability to refer to them 
demonstratively, and justifies us in thinking of them as mind-independent (i.e. 
as existing unperceived, as possessing the physical properties that 
determine their behaviour, and as public objects). To be entitled to think of 
visual attention as grounding demonstrative reference to objects, and 
justifying our thinking of them as mind-independent, we need to think of 
visual experience Relationally. That is, we need to think of the objects we 
visually experience as constituents of our experience. This carries with it the 
commitment that we cannot, in principle, know the phenomenal character of 
our hallucinatory experiences, and I confessed myself unable to accept this 
commitment. In the hypothetical case I describe, where without my 
knowledge my villainous neighbour implanted a virtual reality device in me, it 
seems to me self-evident that I know the phenomenal character of my 
resulting hallucinatory visual experiences. Moreover, I have tried to show that 
there is an alternative explanation of why blindseers cannot use visual 
demonstratives in the way we do, and an alternative account of our 
inclination to think of objects as existing unperceived. I have also, in this 
section, proposed an explanatory role for visual attention according to which 
it provides us with reasons for thinking and acting, accessible on the basis of 
introspection, that integrates our thoughts with our actions. Finally, I have 
tried to show how I think visual attention to an object puts us in a position to 
intentionally respond to it, where that response takes precedence over other 
intentional visually based responses we might be in a position to make. 
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In my sketch of Evans’ account of the relation between spatial perception 
and our conception of objects as existing unperceived, the lynchpin is our 
grasp of the conditions necessary for perception. I want to end this chapter 
by saying a little more about the phenomenal character of our spatial visual 
experience. Our spatial visual experience allows visual attention to integrate 
our visually based thoughts and actions because it conforms to some 
constraints. The phenomenal character of our visual experience is 
systematically related to the actions available to us. For instance, it visually 
seems to me as if I am in a position to touch the objects within my reach as I 
walk past them; it visually seems to me that I have to walk around objects in 
my path. But the phenomenal character of our visual experience is not just 
systematically related to our visual sense of our own position with respect to 
the object we might happen to be visually attending to, but also to other parts 
of our environment. It not only visually seems to me as if I am in a position to 
touch the cup I am visually attending to, but it also visually seems to me as if 
I am within reach of the table the cup is resting on, and the wall behind the 
table. We are, a lot of the time, visually aware of more of our surroundings 
than just the object we happen to be attending to, and this contributes to our 
visual experience having the spatial qualities it seems to us it does. When, 
for example, I attend to a friend’s face while remaining aware of the crowd 
surrounding her, my awareness of the crowd provides me with a sense of the 
spatial relations between my friend and the people surrounding her, and 
between all of them and me. If I lose sight of her because people in the 
crowd move between us, I am reassured that she has only disappeared from 
my view and not from existence – my grasp of the necessary conditions for 
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visually perceiving things provides me with the alternative explanation. If this 
is correct, visual attention is not necessary for visual awareness. In the next 
chapter, I defend this seemingly obvious feature of visual experience in the 
face of empirical evidence that, it is claimed, shows it is false. 
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Chapter 4: Awareness Without Attention 
 
In this chapter I critically examine the claim that visual 
attention is necessary for visual awareness. The claim 
is based on the results of experiments in which subjects 
had to concentrate on a task, and while doing so failed 
to notice a task-irrelevant stimulus in full view, a 
stimulus which when they were not engaged in the task, 
they invariably did notice. I describe some of the 
experiments in §2. The common-sense explanation of 
why subjects in these experiments fail to notice the 
task-irrelevant stimulus is that they were concentrating 
on the task. When we are concentrating on a task, and 
this includes visual tasks, we tend to ignore distractions. 
In §3 I outline experimental evidence that supports the 
common-sense explanation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When I look at the silhouette of a tree against the sunset-sky, what is striking 
about the scene is the contrast between the dark shape of the tree, and the 
vivid sky behind it. When I visually attend to the tree, visually picking it out, it 
still seems to me that I remain visually aware of the sky. Or again, when I 
visually attend to my computer screen, it certainly seems to me that I am also 
visually aware of the window behind it, and the clutter of objects around it. In 
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general, it seems to me that my visual sense of my own position within my 
surroundings is provided by my visual awareness of my surroundings, over 
and above my awareness of any object I happen to be visually attending to. 
The clear exception is when I am concentrating on something. If I am ‘lost in 
thought’, or looking intently for something, I may not notice something else in 
full view. But if we leave those situations to one side, it seems to me that 
visual attention to an object is not necessary for visual awareness of it. I 
presume that other people’s visual experience is, in this respect, the same. 
 
This seemingly obvious observation has been challenged by psychologists 
who, on the basis of the performance of subjects engaged in tasks 
manipulating visual attention, have said things like “… there is no conscious 
perception without attention.”224 In this chapter, I will defend the view that visual 
attention to an object is not necessary for visual awareness of it. To defend 
the view that attention is not necessary for awareness, I only need to provide 
one plausible instance, or kind of instance, of awareness without attention. 
What I claim is that we are routinely visually aware of objects we are not 
visually attending to. 
 
In the next section I describe two sets of experiments in which subjects failed 
to report objects in full view while their attention was focused on a task. In 
the following section, I describe some empirical results that support the 
evidence from introspection, that unless we are concentrating on a task of 
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some kind, we are aware of and can report the presence of objects we are 
not visually attending to. 
 
2 Inattentional Blindness 
 
Arien Mack (Mack and Rock (1998)) has claimed that attention is necessary 
for awareness. The claim was made on the basis of research carried out into 
the phenomenon now generally known as inattentional blindness. Mack and 
Rock’s research began partly as an investigation into which features of 
objects are pre-attentively processed, that is, which features of objects, such 
as colour or shape, are processed before attention comes into play. The 
question makes sense in the context of the debate, in the psychology of 
perception, between ‘early’ and ‘late selection’ theories of attention. As the 
psychologist Jon Driver, in his review (Driver (2001)) of selective attention 
research explains, early psychological research into auditory attention 
focussed on what was known as the ‘cocktail party effect’, and in particular 
on two questions. Roughly, the questions ask ‘On what basis can information 
be selected?’, and ‘What, if anything, is retained of information that is not 
selected?’. In the context of the proverbial cocktail party, the first question 
asks how we are able to pick out one conversation at the party from all the 
others going on simultaneously. The second question asks what we can 
recall of the conversations we were not paying attention to. It is differing 
answers to the second question that gave rise to the debate between ‘early’ 
and ‘late selection’ models of attention. Donald Broadbent’s Filter Theory 
(Broadbent (1958)) proposed that, apart from certain basic qualities of 
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sounds on the basis of which the sounds were filtered, unattended 
information was discarded.225 Broadbent’s Filter Theory is an example of an 
‘early selection’ theory of attention. Other theories, motivated by evidence 
that unattended information was processed to a greater degree than 
Broadbent’s theory predicted, argued for ‘late selection’ models of attention. 
Mack and Rock’s research began as an investigation into the role of attention 
in the processing of different aspects of visual stimuli.226 
 
Their experiments, like the Posner paradigm described in Chapter 2, made 
use of covertly deployed attention (i.e. attention directed outside fixation). 
The centre of the computer screen, which the subjects were to fixate for the 
period of each trial of the experiment, was initially marked by a small cross. A 
larger cross was subsequently briefly displayed, with the duration of display 
intended to be too brief to allow saccadic movement, but not too brief for the 
subjects to see it. The distraction task was to report which of the arms of the 
larger cross were longer, the vertical or horizontal one, a task that required 
concentration. The larger cross was positioned either at the centre of the 
display at fixation, or a little outside fixation. After the larger cross had 
disappeared, a patterned mask was briefly displayed to prevent any residual 
information from the previous display affecting the experiment, and then the 
subjects reported which of the arms they thought was longer. In the critical 
trials, a small shape, the critical stimulus, which the subjects were not 
expecting, was displayed near the larger cross for the same duration. The 
                                            
225
 “… the Filter Theory… supposes a filter at the entrance to the nervous system which will 
pass some classes of stimuli but not others.” Broadbent (1958) p. 42. 
226
 Mack and Rock (1998) pp. 2-4. 
186 
 
critical stimulus varied depending on what was being tested for: if the 
experiment was a test for whether colour captured attention in these 
conditions, the critical stimulus was a small brightly coloured square, if the 
experiment was a test for whether shape captured attention, the critical 
stimulus was a small black square or other simple shape, and so on. 
Immediately after the critical trial, subjects were asked whether they had 
seen anything during the trial they had not seen on the preceding trials, and 
if so, what it was. In the control trials, subjects were asked to maintain 
fixation on the small central cross but ignore the larger cross and only report 
what else, if anything, they saw. 
 
Mack and Rock found that when the larger cross was displayed at fixation 
and the critical stimulus was displayed outside fixation, around 25% of 
subjects reported not seeing anything different from the non-critical trials.227 
More surprisingly, when the larger cross was displayed outside fixation and 
the critical stimulus was displayed at fixation, between 60% and 80% of 
subjects did not notice the critical stimulus.228 In other words, when the 
subjects were attending to an area they were not fixating (i.e. staring directly 
at), they were much more likely not to notice something appearing in the 
area they were staring directly at. In the control trials, in contrast, “subjects 
virtually always succeeded in seeing and correctly identifying the critical stimulus and its 
location”.229 
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Mack and Rock started their research with ‘what appeared to be a self-
evident assumption’ that “some percept, if only a minimal one, must exist prior to the 
engagement of attention, because attention requires an object…”.230 On the basis of 
their results, they ‘arrived at what seems to be exactly the opposite 
conclusion’, that “there is no conscious perception at all in the absence of attention and 
therefore no perceptual object can exist preattentively.”231 Their reason for thinking 
their starting assumption is self-evident is that they consider attention to have 
‘an inherently intentional nature’ – that is, when we are attending, we are 
always attending to something. They resolve this ‘apparent contradiction’ by 
distinguishing between conscious and unconscious perception of the object 
of attention. “It is not that no perceptual object can exist preattentively, but only that no 
conscious perceptual object can do so.” 232 
 
This is consistent with the kind of description someone might give of an 
involuntary shift of visual attention, but seems to be quite at odds with the 
kind of description of many cases of voluntary shifts of visual attention. If I 
am attending to one book in a pile of books, perhaps while searching for a 
particular title, it very much seems to me that I know where to direct my 
attention to next because I am visually aware of the other books in the pile. It 
also seems to me that I usually know which object I am attending to, whether 
it is to a particular face in a crowd, or one particular book in a pile of books. If 
I am, as it seems to me, visually attending to just that book, and I am, as it 
seems to me, at the same time visually aware of the other books, then it 
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follows that I am visually aware of the other books without visually attending 
to them. The alleged difficulty with relying exclusively on introspection of our 
visual experience, as J. Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë have suggested,233 is 
that we might be subject to something analogous to the ‘refrigerator light 
illusion’: whenever we open the fridge door to check whether the light is on, it 
always seems to be, but this is because opening the door turns the light on. 
In effect, the claim is that the only way we have of checking whether we are 
aware of something is by attending to it. This seems to just beg the question 
at issue, but to give the evidence from introspection some independent 
support, in the next section I present empirical evidence that weighs in its 
favour. 
 
Before that, I want to describe one more quite influential set of experiments 
into inattentional blindness. This set of experiments were conducted by 
Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris (Simons and Chabris (1999)) and, 
perhaps because they employed a more naturalistic paradigm, can seem 
even more striking. Simons and his colleagues recorded videos of two small 
teams of people passing a basketball between each other. The experimental 
subjects were required to watch the videos, each of a minute and a quarter, 
and asked to keep a mental count of the number of passes one of the teams 
made. In one condition (the hard condition), two separate counts had to be 
kept, one of bounced passes, and the other of aerial passes. A little over half 
the way through the video, one of two unexpected events occurred. In one 
case, a person in a gorilla costume walked through the two teams passing 
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the ball. In the other case, a tall woman holding an open umbrella walked 
through the two teams. Both unexpected events lasted for 5 seconds. After 
seeing the video, the subjects were immediately asked to write down their 
counts, and were then asked the following four additional questions they 
were not expecting: (i) Did you notice anything unusual on the video? (ii) Did 
you notice anything other than the six players? (iii) Did you see anyone else 
besides the six players appear on the video?, (iv) Did you see a 
gorilla/woman carrying an umbrella walk across the screen? If any of the 
subjects answered ‘Yes’ to any of the questions, they were asked to provide 
details, and as soon as a subject mentioned the unexpected event any 
remaining questions were skipped. Overall, only just over half the 
participants noticed the unexpected event, though less noticed the 
unexpected event in the hard condition. Several of the subjects who had not 
noticed the unexpected event, on being told about it refused to believe it had 
happened until the video was replayed for them. In common with some of the 
results of (Mack and Rock 1998), the critical stimulus in these experiments 
(the gorilla or the umbrella-carrying woman), passed through the same area 
as the objects which were the focus of attention. Unlike Mack and Rock’s 
experiments, Simons and Chabris’ experiments involved moving (images of) 
real-world objects. 
 
An aspect of their results that Simons and Chabris highlight is the surprise 
evinced by the participants themselves, when the presence of the unnoticed 
‘gorilla’ was made apparent to them: 
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“… observers in our study were consistently surprised when they viewed the display a 
second time, some even exclaiming, ‘I missed that?!’”234 
 
Simons and Chabris argue that the subjects’ surprise is evidence that 
favours inattentional blindness rather than a rival explanation of inattentional 
amnesia, suggested by Jeremy Wolfe (Wolfe (1999)). Wolfe’s explanation is 
that attention plays a role in visual experience entering memory, and that in 
the experimental conditions used by Mack and Rock, subjects had to report 
whether or not they saw the critical stimulus after the trial, leaving open the 
possibility that they just forgot seeing it.235 In response, Simons and Chabris 
say 
 
“It seems more parsimonious to assume that observers were never aware of the 
unexpected object than to assume that they saw a gorilla, then forgot about it, and then 
were shocked to see it when told to look for it.”236 
 
Declan Smithies (Smithies (2011a)), whose Rational Access view of visual 
attention we came across in the last chapter (§3) has argued for a more 
general hypothesis, according to which attention is “… necessary for information 
to be accessible for use in the control of action, reasoning and verbal report…”237 on 
the grounds that that is all that is required to explain subjects’ failure to report 
the unexpected object. Smithies’ inaccessibility hypothesis is sufficient to 
account for the inattentional evidence without committing itself to any more 
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specific claims (such as blindness or amnesia) regarding why subjects fail to 
report the unexpected object; it is also consistent with subjects’ awareness of 
the unexpected object.238 
 
John Campbell (Campbell (2011)) whose Relational View we came across in 
the last chapter (§4) puts forward a similar hypothesis to Smithies’ as part of 
his distinction between selection and access. According to Campbell, we are 
conscious of selected objects though we may not access (e.g. be able to 
report) all the objects we are conscious of. Subjects in Simons and Chabris’ 
experiments could, therefore, have been visually aware of the gorilla, but 
simply failed to access that information. 
 
I regard it as plainly evident that when we are not concentrating on 
something, in thought or in perception, we can be visually aware of more 
than just the object we happen to be visually attending to. I can visually pick 
out a book from the shelf full of books opposite me while remaining visually 
aware of the other books. My visual awareness of the other books may not 
be as distinct as my awareness of the book I am attending to, but I am, 
nevertheless, aware of them. We don’t need to appeal to blindness, amnesia 
or inaccessibility to explain exceptions to this default condition. When we are 
engaged in a taxing task, such as trying to perform a difficult mental 
calculation, or searching for an empty seat in a crowded cinema, we need to 
concentrate on the task, and avoid distractions. It can be surprising that 
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when we are engaged in a visual search, like finding a seat in a crowded 
cinema, we can miss something we would normally be visually aware of, 
such as a friend waving at us.239 That surprise ought to be attenuated by the 
realisation that, in terms of the task we set ourselves, the thing we missed – 
the friend waving at us – was just another distraction. There is no mystery 
here – we ignored them, albeit without first noticing them. Any residual 
surprise is explained by taking the evidence from introspection at face value 
– we are frequently visually aware of more than we are visually attending to. 
On the infrequent occasions when we notice that, as a result of concentrating 
on what we are looking at, we have missed something in full view we 
otherwise would not have, we tend to be surprised. 
 
In the next section, I outline some empirical findings based on the same 
experimental paradigm as used by Mack and Rock. The findings support the 
evidence from introspection – concentrating on a task limits awareness of 
task-irrelevant stimuli. 
 
3. Perceptual Load Theory 
 
Nilli Lavie has put forward and provided experimental evidence for a 
hypothesis that supports my claim that visual attention is not necessary for 
awareness. According to the Perceptual Load hypothesis, 
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“… focusing attention on a current task can prevent the perception of task-irrelevant 
stimuli (i.e., early selection) when the task-relevant processing involves a high level of 
perceptual load which consumes all available capacity. By contrast, when the processing 
of task-relevant stimuli involves only low perceptual load, any spare capacity spills over 
involuntarily to the perception of irrelevant stimuli (i.e., late selection).”240 
 
Examples of conditions with a high perceptual load are a search task 
involving several items, or a subtle length-discrimination task; examples of 
conditions with a low perceptual load are a search task involving few items, 
or a simple colour discrimination task. In Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007), 
the authors use the same experimental paradigm as Mack and Rock, to 
ensure their results provide evidence of what subjects are visually aware of. 
A task-irrelevant distractor might influence the time it takes for a subject to 
complete an experimental task (e.g. report the identity of the target stimulus), 
but that fact alone is not sufficient to show the subject is visually aware of the 
distractor. If, however, the subject verbally reports the presence of the 
distractor, that is pretty firm evidence they are visually aware of it. 
 
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie note that the results of Simons and Chabris 
(1999) also suggest that a harder task is more likely to result in subjects 
failing to become aware of a task-irrelevant stimulus (the gorilla or the tall 
woman), but question whether the nature of the hard condition (keeping 
separate counts of bounced and aerial passes) required subjects to make 
more eye movements to keep track of the different trajectories of the ball, 
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and therefore made it harder for the subjects to notice the task-irrelevant 
stimulus. By using the same experimental paradigm as that used by Mack 
and Rock, Cartwright-Finch and Lavie did not have to worry about eye 
movements or saccades (the distraction task is presented too briefly for 
saccadic eye movement). 
 
Overall, the results for the four experiments, involving judging line-length 
(high load) or colour (low load), and visual search involving similar distractors 
(high load) or dissimilar distractors (low load) showed a clear difference 
between the conditions. The first experiment produced the lowest results for 
visual awareness of the critical stimulus in both high and low load conditions, 
10% and around 55% respectively, but the other three experiments had 
results between 40 and 50% (high load), and 80 to 90% (low load). 
 
What is of interest in terms of supporting the evidence from introspection is 
the very marked difference between the results for the different load 
conditions. In low perceptual load conditions there were a considerably 
higher proportion of subjects who noticed the task-irrelevant stimulus, 
suggesting that in such conditions we are much more likely (roughly twice as 
likely based on the last three experiments) to become aware of something 
we are not attending to, despite being engaged in a visual task. If we are 
frequently able to notice objects other than those we are attending to, that 
explains why we might be surprised when, on the less frequent occasions 
when we are engaged in a visual task demanding concentration, we are not 
able to notice unattended objects. 
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The results reported by Cartwright-Finch and Lavie are, it must be said, 
consistent with another construal than the one I have been urging.241 It is 
possible to think of attention as being paid to different degrees across the 
visual field. On this construal, subjects were paying most attention to the task 
they were instructed to complete (e.g. judging line length), but were still 
paying some attention to the unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus, on the 
occasions when they noticed it. Therefore attention is, according to this 
construal, still necessary for awareness. I have a couple of things to say in 
response. Firstly, even on this construal, there will be a significant difference 
between the amount of attention paid to the experimental task, and the 
attention paid to the task-irrelevant stimulus. Secondly, the relevance of the 
perceptual load experiments for the kind of pre-theoretical conception of 
visual attention I described at the beginning of this thesis, it seems to me, is 
that the perceptual load conditions resemble the kind of situations we come 
across in day-to-day life. Looking for a seat in a crowded cinema resembles 
one of the high perceptual load conditions, and visually attending to a book 
in a small pile of books resembles one of the low perceptual load conditions. 
If the comparison is acceptable, the characterisation I gave, of visually 
attending to one book in a small pile of books, while remaining aware of the 
other books in the pile, should also apply to the low perceptual load 
condition. My strategy here is the same as it was in relation to the question of 
whether the Posner task measures the effects of visual attention. What 
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legitimises an experimental task as a measure of the effects of attention is its 
similarity to a pre-theoretically recognisable exercise of attention. In the case 
of the Posner task, the comparison was with directing someone’s attention 
by pointing. In the case of the perceptual load conditions, the comparison is 
with situations like looking for a seat in a cinema, or attending to one among 
a group of objects. Given the comparison, and the characterisation I gave of 
looking for a seat in a cinema and attending to one among a pile of books, 
the data from the perceptual load experiments supports the view I have been 
defending, that visual attention to an object is not necessary for visual 
awareness of it. I have already made a case for my characterisation of 
visually attending to one among a pile of books. It seems to me that, in 
general, I know what I am visually attending to. It also seems to me that I can 
attend to one among a small pile of books, while remaining visually aware of 
the rest of the pile. I have just argued that the same kind of characterisation 
should be given of the low perceptual load conditions. 
 
I’m going to end this chapter by first looking briefly at an explanation of the 
surprise of subjects in inattentional blindness experiments offered by Daniel 
Dennett, and second by looking – even more briefly – at the phenomenon of 
multifocal attention. 
 
Daniel Dennett has suggested an alternative explanation to the one I have 
given of the surprise that we are liable to feel on realising that we have failed 
to notice something in full view. Dennett has suggested that we think of our 
visual experiences as being uniformly detailed throughout, from centre to 
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periphery. Though many of the experiments I have described in this thesis 
make use of covertly deployed attention, in general we fixate – look directly 
at – what we are visually attending to. We do that precisely because it 
provides us with a much more detailed view. If Dennett is right that we think 
of our visual experiences as uniformly detailed throughout, that could provide 
a different explanation of the surprise expressed by subjects in inattentional 
blindness experiments, and people in analogous situations in day-to-day life. 
In this Dennett-inspired alternative, the surprise would be explained by our 
expectation that our visual experience is uniformly detailed throughout, rather 
than, as I have suggested, that we don’t usually expect awareness to be 
limited by concentration. This is what Dennett says: 
 
“Suppose you walk into a room and notice the wallpaper is a regular array of hundreds of 
identical sailboats, or – let’s pay homage to Andy Warhol – identical photographic portraits 
of Marilyn Monroe. In order to identify a picture as a portrait of Marilyn Monroe, you have 
to foveate the picture: the image has to fall on the high-resolution foveae of your eyes. As 
we saw… your parafoveal vision (served by the rest of the retina) does not have very 
good resolution; you can’t even identify a jack of diamonds held at arm’s length. Yet we 
know that if you were to enter a room whose walls were papered with identical photos of 
Marilyn Monroe, you would ‘instantly’ see that this was the case. You would see in a 
fraction of a second that there were ‘lots and lots of identical, detailed, focused portraits of 
Marilyn Monroe’. Since your eyes saccade four or five times a second at most, you could 
foveate only one or two Marilyns in the time it takes you to jump to the conclusion and 
thereupon to see hundreds of identical Marilyns. We know that parafoveal vision could not 
distinguish Marilyn from various Marilyn-shaped blobs, but nevertheless, what you see is 
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not wallpaper of Marilyn-in-the-middle surrounded by various indistinct Marilyn-shaped 
blobs… It seems to you as if you are actually seeing hundreds of identical Marilyns.”242 
 
I am myopic, so perhaps I am more aware than people lucky enough to have 
unimpaired vision of the limitations to what I can see. Even while wearing my 
corrective spectacles, however, I am quite aware that I do not visually 
experience the world in the uniformly focused and detailed way that Dennett 
claims I do. We are certainly able to pick up the ‘gist’ of a scene very quickly. 
Mack and Rock noticed this phenomenon in the course of their inattentional 
blindness experiments.243 But it doesn’t follow from the fact that I can get an 
overall sense of the scene before me very rapidly, that I visually experience it 
in detail, or even (as Dennett claims) that I think I visually experience it in 
detail. Getting an overall sense of something is quite consistent with a lack of 
detail. I have said visual attention to an object is not necessary for visual 
awareness of it, but that claim is quite consistent with the claim that we 
experience peripheral, unattended objects in a much less detailed way than 
the way we experience foveated attended objects. As Alva Noë has pointed 
out (Noë (2002) p. 4), the fact that we think of our visual experience as 
providing us with access to detailed visual information does not mean we 
think of ourselves as actually experiencing the world in uniform detail from 
the centre to the periphery of our visual field. I have endeavoured to provide 
a more plausible explanation of the surprise we may feel when we realise we 
have failed to notice something in full view. 
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Finally, I want – very briefly – to consider the phenomenon of multifocal 
attention. Patrick Cavanagh (e.g. Cavanagh and Alvarez (2005)) has 
investigated divided visual attention, building on work by Zenon Pylyshyn. A 
typical task involves subjects simultaneously tracking the location of multiple 
moving objects (multiple object tracking, or MOT). The kind of single focus 
visual attention I have confined discussion in this thesis to cannot explain 
subjects’ abilities to keep track of multiple randomly moving objects, but MOT 
does not constitute a problem for my defence of visual attention as sufficient 
but not necessary for awareness. I have said that, in general, we know what 
we visually attend to, and that in at least some cases, we know we are 
visually attending to one object while remaining visually aware of surrounding 
objects. This characterisation of visual experience seems to me to accurately 
reflect the phenomenology of visual experience, and broadly similar 
characterisations are offered by Campbell and Smithies (§2 above). For all I 
have said, visual attention may, on occasion, have multiple simultaneous 
foci, or attention may be switched from one location to another 
discontinuously. The thesis I have been defending is that visual attention to 
an object is sufficient but not necessary for visual awareness of it, and as far 
as I can see that is quite compatible with MOT and the possibility ofdivided 
attention. 
 
In this chapter I have argued against an interpretation of experimental 
evidence purporting to show that a phenomenological description of the 
relation between visual attention and visual awareness is wrong. The 
interpretation I have argued against claims that visual attention to an object 
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is necessary for visual awareness of it. As evidence against this claim, I have 
pointed to the phenomenology of visual experience. I have assumed that we 
do know what we are attending to, and that we can (and frequently do) 
visually attend to single objects, like a book on a shelf of books, or a pen on 
a table. This assumption follows naturally from the account of visual attention 
I gave in the last chapter, according to which visual attention to an object 
enables us to demonstratively refer to it, and prioritises it for visually based 
intentional actions. I visually attend to the book before drawing my 
companion’s attention to it using a visual demonstrative; I visually attend to 
the book before removing it from the shelf. Given that I know that I am 
visually attending to one book on the shelf, and that I am simultaneously 
aware and can report the presence of other books on the shelf, it follows that 
I am visually aware of objects I am not visually attending to. 
 
It is certainly the case, however, that there are occasions when we do not 
notice things in plain view. The natural explanation is that on those 
occasions, we are engaged in a task demanding concentration. I have 
pointed out that in order to concentrate on a task, we need to ignore 
distractions. In the experiments I have described (Mack and Rock (1998), 
Simons and Chabris (1999)), subjects had to concentrate on visual tasks, so 
would have needed to ignore task-irrelevant distractions like the gorilla. 
Findings from experiments using Mack and Rock’s inattentional blindness 
paradigm carried out by Ula Cartwright-Finch and Nilli Lavie (Cartwright-
Finch and Lavie (2007)) provide independent support for this explanation. 
Whether subjects were able to report task-irrelevant stimuli depended on the 
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degree to which they had to concentrate on their tasks: awareness depended 
on perceptual load. 
 
To explain the surprise that subjects in these experiments and in analogous 
situations in everyday life have expressed, I have argued that if we are 
frequently visually aware of objects we are not visually attending to, we may 
be surprised by the occasions on which this is not the case. According to 
Dennett, we think of visual experience as uniformly detailed from the centre 
of the visual field to its periphery. If he is right, the surprise can be explained 
by our expectation that we are aware, in a uniformly detailed way, of all 
objects in full view. I think a moment’s careful reflection on our own 
experience shows us that is not the case: we visually experience the world in 
less detail towards the periphery of our visual field. But we don’t need to 
explain our surprise at not noticing things in full view by thinking of ourselves 
as all-seeing observers. We have a perfectly adequate explanation to hand. 
When we are concentrating on one thing, we are liable to miss other things. 
We so infrequently realise that, as a result of our concentration, we have not 
noticed something in full view that we otherwise would have, that the 
realisation is liable to surprise us. 
 
  
202 
 
Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I revisit the key points of the previous 
chapters to give an overview of the arguments in this 
thesis. 
 
In this concluding chapter I will revisit the key points of the preceding 
chapters in order. In the first chapter I began by setting out what I take to be 
a recognisable pre-theoretical way we think about attention and awareness 
in visual experience. Those of us with normally functioning vision are able to 
think about and act with respect to our immediate physical environment on 
the basis of seeing it. We are also able to think about and act with respect to 
particular objects in our immediate environment on the basis of visually 
picking them out: someone may draw my attention to the book I am looking 
for, allowing me to visually pick it out from the pile of books surrounding it. 
Conversely, our visually picking out or attending to a particular object 
becomes intelligible when it is for the purpose of thought or action. Visually 
attending to one object needn’t, however, mean losing sight of surrounding 
objects. I can attend to a particular book among a pile of books for the 
purpose of thinking about it, or acting with respect to it, while remaining 
aware of the other books surrounding it. When you draw my attention to a 
book in front of me, or when my attention is caught by an unexpected face at 
the window and I am sufficiently startled to altogether cease paying attention 
to what is on the television, not only am I aware of what my attention is 
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drawn to, caught by, or paid to, but I know that I am attending to it. Visual 
attention is, in short, sufficient but not necessary for visual awareness. 
 
In Chapter Two, using examples, I introduce the idea of visually based 
object-directed actions and thoughts. When I see a particular object, such as 
a coin, and as a result of seeing it I reach out and grab it, my action is 
visually based and object-directed. If, instead, I had closed my eyes and 
spun around on the spot till I had become disorientated and then reached out 
and grabbed the first object that came to hand, my action of grabbing that 
object would have been neither visually based, nor directed towards that 
particular object, since which object I ended up grabbing would have been a 
matter of chance. Similarly, if by chance the word ‘racoon’ enters my 
thoughts, the presence of a racoon in my vicinity does not make my thoughts 
either visually based, or about that racoon. If, instead, on the basis of seeing 
the racoon, I think ‘Racoon!’ then my thought is both visually based and 
object-directed. These examples suggest that visually based object-directed 
thoughts and actions require the thinker or agent to be visually aware of the 
relevant object because it is by being aware of the object that the visually 
based thoughts and actions are about the object. Thinking about, or acting 
with respect to a particular object also requires that object to be visually 
picked out, and this is what happens when my attention is drawn to an 
object, and when I pay attention to an object; I visually pick the object out. 
Moreover, what we usually mean when we talk of drawing someone’s 
attention to something, or of them paying attention to that thing, is that they 
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are aware of it. So it seems that visually based object-directed thoughts and 
actions require visual attention conceived of as conscious. 
 
However, as I go on to describe, evidence from subjects with blindsight 
shows that visually based object-directed thoughts and actions are possible 
in the absence of any visual awareness of the relevant objects. When 
blindseers are required to make ‘guesses’ about the objects and properties 
presented to their blind field, usually from a limited range of options, their 
responses indicate they can visually detect and identify the objects and some 
of their properties. So the thoughts expressed by their ‘guesses’, and their 
actions (such as pointing in the direction of the object), seem to be visually 
based and object-directed. This prompts the question: Is visual attention to 
an object possible in the absence of any awareness of it? 
 
Robert Kentridge and colleagues have interpreted the evidence from 
blindsight as showing that visual attention to an object is possible in the 
absence of any awareness of it. This certainly isn’t how we generally think of 
visual attention – in general, we think of visual attention as sufficient for 
awareness. It is plausible that we think of visual attention as a way of being 
aware: William James spoke of attention as being a ‘concentration of 
consciousness’. I consider the possibility that thinking of attention in this way 
could simply be the result of our ignorance of the possibility of attention 
without awareness. 
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Christopher Mole attempts to defend the sufficiency of attention for 
awareness by arguing that blindseers attend to and are also aware of the 
regions of space occupied by the objects they detect. I show that Mole’s 
defence of sufficiency depends on understanding attention and awareness 
non-visually, and that what he takes the blindseer to be attending to is ‘part 
of the space in which the blindseer experiences himself as oriented’. 
Kentridge and colleagues are making a claim exclusively about visual 
attention, and visual awareness, which leads me to conclude that the two 
parties, Mole on one hand, and Kentridge and colleagues on the other, are 
talking at cross-purposes. 
 
The dialectic at this point is in danger of fossilising into a polarised 
disagreement between those who think there is clear experimental proof of 
visual attention without visual awareness and those who insist, dogmatically, 
that attention is sufficient for awareness. To continue with a defence of the 
sufficiency of attention, an obvious option at this point would be to deny that 
attention is possible in the absence of awareness on the grounds that what 
we mean by attention implies awareness of what is attended to. This would 
be a mistake for two reasons. One I have already mentioned – on the basis 
of the evidence from blindsight, there are grounds for investigating our initial 
conception of attention. Secondly, the blindseer GY, who was the subject of 
the experiments carried out by Kentridge and colleagues described in 
Kentridge et al. (1999), and in Chapter Two of this thesis, described what he 
was doing during one set of experiments as ‘trying to pay attention higher up 
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in his blind field’. Some account of what GY was trying to do, if not visually 
attend to the target stimulus, seems to be in order. 
 
I focus on the experimental task, the Posner spatial cueing task, used by 
Kentridge and his colleagues to demonstrate that the blindseer GY was 
visually attending to the target stimulus without being visually aware of it. I 
argue that the only grounds for thinking that the Posner task measured the 
effects of visual attention is that the task resembles drawing someone’s 
attention to an object by pointing at it. Drawing someone’s attention to an 
object by pointing at it is an activity we reserve for people who are capable of 
being visually aware of the object we are drawing their attention to. So it is at 
least questionable whether when a blindseer undertakes the Posner task, 
what is being measured is the effects of visual attention. That is to say, we 
should not accept without further investigation the assumption that the 
Posner task measures the effects of visual attention whether or not the 
subject undertaking the task is visually aware of the target stimulus. 
 
This changes the dialectic somewhat. Now, instead of being faced with the 
two poles of the debate, for and against sufficiency, we are instead faced 
with a challenge. The challenge is to identify how visual attention, conceived 
as sufficient for awareness, explains our visually based object-directed 
thoughts and actions in a way that the selective enhancement the blindseer 
is capable of does not. This, I say, is a distinctively philosophical challenge. 
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I endeavour to explain GY’s description of himself as ‘trying to attend to a 
portion of his blind field’ by returning to Mole’s attempt to defend sufficiency. I 
suggest that GY was attending in thought to a portion of his blind field. If we 
understand GY, and blindseers more generally, to altogether lack visual 
sensations in their blind field, we need to think of their intact visual field as 
reduced in size, rather than as occluded in some way. I end Chapter Two by 
arguing that, if that is how we understand the blind field of blindseers, it 
doesn’t make sense to think of them as able to select parts of their blind field 
to visually attend to: we can’t select something we have no awareness of. 
 
In Chapter Three, I begin by reiterating one of the key conclusions of the 
previous chapter. The sufficiency of visual attention for visual awareness 
cannot be defended by appealing to the necessity of visual attention for 
having visually based object-directed thoughts and performing visually based 
object-directed actions, since blindseers are capable of both. We need to 
identify another explanatory role for visual attention, a way in which visual 
attention explains our visually based object-directed thoughts and actions, an 
explanatory role that the selective enhancement blindseers are capable of 
does not make available to them. 
 
The first proposal I consider is that visual attention makes visual information 
spontaneously accessible for the purpose of visually based object-directed 
thoughts and actions. The cases of Helen the monkey, and TN the bilaterally 
blindsighted human show that visual attention is not necessary for visual 
information to be spontaneously accessible for the purpose of visually based 
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object-directed actions: both Helen and TN were capable of using visual 
information, spontaneously (i.e. without prompting), for the purpose of 
visually based object-directed action. I then look at an influential explanation 
of this apparent divergence between visually based thoughts and actions, 
David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s two visual systems hypothesis. I 
describe some of the evidence for their hypothesis, and accept that the 
evidence is decisively in favour of visual awareness dissociating from visually 
based actions in both directions: visually based object-directed actions can 
be performed in the absence of visual awareness of the relevant objects, and 
visual awareness of objects is possible without a commensurate capacity to 
act on those objects. Milner and Goodale conclude that attention also comes 
in two varieties, one conscious and one unconscious. I reject their 
conclusion, but concede that the explanatory role of visual attention is not to 
make visual information spontaneously accessible for the purpose of visually 
based object-directed thoughts and actions. 
 
The second proposal for the explanatory role of visual attention I consider in 
Chapter Three is Declan Smithies’ Rational Access View. Smithies argues 
that attention makes visual information fully accessible for the rational control 
of thought and action. However, the kind of reasons visual attention provides, 
according to Smithies, are justifying reasons, which must be accessible on 
the basis of introspection alone. I argue that reasons accessible on the basis 
of introspection alone might fail to justify our thoughts and actions. For 
example, if my cognitive abilities are compromised, I might think I am acting 
on the basis of a visual experience, when in fact I am not, I am acting on the 
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basis of a guess. I do, however, agree with Smithies that there is something 
very plausible about the thought that visual experience provides us with 
reasons. 
 
The third proposal I consider in Chapter Three is John Campbell’s view, 
according to which visual attention to objects grounds our ability to refer to 
them demonstratively, and justifies us in thinking of them as mind-
independent (i.e. as existing unperceived, as possessing the physical 
properties that determine their behaviour, and as public objects). To be 
entitled to think of visual attention as grounding demonstrative reference to 
objects, and justifying our thinking of them as mind-independent, we need to 
think of visual experience Relationally. That is, we need to think of the 
objects we visually experience as constituents of our experience. This carries 
with it the commitment that we cannot, in principle, know the phenomenal 
character of our hallucinatory experiences, and I confess myself unable to 
accept this commitment. In the hypothetical case I describe, where without 
my knowledge my iniquitous neighbour implants a virtual reality device in me, 
it seems to me self-evident that I know the phenomenal character of my 
resulting hallucinatory visual experiences. Moreover, I outline an alternative 
explanation of why blindseers cannot use visual demonstratives in the way 
we do, and an alternative account of our inclination to think of objects as 
existing unperceived. I end the chapter by proposing an explanatory role for 
visual attention according to which it provides us with reasons for thinking 
and acting, accessible on the basis of introspection, that integrate our 
thoughts with our actions. I believe attention is related to intentional action, 
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and as part of my characterisation of visual attention I describe visual 
attention to an object as putting us in a position to intentionally respond to it, 
where that response takes precedence over other intentional visually based 
responses we might be in a position to make. 
 
In Chapter Four, I defend a phenomenologically motivated conception of 
visual attention according to which it is not necessary for visual awareness. I 
can be visually aware of objects in the immediate vicinity of the object I am 
visually attending to. Psychologists including Arien Mack and Daniel Simons 
have claimed that we are only visually aware of what we are visually 
attending to. The results of experiments on so-called inattentional blindness 
have been interpreted to show that the unexpected stimulus many subjects 
failed to report when they were engaged in a task demanding their 
concentration was not reported because the subjects were not attending to it. 
I suggest that a better explanation of the experimental results is that we are 
liable not to notice things in full view, objects which in other circumstances 
we would notice, when we are concentrating on a task. Unless the object is 
relevant to the task we are engaged in, it makes perfect sense that we ignore 
it. We can find it surprising when we realise that we have failed to notice 
something in full view in circumstances like this, I go on to say, because the 
occasions when we do realise this are relatively rare. For my primary 
evidence against the claim that visual attention is necessary for visual 
awareness, I point to the phenomenology of visual experience. I assume that 
we do know what we are attending to, and that we can (and frequently do) 
visually attend to single objects, like a book on a shelf of books, or a pen on 
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a table. This assumption follows naturally from the account of visual attention 
I give in Chapter Three, according to which visual attention to an object 
enables us to demonstratively refer to it, and prioritises it for visually based 
intentional actions. I visually attend to the book before drawing my 
companion’s attention to it using a visual demonstrative; I visually attend to 
the book before removing it from the shelf. Given that I know that I am 
visually attending to one book on the shelf, and that I am simultaneously 
aware and can report the presence of other books on the shelf, it follows that 
I am visually aware of objects I am not visually attending to. To support this 
phenomenological evidence, I briefly describe the results of experiments by 
Ula Cartwright-Finch and Nilli Lavie, which show a marked difference in the 
ability of subjects to notice task-irrelevant stimuli depending on how 
demanding the task they were engaged in was. In less demanding conditions 
(‘low perceptual load conditions’), there were a considerably higher 
proportion of subjects who noticed the task-irrelevant stimulus, suggesting 
that in such conditions we are much more likely (roughly twice as likely) to 
become aware of something we are not attending to, despite being engaged 
in a visual task. 
 
It is possible to read into this thesis a battle between the two disciplinary 
approaches of philosophy and experimental psychology. Staging such an 
encounter has not been my intention. As I understand the two disciplines, 
they both have different starting points; philosophy starts with experience, 
psychology with behaviour. Experience and behaviour are intimately 
connected; either on its own is only part of the story. What I have argued 
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against in this thesis is misunderstandings, primarily the misunderstanding of 
the role visual attention plays in our conscious lives. Once we understand 
that visual attention, conceived of in the recognisable pre-theoretical and 
phenomenological ways described, integrates our visually based reasons for 
thinking about and acting with respect to objects in our environment, and 
prioritises our intentional visually based responses to them, we can place the 
important discoveries of experimental psychology in their proper context. 
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